TRANSPARENCY AND CORRUPTION PREVENTION IN LOCAL GOVERNMENT: DO PUBLIC TRUST AND PUBLIC AWARENESS MATTER?

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Abstract: This study examines why local government transparency unable to reduce corruption in Indonesia. Previous literature and empirical research indicate that government transparency should be an effective tool to fight against corruption. Indonesia offers interesting study related to the topic. The government continues to make improvements on transparency, but the corruption continue to grow. This study is explorative, which is not only examining the effect of government transparency on corruption prevention, but also examine the public trust and the public awareness of corruption as a quasi-moderating variables. Using the questionnaire instrument, we performed by two approach analysis, i.e. a descriptive analysis and Structural Equation Modeling (SEM). The findings of descriptive analysis show that the socio-economic status, educational attainment and corruption engagement, positively correlate to trust perception, awareness of corruption and the desire to prevent corruption. Another finding is public trust's perception has the lowest average, rather than public awareness perception, information transparency and perception of corruption prevention. SEM analysis proved that local transparency and public awareness have a positive effect on the prevention of corruption, and public awareness also strengthens the influence. However, the public trusts do not significantly moderate the effect of local transparency on prevention of corruption. The implications of this study indicate that to combat corruption, government does not enough by increasing transparency if the public trust is low. To enhance public trust, the government should improve the education and the economic condition in Indonesia, since public trust is nurtured by educational attainment and socioeconomic status.

Keywords: transparency, corruption, public trust, public awareness, local government

INTRODUCTION

Government transparency is defined as the visibility of government decisions, actions and rules, whereby citizens are able to access public information and scrutinize elected officers (Stechina, 2008). Allowing public policies, policy decision making process, as well as public resources utilization opened to the public, will lead to better public control, minimizing public officers' moral hazard, and consequently reduce corruption. As stated in the seminal paper on the economic theory of crime by Becker (1968), the possibility of an individual committed in a crime depends on three determinant factor namely the assumed risk, the possible gain, and the probable punishment.

Various researches suggest that to reduce corruption, government should be open in all actions, rules and resources utilization to the public (Stechina, 2008, Hood and Heald, 2006; Lindstedt and Naurin, 2010; Peisakhin and Pinto, 2010).

Indonesia offers an excellent case to analyze the relation between government transparency and corruption prevention for several reasons. ***First***, the increasing corruption cases in the last decade. According to Transparency International, Indonesia ranks 90 out of 176 countries in a country indexed of corruption perception in 2017. Whereas among the ASEAN country members, Indonesia is in the fourth place after Singapore,

Brunei and Malaysia. Despite the government hard work to increase the transparency of information on a large scale, the phenomenon of corruption in Indonesia in recent years is apprehensive. In 2016 1,400 corruption cases or an average of five daily cases emerged in Indonesia (*http://www.tribunnews.com/regional/2016/03/30/setiap-hari-rata-rata-muncul-lima-perkara-korupsi-di-indonesia*), carried out in various kinds of fraud such as bribery, gratifications, extortion, embezzlement, or procurement-related fraud resulted in state financial losses.

Second, corruption in Indonesia is mostly committed by local government officials and legislators. Indonesia has implemented a decentralized system since 1999, with now has 542 local governments, consists of 34 provincial governments, 415 district governments and 93 municipalities. Statistics shows most of the corruption cases took place in Local Government level, involving local officials, members of the local legislative, and Head of Region. Corruption in local government is a creative collaboration of the executive, legislative, and judiciary function, thus rendering corruption as constitutional "collective robbery" (Karyana, 2004). The creative collaboration of local legislative members with the local government executives begins since the budgeting process, by manipulating budget allocations favoring certain groups of constituents of the elected Head of Region and legislative members during the general election. The corruption cases at the local government level is soaring subsequent to the decentralization era. Decentralization provides power to local governments in revenues collections and regional expenditures with greater discretion in the provision of public goods to suit the needs of local communities (Tiebout, 1956). With greater control in hand, the decentralization policy later created "local kings" within diverse areas of the executive and legislative institutions (Karyana, 2004). This suggests that the misappropriation of delegated authority of regional financial management is widespread following the decentralization era. Decentralization opens opportunities for corruption in the region (Treisman, 2002). Empirical studies show that decentralization is closely linked to corrupt practices in the region (Fisman and Gatti, 2002; Huther and Shah, 1998). Treisman (2000) and Schick (2003) also found that higher levels of corruption in federalism compare to centralized states.

Third, Indonesia has sought to suppress corruption both at the Central and Regional levels by increasing the transparency of public information. By issuing Law Number 14 of 2008 on Public Information Disclosure, the government seeks to optimize public oversight of the state administration and other public agencies. The act requires every public agency to disclose all information related to its function, activities, performance, financial statements, or other relevant information under public inquiry. Moreover, this law also demands every public agency to build high accessibility information channel, such as a website, to provide relevant information that rightfully needed by society. The government website will enable the public to obtain relevant information related to public service management and the provision of public goods. In addition, the website will allow the public to supervise and participate in the public policy making process.

Fourth, in 2017, Indonesia has fifth largest number of global internet users, accounted for 123 million users, below China, India, US, Brazil. Data from the Ministry of Communication and Information shows that the number of internet users in Indonesia in 2016, 2015 and 2014 is 112.6 million, 102.8 million and 93.4 million, respectively. The growing number of internet users provides opportunity to the government to disseminate relevant information using website. The use of information technology enhances the government publication of all government policies and actions, including information from representative council members (da Cruz, Tavarez, Marques, Jorge and De Sousa, 2016).

The phenomenon in Indonesia is appealing to examine local transparency within the country, on why local transparency is unable to reduce corruption in Indonesia. Afonso (2014) states that although information is available abundantly, and also with high accessibility is in place, the public remains distrusted and dissatisfied with government policy. Ferrari and Randisi (2013) indicate that the public's lack of understanding and awareness of the government's financial information, that make public has no intensive attention to the government's financial activities. Information transparency does not only mean providing information

about the profile of government institutions, performed activities and the resource utilization report, but transparency also means that information was actually reaching to and being received by the public. This is called publicity conditions, where the provision of information to the public is not only concern about the availability of information, but also consider to strengthening the capacity of the public to receive information, so that the impact of information transparency is able to encourage the public to perform the desired action (Lindstedt *et al.*, 2010). Limited studies can be found related to the local transparency issues associated with public trust and public awareness in Indonesia. Some of the studies related to budget information transparency are Werimon, Ghazali, Nazir (2007), Siringoringo (2009), Coryanata (2011) and Rahmawati (2013). The studies emphasized the effect of information transparency and budget accountability to Board members' knowledge and community participation.

