

THE PROBLEM OF THE YOUTH'S RELIGIOUS IDENTITY FORMATION IN THE FRONTIER TERRITORIES OF THE NORTHERN CASPIAN SEA REGION: CONTEMPORARY ASPECT

Vyacheslav Sergeevich Dryagalov*, Mikhail Sergeevich Topchiev* and Olesya Sergeevna Yakushenkova*

Abstract: The article focuses on studying the formation specificity of the youth's religious identity in the frontier territories of the Northern Caspian Sea region and the influence of the contemporary transgression processes on it. In the poly-cultural region with the high mosaicism index and intensive migration flows the formation of religious identity occurs under the effect of the specific features of the frontier territories. The study aims at the determination of the main vectors of the religious identity formation and the course of transgression processes as well as the reflection of these processes in the youth's world view. The research methodology is based on the frontier approach and the basic methods of social studies. The study educes the change of the youth's value orientations caused by the change of the confessional landscape, the main vectors of religious transgression and the differentiation of the respondents' attitudes to this process.

Keywords: A poly-confessional region, religious transgression, religious identity, Islam, Christianity, values, youth, frontier, Northern Caspian Sea region.

INTRODUCTION

The processes of globalization and glocalisation and intensive migration have recently started to affect those territories which were considered rather stable in respect of cross-cultural communications before. The expansion of the information space, the emergence of transnational network structures, migration flows of both internal and external migration that are sometimes insufficiently controlled have an effect on the world view and value system of the modern youth. However, the important part of the Russian young people's development has still been the formation of their cultural and religious identity despite all changes. Religious identity is linked with the value system which dictates the behavioral living position of a person in many respects. The mono-cultural and mono-religious environment forms the fairly traditional mechanisms of religious self-identification practically since the birth of a person. In their turn, frontier areas represent the territory of active cross-cultural contacts therefore transgression processes including religious ones appear here more intensively and must be studied closely. The Russian Federation which territory is situated on the crossing of many geographical, political and cultural interests uniting the West and the East has a number of border territories which cultural outlines are unstable and are created by mobile and more often migrating people. Some of such areas are of a particular interest because of a number of

* Astrakhan State University, 414056, Tatischeva 20a Astrakhan, Russia

historical reasons. In the south of Russia, Astrakhan region is such an area which territory is specified as the Russian territory of the Northern Caspian Sea region*.

The Northern Caspian Sea region is a territory of frontier and intensive cross-cultural and interreligious contacts. From the confessional point of view this territory and first of all Astrakhan region is unique to a large extent even for the South of Russia. According to the experts the distinctive feature of its ethnic structure is the lowest specific density of the Russian ethnic group and the highest index of ethnic mosaic by B. Eckel in comparison to other regions, areas and some republics of the Russian Federation. (Zeletdinova & Lagutkin, 2008) Following the results of the All-Russia population census of 2002 the index was higher than in the other regions of central part and the south of Russia – 0.4888.

Correspondingly, the index of confessional mosaic (Manakov, 2002), which is not used by researchers very often, is also higher. The index of confessional mosaic reflects the level of a poly-confessionality of the territory and exemplifies the existence of diverse confessional groups with various world view orientations in the Caspian Sea region and Astrakhan region. As well as the index of ethnic mosaic it is also calculated by the formula:

$$P_j = 1 - \sum_{i=1}^m \frac{n_i}{N_j} ;$$

P_j – index of religious mosaic;

m – number of religious groups in an area (j);

n_i – specific density, rate of the representatives of a religious group (i) in the population structure of an area (j). (Savchenko, 2010).

The index of the confessional mosaic of Astrakhan region calculated by us makes 0.6156. For example, the index of the confessional mosaic of Stavropol Krai that is also not mono-religious is 0.30725.

