

ABOUT ECONOMIC BASICS AND SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF EXTREMISM AND TERRORISM

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Abstract: This article considers economic basics and possible social consequences of extremism and terrorist attacks. Taking into account the terrorist attacks that have taken place in Kazakhstan over the recent years, the channels of financing extremism movements that exist in the world are analyzed. Opinions of famous foreign specialists about the cost of criminality for the state and society are studied. The parties of conflicts are defined, and the scheme to estimate social consequences of terrorist attacks is given. It is offered to take into account the cost of extremism and terrorism when developing the state policy in the area of criminality prevention.

Keywords: Terrorist attack in Aktobe, financing terrorism, economic basics of extremism and terrorism, social consequences (cost) of extremism and terrorism.

INTRODUCTION

June 5, 2016 will forevermore enter the history of Kazakhstan as the day of the terrorist attack that is unprecedented according to its scale. In the city of Aktobe several dozen extremists attacked two gun shops and the military unit of the National Guard to capture weapon and further de-stabilize the situation in the regional center. As a result of the terrorist attack, several military men and civilians died, dozens of people were wounded. The law enforcement bodies and special services liquidated above ten attackers, some of them were wounded, and the rest are wanted. A number of people are checked in terms of their possible involvement in the attack (Aktobe is Declared to Have a “Red” Level of Terrorist Danger).

Analyzing the conditions that contributed to a series of such resonant crimes, it is necessary to note that they became a finishing point of a serious preparation work that had involved a lot of people. The initial point of this activity, as a rule, is the establishment of financing channels and economic basis of future terrorist attacks.

Studying the foreign experience shows that in this area there are a lot of problematic issues that are not always dealt with by the Kazakh safety bodies in their work. Thus, after the known terrorist attacks that took place on September 11, 2001 in the USA (United States of America), special services revealed a branched network of channels financing terrorists. As a result, the accounts of Al-Barakaat, a large Somali financial establishment that had a chain of outlets in the North America used by Somali people to send money to their families like American Express, were

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blocked. Al-Barakaat was a part of the “Hawala” system, and “Al-Kaida” money was transferred using it (Robinson, n. d.).

According to the experts’ estimates, to make this terrorist attack, criminals had to spend about USD 200,000 – 300,000. Although some of 19 hijackers used ATMs, nevertheless, the “Hawala” remains the main source of financing strategic plans of “Al-Kaida” in the North America (The Tube Must Be Reconstructed). Anti-Israel “ Hamas” and “Hezbollah” groups also use the same methods and the same systems for transferring money (Greenberg, et. al. 2002). Two members of the Islamic Movement of the Eastern Turkestan (IMET) were arrested in July 2010 in Dubai. They were suspected in preparing a terrorist attack against the Chinese trading center. They acknowledged that they had been trained in “Al-Kaida” camps in the Pakistani Waziristan, and had obtained the funds for organizing the terrorist attack in the amount of \$10,000 via the “Hawala” network from Turkey (Pantucci 2010).

There are several reasons that stipulated the development and such high popularity of “Hawala”. Above all, this is a growth of labor migration in the whole world. According to the official data, in 2006 above 200 mln. persons, or 3% of the global population lived beyond their historical Motherland. It is natural that the acute need in efficient and cheap system of transferring funds to the Motherland emerged. Besides, the “Hawala” commission charges are somehow lower (by 1-2%) than transferring funds via Western Union or within any other similar legal banking system. The transfer of large amounts is even cheaper – tenth of percent. Due to this, for example, in India the turnover of “Hawala” is up to 40% of the gross national product (in 2005 it was \$3.6 tln.) (Hohlov, n. d.). It is impossible to accurately estimate its sizes globally, but it may go about trillions of the US dollars per year (Faith 2011).

As for Kazakhstan, ways to finance extremism and terrorism are searched traditionally, and “Hawala” has not yet attracted due attention of police and special services. Now it is possible to see a dangerous tendency of the criminal world and terrorist underground merger. It is possible to hear that entrepreneurs have to pay money to the people who attend them as believers. Often members of underground groups are engaged in the criminality themselves like the group of Rusembay Ishimbetov in Almaty. In spring 2011 it killed and robbed the healer, and then shot the entrepreneurs who refused to agree with the real racket (Ivanov 2011).