This paper performs data analysis with two different approaches. The first approach is descriptive analysis, to present the variability of individual public trust, public awareness, government transparency, and also corruption prevention. This analysis focuses on individual level factors which are associated with individual engagement in community forums (we called it as anti-corruption engagement), such as interaction with the government websites and individual interest in reading news related to corruption. The individual perceptions are also linked to demographic factors, such as age, gender, education and income. Political engagement and demographic factors induce different perceptions of public trust, public awareness, transparency and prevention of corruption (Piotrowksi *et al.*, 2007; Verba and Nie, 2004; Putnam, 2000; Jennings, 1983). In addition, political engagement of respondents influences a description of public trust, public awareness and reveal the desire to combat corruption (Boeckmann and Tyler, 2002).

The second approach is conducted through inferential analysis using Structural Equation Modeling (SEM). The effect of local transparency on corruption prevention is examined, where public trusts and public awareness are assessed using quasi-moderation approach. This method is applied considering both previous relevant

studies and the symptom of relentless corruption in Indonesia amid high local transparency and large internet user. Consequently, the effect of transparency on the prevention of corruption is questioned. We believe that there are other factors that influence the prevention of corruption, therefore we include public trust and public awareness into the model.

The implications of this study are: **first**, in order to prevent corruption, the government should be concerned about the improvement of public trusts. Public trust could be enhanced through better education system, higher socio economic status and other factors out of this study. **Second**, the effectiveness of transparency should be evaluated whether the information presented on the government website is actually *reaching to* and *being received* by the public. Although internet users are noticeably large, however their biggest preference is in social media. The government should be more active in socializing information in social media.

LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT

Government Transparency

Transparency is defined as an environment in which the objectives of public policy, its legal, institutional, and economic framework, policy decisions and their rationale, data and information related to monetary and financial policies, and the terms of agencies' accountability public in a comprehensible, accessible and timely manner (OECD, 2008). Another definition of transparency is the openness in the flow of economic, political, social information to the relevant stakeholders (Kaufmann and Kraay, 2002; Meijer, 2009).

Information transparency is carried out mostly by using e-government, where government websites as the main feature, not only to provide information to the public, but also to allow citizens to take an active role in public affairs. Transparency enables accountability by empowering citizens, the media, monitoring bodies and other stakeholders to find, process and reuse government data to generate meaningful information and knowledge (Murillo, 2015). Through greater transparency, citizens will be more informed about the activities of public

bodies and encourage the public to play an active role in the process of providing public services (Bertot *et al.*, 2010; Pina, Torres and Royo, 2010).

Public Trust and Public Awareness

Trust is a challenged term, there seems, by all accounts, to be some negligible agreement about its significance. Levi and Stoker (2000) defined trust is relational, it includes an individual making herself defenseless against another individual, gathering, or organization that has the ability to do her damage or to sell out her. The growing empirical research on political corruption shows trust cause and consequence of corruption. The absence of trust sustained by corruption is viewed as basic in that it undermines government endeavors to prepare society to help battle debasement and leads people in general to routinely expel government guarantees to battle corruption (Morris and Klesner, 2010). Other researchers documented that trust as a determinant of political participation and effective democratic institution, and low levels of trust nurture corruption (Fukuyama, 1995; Hagan, Mergens, Boehnke, 1995; Klesner, 2007; Putnam, 2000). A society that holds little trust in others tend to extreme care and caution, diminishing social and economic transactions and impeding social cooperation. Distrust thus fosters a tolerant or acquiescent attitude toward corruption and, by creating the expectation of corrupt behavior among others, feeds individual participation of corruption. Lower levels of interpersonal trust in societies with higher levels of corruption, and such societies also tend to be more tolerant or permissive of corruption (La Porta, Lopez-De Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1997).

Public awareness is the level of public understanding related to the importance and implications of corruption on the prosperity and public welfare. Generating public awareness is not the same as telling the public what to do, but rather explaining the issues and disseminating knowledge to the community so that they can make their own decisions. High public awareness occurs when large numbers of community members agree that corruption is an important issue that endangers their lives and welfare. Public awareness is low when most community members are ignorant or unconcerned about corruption cases

committed by government officials. Here are two things that become the focus of attention if you want to revive public awareness about corruption practices in Indonesia. First, in public awareness in general, which involves a thorough understanding and recognition of the dangers of corruption at all levels of society. Second, the emergence of personal consciousness, which occurs where every individual understands the concept of corruption and its impact on their personal lives.

Corruption

Corruption is most often defined as the abuse or misuse of public office for personal gain (World Bank, 1997). It comes in various forms and various illicit behaviors, such as bribery, extortion, fraud, nepotism, corruption, money speed, theft, theft, embezzlement, bribes, peddling effects, and campaign contributions (Klitgaard, 1998). While corruption is generally associated with the public sector, corruption also exists in other aspects of government, such as political parties, the private business sector, and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs).

Decentralization provides for power in the collection of revenues and the preparation of regional expenditures to local governments with greater provision in the provision of public goods to suit the needs of local communities (Tiebout, 1956). Autonomy in the management of the regional budget provides opportunities for corruption. The practice of corruption often occurs in the budget process and public financial management process (Motza, 1983). The authority in budgeting is often used to deflect budgets for personal or group interests, even legislative bodies that are supposed to be government controllers and supervisors get trapped in negotiations for their own political interests (Karyana, 2004). The practice of budget corruption results in budg *et al.* locations that are inconsistent with the public's preference for the supply of public goods. In addition, budget corruption results in inefficiency and ineffectiveness of government budg *et al.* location.

Tanzi (1998) explains three things in which budget corruption makes public spending wasteful. First, budget corruption tends to increase total government spending by launching unnecessary and unproductive public projects. Second, budget corruption contributes to higher payments

(mark-ups) for some services or purchases of government goods. Third, budget corruption often leads to payments to individuals who are not eligible to receive payments.

Given this situation, budget corruption leads to a reduction in public funds spent in vain by corruption. Finally, public resources are used for the personal benefit of some parties rather than the needs of society (Isaksen, 2005). Corruption of public officials tends to be reluctant to deplete public resources in posts such as education, which is more difficult to engage in bribery (Mauro, 1998).

Corruption leads to inefficiencies and ineffectiveness of government budget management. Corruption drives wastage to public spending, so shopping growth is often inconsistent with the growth of people's prosperity. The discretion held by bureaucrats in setting budg *et al.* locations and controlling information related to budget management (Niskanen, 1971), has prompted the government to discourage all information related to all government policies in budget management. So the higher the inefficiency of the budget, the less information is submitted to the public. The higher the level of corruption committed by the government, the smaller the transparency of information (Tanzi, 1998).

Based on literature and previous research, the hypotheses designed in this study are as follows:

H$_1$: information transparency has a positive effect on the prevention of corrupt practices.

H$_2$: public trust has a positive effect on the prevention of corrupt practices.

H$_3$: public awareness affects the prevention of corrupt practices.

H$_4$: public trust strengthens the effect of information transparency on the prevention of corrupt practices.

H$_5$: public awareness strengthens the effect of information transparency on the prevention of corrupt practices.

RESEARCH DESIGN

Data Description

This study used primary data with randomly selected respondents. Respondents are Indonesian citizens aged 17 years and over, living in Indonesia and representing the population from all over Indonesia. The population in this study is all Indonesian citizens aged 17 years and over. Respondents are expected to represent Indonesian citizens as a whole, who live from the easternmost Indonesia, Sabang to Merauke, the westernmost. The distribution of questionnaires was done during April-June 2017, by way of manually distributing at three locations ie Jakarta, Surabaya and Batam. We also conduct dissemination of questionnaires online by google form. Questionnaires are sent to respondent as many as 448, with an incomplete questionnaire of 27 questionnaires, so the questionnaire can be processed as much as 421. The questionnaires collected by google form as much as 250 questionnaires, while the 198 questionnaires obtained directly from respondents. We used the Slovin formula to determine an adequate sample size in this study. With the estimated population of Indonesia in 2017 as many as 262 million people (bps.go.id), then *n* samples are obtained as many as 400 people. The number 421 of respondents has fulfilled the adequacy ratio of the sample.

Variables

The dependent variable is the prevention of corrupt practices (Corr). The independent variables in this study are information transparency (Transp), Public Trust (Trust) and Public awareness (AWR). Since this research is an explorative research, public trust and public awareness we use as an independent variable as well as moderation. All the variables, either dependent or independent we measure by using the Likert Scale 1-5, ranging from Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree.

Prevention of Corruption (Corr). Prevention of corrupt practice is defined as an individual effort to take concrete action to participate actively in preventing corrupt practices. A five-item scale was used to asses the desire to prevent of corruption. The question began with "Do you follow the progress of corruption cases…." Which was followed by "Are you angry and disappointed if government officials and legislators become accused of corruption cases? "…. I do not vote for Governors/Regents/Mayors who are exposed to corruption cases" …. I will report any form of fraud from the government apparatus". In the prevention of coruuption, we arrange

10 questions, and the average responses to these items (á=0.789) was used of prevention of corruption. High scores indicate greater prevention of corruption.

Transparency. Transparency information questionnaire instrument (Transp), we compiled from Lindstedt and Naurin (2010) with information transparency dimension, ie information accessibility, information needs, mediators, and cognitive aspects of information. To assess transparency, a fifteen-item scale was used. The partially scale items are as follows: "The government makes development programs every year"; "Government development programs are financed from tax revenues and non-tax revenues"; "Each year, the Government sets revenue and budget targets"; and so on. The average responses to these items (á=0.922) was used of transparency. It was high scores indicate local transparency.

Public trust. Public trust (Trust) is defined as the condition a person has confidence in an exchange with a partner who has integrity and can be trusted (Morgan and Hunt, 1994: 324). The dimension of trust contains an element of belief, fair, caring and reliable. Trust is the belief of a particular party against the other in conducting a transaction relationship based on a belief that the person he or she believes will fulfill all its obligations well as expected. To assess public trust perception, a ten-item scale was used. The partially scale items are as follows:"The government is able to provide cheap health and education services to the community"; "The government ensures security and order in society"; "I obey and follow the rules of government, because each government's rule which has good intentions towards the people"; "The courts in Indonesia have decided every case fairly". The average responses to these items (α=0.857) was used of public trust. It was high score to indicate public trust to government.

Public awareness. Public awareness (Awr) is the level of public understanding related to the importance and implications of corruption on the prosperity and public welfare. High public awareness occurs when large numbers of community members agree that corruption is an important issue that endangers their lives and welfare. Public awareness is low when most community members are ignorant or unconcerned about corruption cases committed by government officials. Two basic things in public awareness about corruption are: firstly, in public awareness in general, involving a thorough understanding and recognition of the dangers of corruption at all levels of society. Second, the emergence of personal consciousness, which occurs where every individual understands the concept of corruption and its impact on their personal lives. We used ten-scale item to assess public awareness of corruption. And the average responses to these items (α=0.923) was used of public trust. It was the highest score than the others. And the highest score to indicate public trust to government.

Demographic Factors. In this study, we refer to previous studies using explanatory variables with demographic factors (Piotrowksi *et al.*, 2007; Verba and Nie, 2004; Putnam, 2000; Jennings, 1983). The demographic factors used in this research are:

1. Age; age factor is grouped into 4, i.e.: group I: <18 years, group II: 18 <x <30 years; group III: 30 <x <45 years; and group IV: > 45 years.

2. Education; education is based on education groups (elementary and junior high), secondary education (senior high school), Diploma-education and higher education (Strata-1/Strata-2/Strata-3).

3. Per capita income; per capita income is grouped into several groups: group 1 (income <Rp1 million / month), group 2 (income between Rp1 million/month <x< Rp5 million / month), group 3 (income Rp5 million / month <x <Rp10 million / month), group 4 (income Rp10 million / month <x <Rp25 million / month) and group 5 (income> Rp25 million / month).

4. Gender is using dummy variables, 1 if male, and 0 if female

5. Work is grouped into: Students, civil servants, private employees, self-employed and others.

6. Domicile is grouped into two, namely domicile on Java Island and domicile outside Java.

7. Web Activity is measured by frequency of following corruption news on TV, radio or online media.

Research model

The research problem is solved by using the research model. The type of research is causal research, then we design the connection between the dependent variable (corruption prevention/Corr) and the independent variables (Transp), public trust (Trust) and Public Awareness (Awr). Variables of Public Trust (Trust) and Public Awareness (Awr) are also treated as moderation for the influence of Transparency (Transp) on Corruption Prevention (Corr). All variables were measured using the primary data obtained through the questionnaire instrument.

The moderating variable is a variable that can strengthen or weaken the direct relationship between the independent variable and the dependent variable. The use of these moderating variables is based on the fact that the consequences of a continuing corruption case in Indonesia over a long period of time may undermine public trust on government action, thus making the transparency of information ineffective in reducing corruption if the community is not believe. Neither does the public awareness of the dangers of corruption (public awareness).