It is also confirmed by the events that took place in summer 2011 in the Temir Area of the Aktyubnskiy Region of Kazakhstan. At that time a group of armed extremists attacked police officers. Several persons were killed and wounded, and all terrorists were terminated. According to the official version, criminals were moved by not so much religious motives as the wish to earn money – they stole oil from the pipeline located there and the conflict between them and policemen was based on it (Gubaydullin 2011).

Hence, it is possible to conclude that studying the economic basis of extremist and terrorist groups existence can give important information about methods of their activity and help security forces to timely reveal and neutralize them.

METHODOLOGY

The mythological basis of the article included the knowledge of social and legal phenomena, as well as system and structural, comparing and legal, logical and theoretic, and peculiarly scientific methods of study. Besides, the research used such sociological techniques as polling employees of law enforcement bodies and studying specific criminal cases. In order to achieve objectivity of the research results, these methods were used comprehensively.

RESULTS

When researching the essence of extremism and terrorism, one more important problem emerges. It is related to estimating their social consequences. In other words, what is the cost of terrorist attacks for the state and society?

Unfortunately, this extremely important theme as well as the cost of criminality in general have not been studied in Kazakhstan yet. Along with this, methodology of such study abroad has been known since 1960s. In due time, such famous researchers as T.C. Schelling (1967), G.S. Becker (1968), and J.M. Buchanan (1980) considered the problem related to the cost of criminality as a whole and its specific displays in details.

Their approach was peculiar by the fact that they had researched criminality not only in terms of criminology but also economy. A famous Russian criminologist V.V. Luneev used an analogous way. He made the following example. The driver had violated the traffic code, and had stroked a woman who then died because of the caused damage. Incautious cause of this woman's death is a direct and qualified cause of the crime provided by the relevant article of the Criminal Code. However, this woman was a mother of three children she brought up alone. They had become orphans and all social consequences caused by this emerged. Indirect consequences of such sort are not even specified as aggravations but they are the ones in terms of criminology (Luneev 2009).

Based on the above approach, it is possible to try to analogously estimate social consequences of terrorist attacks as applied to conditions of Kazakhstan. Due to the novelty of these issues, many of them will be considered when setting the problem.

It is obvious that terrorist attacks result in victims. First of all, these are attacks victims and their relatives whose fate most often changes dramatically for worse, especially if this is the death of the man who fulfilled the main functions on keeping his family. In this case, the cost of the terrorist attack will be based on

the total volume of income the family could get in the future if the killed man had been alive.

One more suffering party is the state that bears additional expenses on paying compensations to families of terrorist attacks victims, providing them with the residence, and creating other social conditions. Besides, every hour and day of counter-terrorist operations require funds to pay military men and police officers for the work under special conditions, increased expenses for the transport tear and wear, oil and other resources. The final amount increases many times if the above facts are supplemented by expenses for numerous criminal cases, and problems related to keeping extremists and terrorists in prisons.

This is only the visible part of the iceberg, i.e. direct damage from the terrorist attack measures in specific monetary amounts. In addition, there is indirect damage expressed in worsening the life of close relatives of terrorist attacks victims, their psychological and other associated diseases, and a number of other negative factors.

The indirect cost of the terrorist attack for the state is expressed in decreasing investment and touristic attractiveness, increasing expenses for defense, safety, law enforcement area, and other associated areas.

It is obvious that volumes of all above expenses are so considerable that it is impossible to ignore them. However, in spite of it, methodologies of estimating social consequences of extremism and terrorism in Kazakhstan have not been yet developed.

The research will be incomplete without considering one more party indirectly involved in terrorist attacks. These are fates of terrorists' family members. In addition to direct damage, they suffer from the death or imprisonment of the terrorist attack member, and the indirect damage in the form of remote social consequences can be much more considerable.