This study consider to use a quasi moderation where the public trust (trust) and public awareness (Awr) variables we treat as independent variable and a moderating variable that strengthen/weaken the effect of transparency on corruption prevention. We did this treatment as part of the experiment in this study, and also due to the lack of prior research. This research model is designed as follows:

$$\text{Corr} = a + b_1.\text{Transp} + b_2.\text{Trust} + b_3.\text{Trust*Transp} + b_4.\text{Awr} + b_5.\text{Awr*Transp} + e\ldots\ldots \quad (1)$$

Information:

Corr = corruption prevention efforts (questionnaire)

Transp = transparency of government information (questionnaire)

Trust = public "trust" perception of government (questionnaire)

Awr = perception of public awareness of corruption (questionnaire)

We perform the sensitivity test to obtain the robust test of the model. We included education control variables (Educ), per capita income (Inc), gender (Gend) and Web-Activity (Web) on model 2.

$$\text{Corr} = a + b_1.\text{Transp} + b_2.\text{Trust} + b_3.\text{Trust*Transp} + b_4.\text{Awr} + b_5.\text{Awr*Transp} + b_6.\text{Educ} + b_7.\text{Inc} + b_8.\text{Gend} + b_9.\text{Web} + e \quad (2)$$

Control Variables:

Educ = educational level of respondents

- Primary education (SD-SMP) = 1

- Secondary education (high school and equivalent) = 2

- Higher education (Diploma and S1, S2) = 3

Inc = per capita income per respondent

Gender = gender (Male = 1; Female = 0)

Web = accessibility of government financial information, measured by the frequency of accessing / receiving Government financial information

a = a constant

b1, bi2, b3, b4, b5, b6, b7, b8, b9 = the regression coefficients

The expected result of each variable as follows:

RESULT AND DISCUSSION

(a) Validity Test

Validity test is used to measure whether the questionnaire is valid or not. A questionnaire is valid if the question is able to express something to be measured. So, the validity relates to how large a variable is measuring what will be measured. Validity is measured by Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA). This analysis examines the validity of a construct of validity or tests whether those indicators are valid indicators as a latent construct measure. In other words, whether these indicators are the unidimensional measure of a latent construct. Factor analysis has valid validity criteria if KMO > 0.6 and Barlett's Test with significance <0.05 (Ghazali, 2011).

The Transparency (Transp) consists of 15 questions with a Likert scale of 1-5, where 1 = strongly disagree, 2

Table 1
The expected result

Independent variables and moderation variables	Regression coefficient	The expected direction	References
Transparansi informasi (Transp)	b_1	+ (positif)	Guillamon, Bastida dan Benito, (2011), Lindstedt and Naurin (2010)
Public Trust (Trust)	b_2	+ (positif)	Morris dan Klesner (2010), Fukuyama (1995); Hagan *et al.* (1995); Klesner (2007) dan Putnam (2000).
Transp*Trust	b_3	+ (positif)	Afonso (2014)
Public Awareness (Awr)	b_4	+ (positif)	Ferrari dan Randisi (2013)
Transp*Awr	b_5	+ (positif)	UN-ODCCP (1999:10); Sayers (2006)
Pendidikan (Educ)	b_6	+ (positif)	Piotrowski and Van Ryzin (2007); Verba and Nie (2004)
Gender (Gend)	b_7	?	Piotrowski and Van Ryzin (2007) dan Jennings (1983)
Pendapatan (Inc)	b_8	?	Piotrowski and Van Ryzin (2007); Verba and Nie (2004)
Website-activity (Web)	b_9	+ (positif)	Piotrowski and Van Ryzin (2007)

= disagree, 3 = doubtful, 4 = agree and 5 = strongly agree. Using EFA analysis, we get the following results. Based on the results of processing with SPSS, KMO index for information transparency constructs of 0.912 and Bartlett's Test with a significance of 0.00. The results indicate that the Transparency information construct is valid, since the KMO index is> 0.6 and the Barlett's Test with significance <0.05. The same explanation applied for corruption prevention, public trust and public awareness of corruption.

Table 2
KMO and Bartlett's Test and Reliability Statistics

Variables	KMO of Measure of Sampling Adequacy		Bartlett's Test of Sphericity		Df		Sig		Cronbach's Alpha	
	Before	After	Before	After	Before	After	Before	After	Before	After
Transparency	0.912	0.912	1669.79	1669.79	55	55	0.000	0.000	0.922	0.922
Corruption Prev.	0.846	0.776	612.41	406.56	21	10	0.000	0.000	0.789	0.789
Trust	0.849	0.846	953.51	612.41	45	21	0.000	0.000	0.857	0.857
Awareness	0.919	0.922	1227.28	1150.62	45	28	0.000	0.000	0.923	0.923

We also use the Principal Component Analysis (PCA) to measure the validity of each statement item in the transparency construct. The result for each component in the Transparency (Transp) construct ranges from 0.329 - 0.848. Based on Ghazali (2011), the benchmark validity value is above> 0.5, so item 12, 13, 14 and 15 are invalid, so it is excluded from the statement used in subsequent data processing. After the second test, by omitting the 12, 13, 14 and 15 items the KMO and Bartlett's results are unchanged from table 3. And the PCA results show the validity value> 0.5. The Corruption Prevention construct meets the principle of validity with the KMO index for information transparency constructs of 0.846 (> 0.5) and Bartlett's Test with a significance of 0.00 (<0.05).

Table 3
PCA Test Results_Before and After Revision Component Matrix[a]

	Transparency		Corruption Prevention		Public Trust		Public Awareness	
	Before	After	Before	After	Before	After	Before	After
Questionnaire_1	.653	0.655	.436	-	.589	-	.783	0.794
Questionnaire_2	.664	0.690	.616	0.676	.753	0.772	.821	0.824
Questionnaire_3	.762	0.784	.691	0.759	.755	0.770	.787	0.796
Questionnaire_4	.786	0.803	.802	0.868	.743	0.777	.725	0.710
Questionnaire_5	.818	0.833	.720	0.785	.636	0.679	.452	-
Questionnaire_6	.746	0.745	.413	-	.727	0.704	.351	-
Questionnaire_7	.666	0.687	.547	-	.574	-	.807	0.820
Questionnaire_8	.848	0.871	.459	-	.737	0.724	.849	0.859
Questionnaire_9	.798	0.817	.674	0.713	.591	-	.801	0.805
Questionnaire_10	.755	0.769	.541	-	.699	0.706	.848	0.847
Questionnaire_11	.655	0.646						
Questionnaire_12	.460							
Questionnaire_13	.409							
Questionnaire_14	.350							
Questionnaire_15	.329							

Descriptive Statistics

Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 4 summarized for transparency, public trust, public awareness, and corruption prevention. The following descriptive statistics include minimum values, maximum values, averages and standard deviations. In descriptive analysis of questionnaire groups, we base on Likert scale, 1 = strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = doubtful, 4 = agree and 5 = strongly agree.

Descriptive statistics were analyzed by showing the minimum, maximum, mean and standard deviation of respondents' answers. A minimum value of 1.00 generated from all dimensions. While the maximum value is generated with the same value of 5.00. The smallest average value of 3.36 is given to the public trust. This means that many respondents do not believe in the positive value built by the government. This means that people are starting for not believing in the government's performance. The greatest average value is given to the prevention of corruption, which is 4.37. This means that people actually have a desire to prevent corruption. While the standard deviation of all questionnaires groups ranged between -1 and 1. The standard deviations in the range indicated that the questionnaires had for reasonable limits standards deviations.

In table 5, the analysis of the activity of opening the government website by the respondents is analyzed by

Table 4
Descriptive Statistics

Variabel	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
Transparansi (Transp)	464	1.00	5.00	3,88481	1,074827
Public Trust (Trust)	464	1.00	5.00	3,35892	1,068275
Public Awareness (Awr)	464	1.00	5.00	3,93195	1,202699
Corruption Prevention (Corr)	464	1.00	5.00	4,36847	0,786129

Source: processed from the SPSS 24

making mapping in the demographic factor. The levels of political participation and involvement in government affairs, are influenced by socioeconomic status and educational attainment (Conway, 1985). The Citizne's participation in politics, in this study, is manifested in citizen interactions with government through government website contact. The frequency of the web-activity are:

Table 5
Socio demographic Profile and Frequency of Web Activities

Age	Frequency of Opening Government Website			
	Never	Seldom	Often	Routine
>18 years	0%	75%	25%	0%
18 - 30 years	5.03%	60.34%	27.93%	6.70%
30 - 45 years	5.58%	45.18%	31.98%	17.26%
<45 years	7.14%	36.90%	39.29%	16.67%
Sex				
Male	6.17%	43.83%	35.71%	14.29%
Female	4.49%	61.54%	23.72%	10.26%
Education Level				
Elementary Level	0.00%	100.00%	0.00%	0.00%
Senior High Level	6.45%	70.97%	17.74%	4.84%
Diploma	8.25%	60.82%	27.84%	3.09%
Fresh Graduate	7.58%	42.42%	32.58%	17.42%
S2/S3	2.34%	40.94%	38.60%	18.13%
Income Level				
< Rp1 million	3.85%	76.92%	19.23%	0.00%
Rp1 million - 5 million	9.28%	69.07%	16.49%	5.15%
Rp5 million - Rp10 million	4.06%	50.76%	33.50%	11.68%
Rp10 million - Rp25 million Jt	5.22%	29.85%	41.79%	23.13%
>25 million	10.00%	40.00%	40.00%	10.00%
Occupation (Profession)				
Students	1.75%	68.42%	24.56%	5.26%
Civil Servant	2.99%	45.18%	36.88%	14.95%
Employee	15.25%	55.93%	16.95%	11.86%
Entrepreneur	28.57%	28.57%	14.29%	28.57%
Others	9.09%	57.58%	30.30%	3.03%
Home Occupancy				
Java	5,61%	46,94%	33,16%	14,29%
Others	5,56%	65,28%	23,61%	5,56%

grouped into categories never, seldom, often and routine. Categories are often measured by the frequency of opening government websites every day, and routine is measured by opening government websites daily. Outside these two categories, it is categorized rarely and never. Based on civic engagement literature, demographic characteristics of citizens determine political participation and involvement in governmental affairs (Putnam, 2000; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, 1995; Piotrowski *et al.*, 2007). Therefore descriptive analysis is conducted on the activities interact with the government website.

The sociodemographic categories, are age, gender, education, income, occupation and domicile in Java or outside Java, there are approximate 5% of respondents never interacted with the government websites. Respondents who have are seldom and often frequencies have the same pattern for age, education and income categorization. The older the respondents, the higher the education and higher income, the less frequent frequency (decreases) and frequencies are increasingly (increasing) the population (see Piotrowski, Putnam and Verba Nie). For gender, male respondents have larger respond to the frequency of interaction government website. Finally, respondents who live on Java (the island where economic activity, the Indonesian capital is located, and the concentrated population density) has a frequency of opening the government website larger than the respondents who live outside of Java. Based on a survey of the Indonesian Internet Service Providers Association (APPJI) in 2016, 65% of internet users are domiciled in Java, the rest live in outside Java.

Based on internet activity, an analysis of the perceptions of government transparency, trust perception, perception of awareness of corruption and prevention of corruption. Our interesting results are documented that there is a positive correlation between the frequency of opening the government website with the perception of government transparency and the prevention of corruption (see Boekmann *et al.*, 2002; Parent, Vandebeek and Gemino, 2004). Respondents with higher website-frequencies tend to have better perceptions of transparency and have a desire to prevent greater corruption practices. The results of the analysis are shown in Table 6 underneath.

Table 6
Correlational Analysis of Anticorruption Engagement and

		Transparency	*Public Trust*	*Public Awareness*	*Corruption Prevention*
Frequency of opening government web	Never	3,381	3,029	3,945	4,190
	Seldom	3,800	3,291	3,874	4,300
	Often	4,041	3,370	3,984	4,479
	Routine	4,011	3,419	3,884	4,698
Interest in news of corruption cases	Not interested	3,745	3,282	3,941	4,291
	Not enthusiastic	3,710	3,199	3,847	4,249
	Interested	3,924	3,364	3,957	4,389
	Very interested	4,223	3,468	3,914	4,712
Frequency follow the news of corruption cases	Never	3,567	3,160	4,125	4,300
	Seldom	3,781	3,245	3,808	4,267
	Often	3,979	3,362	4,047	4,422
	Routine	4,059	3,529	3,905	4,709
Frequency of reading newspaper	Never	3,487	3,020	4,144	4,288
	Seldom	3,781	3,236	3,793	4,235
	Often	3,880	3,395	3,964	4,346
	Routine	3,989	3,313	3,944	4,553

Additional information: The calculations are based on measurements with Likert scale: 1 = strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = doubtful, 4 = agree and 5 = strongly agree

In additional information, Indonesian internet users as much as 132 million, which is the 5th rank user in the world. Based on a survey of the Internet Service Providers Association (APPJI) 2016, internet users who visited social media as much as 129.2 million (97.4%) and social media most frequently visited are facebook (54%), Instagram (15%), next Youtube 11% and the rest are g[+], twitter and Linked (in)

Table 7 shows the results of descriptive analysis of the correlation between socio-demographic factors with perceptions of transparency, trust perceptions, perceptions of corruption awareness and involvement in preventing corruption. An interesting finding from this analysis is shown from socioeconomic status (characteristic of age, education, and income) positively correlated to the willingness of involvement in preventing corruption. The older respondents have greater desire to engage in preventing corruption. Similar results are shown in education and incomes, where the higher the education and the higher the income, the greater the desire to engage in preventing corruption. Especially for

educational characteristics are positively correlated with perceptions of transparency, public trust and public awareness of corruption. This is in line with the study of Verba *et al.* (2004). For gender, men have a greater perception of transparency than women, while for prevention of corruption women have a greater perception (Jennings, 1983).

(b) Structural Equation Modelling (SEM)

1. Goodness of Fit Test

The test using SEM model is done gradually. If the model has not been obtained correctly (fit), then the proposed model should be revised. The need for revisions of the SEM model arises from the problems come from the analysis. A possible problem is the inability of the model developed to produce a unique estimate. If the problems arise in SEM analysis, then indicate that the study does not support the established structural model. Thus the model needs to be revised by developing existing theories to form a new model.