Their spouses and children often happen to be "infected" by destructive ideas and devote all their further life to fighting against the state and society. As a rule, these are wives and sisters of jihadists. In February 2016 the court of the Mangistauskiy Region of Kazakhstan sentenced a woman to four years of imprisonment for online distribution of extremist video encouraging to join ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and Greater Syria). She sent these materials to other women and supported terrorist attacks and murders, and encouraged to kill "non-Moslems", although she brought up two small children. Often after becoming members of extremist organizations, women teach it their children (Female Theologists Will Fight against Radicalization in Kazakhstan).

That is why the state and the society have to pay their attention to them. What will these children become? Have they already been infected with a dangerous extremism virus? How much will their socialization cost? If it is not done, a

lot of big and small time bombs may appear, and in the future they will cause another wave of violence the state will be forced to react and spend large resources for.

This will be the “remote” time cost the state and the society will also have to pay if no prevention measures are taken in time.

That is why the estimation of social consequences of extremism and terrorism cost can become the methodological basis for such activity. It will allow to more vividly imagine the degree of damage made by them taking into account so called non-material losses that in fact have their own cost both for a separately taken individual or a group of individuals, and for the state and the society, as a whole. Based on this, it is the most rational way to form the state criminal policy, including the modernizing of the law enforcement system, legislative provision of this process and many other areas. Besides, the awareness about the real volumes of losses from extremism and terrorism will allow to more prudently plan revenues and expenses of the budget taking into account the developed measures.

DISCUSSION

Famous Russian lawyers M.M. Babayev and V.E. Kvashis correctly note that when realizing the cost of criminality, the state acquires an economically expressed motivation of its prevention which is the strongest motivation. The data about the criminality cost may contribute to establishing an accurate criminal policy and revealing “how much funds and efforts it is possible to afford for efficient prevention of crimes to finally decrease the scale of the current and future criminality, to reduce the volume of its socially dangerous consequences, and, what is the main thing, to rescue people’s life, health, property, and comfort” (Babaev and Kvashis, 2009).

Thus, the state policy related to counteracting extremism and terrorism must be based on the methodology of estimating their social consequences.

CONCLUSION

Documents of the UNO (United Nations Organization) say that the main sources of financing terrorism include the organized criminality, drug industry, and other special dangerous criminal manifestations. Illegal armed groups associated with them tear up the foundations of management, prevent social and economic development, weaken democratic institutes, increase violation, and violate the human rights (Terrorism Cases Review, 2010). That is why the protection of human rights in the context of fighting against terrorism is an extremely important element of the final success of any counter-terrorist strategy (Flynn 2005).

As it is known, in the epoch of globalization, extremism and terrorism also acquire an international nature and no state can counteract this alone. That is why it is necessary to develop new mechanisms of cooperation in this area. Above all,

they are related to collecting and generalizing the advanced methods of estimating the social danger of extremism and terrorism.

The nature of terrorist dangers itself makes it necessary to collect and analyze information beyond the limitations stipulated by territorial boundaries or organizational structures (Hertzberger 2007). Such approach reflects new determination of the international community to closely cooperate with one another to counteract the growing threats of the organized criminality, corruption, and terrorism (Joutsen 2006).

As the terrorist attack that took place in Aktobe on June 5, 2016 showed, extremism and terrorism endanger the security of not only Kazakhstan but also the whole world. The attack was organized by adherents of radical pseudo-religious flows who had been instructed from abroad. Using the liberality of the state policy and laws, they wanted to challenge the state government. So called “color revolutions” have various methods and start with sophisticated meetings, murders, and intention to capture the power. Today the countries of the world that underwent such revolutions have neither state nor stability. They are engulfed by poverty and banditism. Conditions for the emergence of extremists and terrorists are created. The economy of these countries is driven decades back (Official Statement of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan Nursultan Nazarbaev on the Aktobe Terrorist attack, 2016).

Taking into account the mentioned above, the social danger of extremism and terrorism require from every state and the global community agreed and purposeful actions on developing efficient mechanisms to counteract these modern challenges and threats.

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