Table 7
Descriptive Statistics of Sociodemographic Determinants

Sociodemographic Determinants		Transparency	Public-Trust	Aware-Ness	Prevention Corruption
AGES	< 18 years	3,633	3,550	3,825	4,250
	18 < x < 30 years	3,840	3,306	3,811	4,262
	30 < x < 45 years	3,925	3,246	4.032	4,395
	> 45 years	3,862	3,540	3,909	4,680
GENDER	Male	3,931	3,286	3,883	4,291
	Perempuan	3,768	3,385	3,931	4,513
EDUCATION	Elementary Level	3,000	3,250	3,933	4,333
	Senior High Level	3,553	3,340	3,833	4,100
	Diploma	3,923	3,280	3,836	4,319
	Fresh Graduate	3,809	3,300	3,940	4,349
	S2/S3	4,032	3,345	3,931	4,535
INCOME	< Rp1 million	3,689	3,088	3,861	4,200
	Rp1 million - 5 million	3,709	3,417	3,777	4,212
	Rp5 million - Rp10 million	3,880	3,274	4,001	4,362
	Rp10 million - Rp25 million	4,033	3,334	3,896	4,508
	>25 million	3,822	3,544	2,783	4,792
OCCUPATION	Students	3,764	3,406	3,267	3,483
	Civil Servant	3,997	3,348	3,922	4,354
	Employee	3,470	3,109	3,952	4,453
	Entrepreneur	3,889	3,078	3,750	4,658
	Others	3,709	3,341	3,898	4,741
DOMICILE	Java	3,885	3,359	3,932	4,368
	Others	3,890	3,363	3,941	4,368

Additional information: The calculations are based on measurements with Likert scale: 1 = strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = doubtful, 4 = agree and 5 = strongly agree

The fundamental measure of overall fit is the likelihood-Ratio Chi-Square. The high value of Chi-Square relative to the degree of freedom (df) indicates that the covariance or correlation matrix observed by the predicted differed significantly and this resulted in probability (p) smaller than the significance level (α) (Ghazali, 2011). The results in this model are summarized as follows:

RMSEA is an index that can be used to compensate for chi_square statistics in large samples. The RMSEA score indicates a goodness-of-fit that can be expected when the model is estimated in the population (Hair *et al.*, 1995). The RMSEA value is smaller or equal to 0.08 is an index for the acceptability of a model showing a close fit of the model based on degrees of freedom (Browne and Cudeck, 1993:17). This index was first proposed by Teiger and Lind which is one of the informative indices in SEM. The RMSEA value ≤ 0.05 denotes close fit, whereas 0.05 <RMSEA ≤ 0.08 indicates good fit, and RMSEA> 0.08 indicates poor fit. CMIN/DF shows The Minimum Sample Discrepancy Function divided by the degree of freedom. This is generally referred to by researchers as one of the indicators to measure the fit level of a model. CMIN / DF is nothing but a chi-square statistic, X2 divided by DF is called relative X2. If the value of X2 less than 2.0 or less than 3.0 indicates the acceptable fit between the model and the data (Arbuckle, 1997).

Table 8
Summary Result_ Good of Fit to SEM

No	GoF Measure	Standard	Results	Informations
1	Chi-Square	Expected > DF	1326 > 625	Model Fit
2	Likelihood	p<0,05	0.00	Model Fit
3	CMIN/df	2< x < 3 atau < 5	2,331	Model moderate fit
4	GFI	0 – 1 (dg 0= poor fit dan 1=perfect fit)	0,770	Model moderate fit
5	CFI	0 – 1 (dg 0= poor fit dan 1=perfect fit)	0,854	Model moderate fit
	TLI	0-1 (>0.90)	0.829	Model moderate fit
6	RAMSEA	< 0,08	0.078	Model moderate fit
7	AIC	Saturated Model <Default Model < Independence Model	992,00 <1134,54 < 4459	Fit

Source: Summarized from AMOS 24 results

Goodness of Fit (GFI) and Adjusted GFI (AGFI) can be classified as an absolute match size, since GFI basically compares the hypothesized model with no model at all (Σ (0)). The minimum value of F for the hypothesized model: The minimum value of F, when no model is hypothesized. GFI values range from 0 (poor fit) to 1 (perfect fit), and GFI ≥ 0.90 is good fit, while 0.80 ≤ GFI <0.9 is often called marginal fit. While the value of AGFI is analog R2 in multiple regression. This Fit Index can be adjusted to the degress of freedom available to test the acceptability of the model (Arbuckle, 1997: 18). The recommended acceptance rate is when AGFI has a value equal to or greater than 0.90 (Hair, *et al.*, 1995). The test results for GFI and AGFI are as follows. The value of GFI 0.761 and AGFI is 0.727. Since the test results show <0.90, but> 0, the model is still stated moderate fit, although it does not achieve good fit.

The Tucker Lewis Index (TLI) is an alternative incremental fit index that compares a model tested against a baseline model. The recommended value as a reference for the acceptance of a model is the acceptance of e" 0.95 (Hair, *et al.*, 1995) and a value very close to 1 indicating a very good fit (Arbuckle, 1997). Comparative Fit Index (CFI). The magnitude of this index is in the range 0-1. The closer to 1 indicates the highest fit level (a very good fit). The recommended value by CFI is ≥ 0.95. The advantage of this index is that the index is not influenced by the size of the sample so it is good to measure the acceptability of a model. In acceptance of a model, the TLI and CFI indices are strongly recommended for use because they are relatively insensitive to the size of the sample and less affected by the complexity of the model. Value TLI = 0.829, this indicates that the model is close to good fit or moderate good fit. The CFI value in the default model is 0.840, indicating that the acceptance of the model is close to fit.

Akaike's Information Criterion (AIC) is a fit indices criteria developed by Akaike (1987), which is used in comparison models where the default AIC value model must be compared with the AIC saturated and independence model values. The default AIC model value must be between the AIC independence model and saturated model, so it can be concluded that the fit model. The model test result for AIC is the default AIC value model 1272,872 which is larger than the value of saturated model (1122) and smaller than AIC independence model (4618,033).

2. *Hypothesis Testing by* **Regression Weight** *of SEM*

The hypothesis was tested by using the structural equation model (SEM), consider that SEM has the ability to combine measurement model simultaneously and efficiently when compared with other multivariate techniques. The use of the equation model with the application of Analysis of Moment Stucture (AMOS 24) produces indicators that support whether the proposed model is a fit model.

Table 9
The SEM Results
Regression Weights: (Group number 1 - Default model)

			Estimate	*S.E.*	*C.R.*	*P*	*Label*
Corruption prevention	<—-	public_trust	,028	,032	,877	,380	
corruption_prevention	<—-	awareness	,094	,027	3,507	***	
corruption_prevention	<—-	transparency	,209	,053	3,942	***	
corruption_prevention	<—-	trans_trust	,005	,022	,209	,834	
corruption_prevention	<—-	trans_aware	-,139	,030	-4,672	***	

Source: Summarized from AMOS 24 results

Basic decision making by looking at probability number (p) in the AMOS output 24. If $p > 0.1$ then H_0 accepted If $p < 0.1$ then H_0 is rejected (Santoso, 2011). Structure model is a model of the relationship structure that forms or explains causality between factors.

The results of SEM analysis are as follows. *First*, the transparency of government information has a positive effect on the prevention of corruption. The test results show p-value of 0.000, where H_0 is rejected, and H_a accepted with regression coefficient 0.028. It means that the hypothesis 1 is accepted, so it was proved that local transparency has a positive effect on the effort to eradicate corruption. *Secondly*, public trust is not significant influence on the prevention of corruption. The test results show p-value of 0.380, where H_0 is accepted, and H_a is rejected. With these indicators, hypothesis 2 is rejected, so in this study public trust does not affect corruption prevention. *Third*, public awareness has a positive effect on the prevention of corruption. Test results show p-value of 0.000, where H_0 is rejected, and H_a accepted with regression coefficient 0.094. So, hypothesis 3 is accepted, and it means the public awareness has a positive effect on the prevention of corruption. *Fourth*, public trust can not strengthens the influence of local transparency on the prevention of corruption. The test results show p-value of 0.834, where H_0 is accepted, and H_a is rejected. With these indicators, hypothesis 4 is rejected, so in this study public trust does not strengthen the influence of government information transparency on the prevention of corruption. *Fifth*, the public awareness strengthens the influence of government information transparency on corruption prevention. Test results show p-value of 0.000, where H_0 is rejected, and H_a accepted with regression coefficient

-0.139. Hypothesis 5 is accepted in part, ie public awareness has a significant influence but weakens the influence of local transparency on the prevention of corruption.

3. The Sensitivity Test

The sensitivity test is an intervention of the input parameters of the model and/or model structure to see how far its sensitivity to the model's output changes, so that it can be observed how the effect or impact of an intervention on the model's overall performance. Sensitivity test can be exercised in two ways, by functional intervention and by structural intervention. Functional interventions are the intervention of certain parameters or combinations of certain parameters of the model by using facilities in the appropriate software or representing changes in decisions, events and specific circumstances. Structural interventions are interventions that affect relationships between elements or structures, which can be done by altering the elements or relationships that change the model structure. Sensitivity analysis was conducted to see the sensitivity of parameters, variables and relationships among variables in the model. The results revealed the behavioral changes and/or model performance. The treatment or intervention of the model is generally based on conditions that may occur in the future.

Sensitivity test was performed by meaning of structural intervention and by adding moderation variable that are read behavior (accessibility) and demographic of respondent. The addition of respondability and demographic variables of respondents is based on previous research (Lindstedt and Naurin, 2010) which also shows the influence of these two variables on endogenous variables, namely the prevention of corruption.

$$Corr = a + b_1.Transp + b_2.Trust + b_3.Trust*Transp + b_4.Awr + b_5.Awr*Transp + b_6.Dmgrp + b_7.Pol + e \qquad (2)$$

Table 10
Regression Weight SEM on Model 2

			Estimate	*S.E.*	*C.R.*	*P*	*Label*
corruption_prevention	<—-	public_trust	,025	,032	,786	,432	
corruption_prevention	<—-	awareness	,093	,027	3,492	***	
corruption_prevention	<—-	transparency	,202	,052	3,870	***	
corruption_prevention	<—-	trans__trust	,011	,022	,499	,618	
corruption_prevention	<—-	trans_aware	-,138	,030	-4,652	***	
corruption_prevention	<—-	demographic factors	-,037	,045	-,822	,411	
corruption_prevention	<—-	political engagement	-,026	,056	-,467	,641	

Source: Summarized from AMOS 24 results

The sensitivity analysis was exercised by structural interventions, i.e. adding the demographic moderation variables (age, gender, education and income) as well as the moderate variable of political engagement. The result does not change to the output results in the main model.

The intervention remains the acceptance of hypothesis 1, hypothesis 3 and part of hypothesis 5. To support the suitability of the models used in the sensitivity test, we present the following sum of good-of-fit test results on Model 2.

Table 11
The Good of Fit of SEM on Model 2

No	Aspects	Criterions	Results	Information
1	Chi-Square	Diharapkan > DF	1709,521 > 774	Model Fit
2	Likelihood	p<0,05	0.00	Model Fit
3	CMIN/DF	2< x < 3 atau < 5	2,209	Model moderate fit
4	GFI	0 – 1 (dg 0= poor fit dan 1=perfect fit)	0,651	Model moderate fit
5	CFI	0 – 1 (dg 0= poor fit dan 1=perfect fit)	0,799	Model moderate fit
	TLI	0-1 (>0.90)	0.787	Model moderate fit
6	RAMSEA	< 0,08	0.074	Model moderate fit
7	AIC	Saturated Model <	1722	Fit
		Default Model <	< 1888,53	
		Independence Model	<5558.14	

Source: Summarized from AMOS 24 results

RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS

The influence of local transparency on corruption prevention

From the descriptive statistic analysis, the respondents gave perceptions of transparency at an average of 3.885, which means that transparency of government information is perceived to be near enough transparent level, but not yet completely transparent. When evaluating further questionnaires, respondents generally have a good understanding of about the Local Budget and Expenditure and the budget cycle from the planning to accountability. However, information about revenue sources, the potential wealth of local government, poverty rate and unemployment rate and per capita income levels are majority unknown by respondents. It was supported by the Maximum Likelihood Estimated-Regression Weight test output showing the questions with Critical Ratio (CR) <2 and p-value> 0.05 (not significant).

When analyzing the questionnaires of corruption prevention, respondents answered by almost agree and strongly agree to prevent corruption (with an average of 4,368). Questionnaires prepared to represent the dimensions of corruption prevention efforts are divided into two parts: passive prevention of corruption e.g. in the form of statements of attitudes and the prevention of corruption in real action. Passive corruption prevention is expressed in support of the Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi (Corruption Eradication Commission/KPK) in combating corruption, approving the dismissal of corrupt government officials and supporting anti-corruption movements. While the questionnaires question about corruption prevention in real action, for example by refusing the distribution of basic needs from election participants, reporting all forms of fraud of government officials, escorting the realization of campaign promises of the elected regional head. The result of Critical Ratio (CR) analysis shows that many respondents give approval to the attitude statement to support corruption prevention efforts in the form of passive attitude statement, where in the questionnaire items the Critical Ratio value> 2 so that p (value) 0,000 (<0.05) and significant. In contrast to the questionnaire which is a real action statement eradication corruption score CR <2, so it is not significant (p-value> 0.05) and removed from data processing.

The first hypothesis shows that support previous research (Linsdtedt *et al.*, 2010). Information transparency is promoted as one of the most important healing remedies against corruption (Lindstedt and Naurin, 2010; Mauro, 1998; Treisman, 2000). The government transparency will reduce rent seeking behavior among government officials (Ellis and Fender, 2006). The reason why transparency is so consistent is advisable because transparency offers knowledge of how a corruption-free system should operate and what it should offer, and the capacity to find out about the day-to-day operations of the government and how manipulation efforts are perpetrated by corruptors. Transparency offers the basis for effective action based on knowledge and understanding. This makes it a truly indispensable feature of anti-corruption programs and some elaborate detailed explanations of any government programs (Sturges, 2004).

Transparency is a term that it is relatively less used by their information and has not been yet encapsulated many of the reasons behind the provision of a good information system, making it libraries, archives, databases, or reporting and monitoring systems. This term is used in conjunction with the associated range and complementary conditions such as oversight, accountability, auditing, openness, and so on which are considerable elements equal to the freedom of access to information.

Public trust effects on prevention of corruption

The analysis of the hypothesis 2 is rejected. We found that public trust does not affect the prevention of corruption. We tried to explain why the public trust has no significant influence on the prevention of corruption. In the descriptive statistic analysis section, the average score for public trust is lowest compared to the others. The average score of public trust perception was 3.359, while the average score for public awareness was 3.932 and the local transparency was perceived at 3.884. The picture of condition of public trust was obtained from the view of respondents. The average of 3,359 described the majority of respondents give more distrust or doubt if using the Likert Scale 1-5, where 1 = strongly distrust, 2 = distrust, 3 = doubt, 4 = trust and 5 = strongly trust.

In a previous literature, the lack of public trust was considered a critical point underlying the government to mobilize communities to help combat corruption. And lack of public trust will lead the public to ignore the government's promise to fight corruption (Morris *et al.*, 2010). Furthermore, the scarcity of trust in the government will raise the level of tolerance for wrongdoing of government officials and cultivate a call for such acts. In addition, many researchers confirm that corruption drives down the level of the political trust and undermines the legitimacy of a legitimate government. But in the results does not support the results of research conducted by previous researchers. Based on the analysis of collected and processed data, we suspect that public trust conditions are low and vary from very unbelieving to those who choose to believe, resulting in public trust variations not affecting corruption prevention efforts.

The influence of public awareness on corruption prevention

The test results on this hypothesis show that public awareness has a significant influence on the prevention of corruption. Descriptive analysis documenting the average score of public awareness 3.9. It was indicated that respondents give optimistic value about awareness of corruption in Indonesia. It also means the level of sensitivity and awareness of the adverse effects of corruption on individuals and the interests of society in general are high.

The perception of awareness of corruption is positively correlated with the level of education. It was documented by the education group from elementary education to Diploma has the average score is 3.83. While the group of respondent fresh graduates (Strata-1/Strata-2/Strata-3) shows the average score of public awareness 3.94. We suggest that these conditions are likely to strengthen the influence of public awareness on efforts to prevent corruption. Through good governance education and the dangers of corruption on people's lives, it has an effect on the interest to make efforts to prevent corruption. The results of this study are in line with findings from Ferrari *et al.* (2013).

Public trusts strengthen the influence of local transparency on corruption prevention

Test results show p-value of 0.834, where H_0 is accepted, and H_a is rejected, so public trust does not significantly strengthen to the relation between local transparency on the prevention of corruption. With the rejection of this hypothesis, it raises many conjectures for further research. The data collected shows low public trust among respondents of this study. This condition confirms the statement of Afonso (2014), which is the availability of sufficient information and high accessibility, ineffective in achieving transparency without the public trust and public dissatisfaction with government policy (Afonso, 2014).

Public awareness strengthens/weakens the influence of local transparency on corruption prevention

The hipothesis test shows that public awareness has a significant weakens the influence of local transparency

on the prevention of corruption. This finding is a good news for the prevention of corruption in Indonesia. Individual respondents still have the desire and awareness to prevent corruption. It was reflected in the questionnaire results that illustrate the more likely for not choosing a corrupt politicians in local election and reject various forms of bribery. Public awareness of corruption can be grown in many ways, i.e. improving the education sytem, intensive campaigns through communication media, disseminating information to the public about rights and obligations, and disseminating efforts to eradicate corruption. Public awareness can also be nurtured by increasing the literacy of state finances. Provision of state financial information will provide an understanding of good state financial governance, so that people will understand how the management should be (Sayers, 2006). Based on literature and empirical researches, public awareness of high corruption should increase the public need for information on daily operations activities of government that is free of corruption. So it fosters a good understanding and encourages people to move to fight corruption

CONCLUSIONS, LIMITATIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

This study aims to prove the effect of local transparency, public trust, and public awareness on the prevention of corruption. Data analysis was performed with two approaches. First approach is a descriptive analysis. By descriptive analysis, we present the variability of individual public trust, public awareness, government transparency and also corruption prevention. We found that the highest average value is the corruption prevention perception, while the lowest average for public trust perception. Respondent behavior related to anti corruption engagement consisting of frequency of opening government website, frequency of following news of corruption case on television, interest in news of corruption and frequency of newspaper reading. Anti corruption engagement is intended to see how the respondent's behavior towards information related to government and corruption. In general, respondents have a tendency to rarely open the government web. Interest in corruption news on average is quite high, but this is not accompanied by frequent follow-ups of high-profile corruption cases. Frequency of reading newspapers is

also quite high, it can be interpreted that not every respondent who reads the newspaper would read the rubric related news corruption.

The second approach is conducted by inferential analysis, which is examined by Structural Equation Modeling (SEM). The effect of local transparency on corruption prevention is examined, and we also find the public trusts and the public awareness with quasi-moderation approach. Our finding is that local transparency and public awareness have a positive effect on the prevention of corruption. In addition, public awareness has a significant influence on the effect of local transparency on the prevention of corruption. But public trust is not significant effect on the prevention of corruption.

Limitations of research are respondents who are still concentrated on the population in Java. It is worried to affect the value of perception, cause the high socioeconomic disparity between residents who live on the island of Java with the inhabitants of other islands. In addition, limitations on the construction of the questionnaire. The results of validity still show results that are not optimal, but still meet the limit of validity.

The implications of this study are: **first**, in order to prevent corruption, the government should be concerned about the improvement of public trusts. Public trust could be enhanced by better educational system, higher socio economic status and other factors out of this study. **Second**, the effectiveness of transparency should be evaluated whether the information presented on its website is actually *reaching to* and *being received* by public. Although the internet users is large, but their biggest preference is in social media. The government should be more active in socializing information in social media.

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