In poly-cultural and poly-confessional region with high mosaicness the border between cultural and confessional identities is rather flexible. Even their definitions are formulated differently: cultural identity is a process of one's identification with a certain cultural group (Ennaji, 2005); ethnic identity represents the identification with a certain ethnic group (Wijeyesinghe, Jackson, 2001; Phinney, Ong, 2007); and confessional identity stands for the identification with the feeling of belonging to a certain confessional group (King, Elder, Whitbeck, 1997; Arweck, Nesbitt, 2010). Besides, all these identities develop long enough, under the influence of the environment, cultural and ethnic traditions of a group and the value system that are typical for this cultural, ethnic or confessional group. In the poly-cultural and poly-

* The term "Caspian Sea region" has been used since the XVIII-th century to denote the areas, bordering the Caspian Sea. The Caspian Sea region is divided after the compass points. Except for southern Iran almost its whole territory was a part of the USSR till it was dissolved. The territories of the Republic of Kalmykia and Astrakhan region are considered to belong to the Northern Caspian Sea region.

confessional mosaic space where most inhabitants have general identification with the Russian culture, with their own ethnic group by the birth, and the confessional identification which cannot match the commonly accepted confession of the ethnic group, the formation of religious identity becomes complicated and unpredictable. Here we would like to make clear that we consider religious and confessional identities synonyms in this study. Currently, the important place in the formation of the religious identity is taken by poorly studied transgression processes that the youth observes in the modern society. Especially, it is characteristic for the frontier territories including the Northern Caspian Sea region.

It is worth-mentioning that it started to consider the Northern Caspian Sea region as a certain historical and cultural integrity not so long ago (Kundakbaeva, 2005) although there are a lot of narrative sources which describe the travels around the region (Gmelin A.G., Olearius A., Jenkinson A., etc.). They also contain cultural characteristics of the main nationalities, inhabiting these territories, their confessional structure and the features of their inter-confessional communications. It was historically developed so that the Northern Caspian Sea region has been the crossing of three world religions (Romanova, 2005). A fair number of the scientific papers by the regional researchers are dedicated to the diachronic aspect of this problem (Victorin, 2000; Victorin, 2008; Syzranov, 2012, Romanova, 2007). The systematic studies of the problems of the Caspian Sea region frontier was initiated in 2005 after the creation of the Laboratory for Studying Socio-Political and Cultural Dynamics of the Peoples of the Lower Volga Region and Caspian Sea Region at Astrakhan State University which was jointed with the Institute of Philosophy of the Russian Academy of Sciences in 2008. The scientific activity strategy of the laboratory is made by two Russian scientists A.P. Romanova and S.N. Yakushenkov. Although transgression was also described in narrative sources (Baddeley, 2013) and in the research papers of the contemporary foreign scientists (Khodarkovsky, 2011), (Barreth, 2000) in the context of the South of Russia (Caucasian frontier in the diachronic aspect), the historical aspect of the religious transgression in the Russian territory of the Northern Caspian Sea region was first touched upon in the research papers of Yakushenkov S.N. and Romanova A.P. (Romanova, Yakushenkov, 2012; Romanova, 2014; Romanova, Topchiev, Baeva, 2014), as it is well-known that the study of the specificities of the frontier territories was involved as well the problems related to the transgression since the time of F. Turner (Turner, 1996) and Billington (Billington, 1960).

Transgression is one of phenomena of modern culture in the last decades. The global migration caused by the processes occurring in the world economy has been gradually changing the geographical, political and religious boundaries of the world. Historically settled cultural areas are reshaped in a new way and this often starts the processes which prove to be unpredictable or uncontrollable owing to their specificity and poor studies. The term “transgression” was originally used mainly

by the philosophers of postmodernism and literally meant “to go beyond limits”, some kind of experience of a limit fixing the situation of crossing a border which is described in culture as intransgressible, and the experience revealing the condition of this transition. The idea of the transgression experience is formulated in Zh. Bataille’s works and numerous comments to them of M. Foucault, M. Blanchot, J. Derrida, etc. M. Blanchot calls the transgression phenomenon an ‘experience-limit’, describing the horizons that transgression opens as the opportunities, “provided after the implementation of all possible opportunities which put down all the previous ones and eliminate them quietly” (Blanchot, 1994). According to M. Foucault, transgression is a gesture which is directed to a limit; there, on the thinnest break of the line, the reflection of its passing, perhaps also all totality of its trajectory and even its source flickers” (Foucault, 1994).

G. Bataille understood the transgression phenomena as “the extreme limit of the possible”, “ecstatic experience” without regard to the limits set from outside”, a shift, the crossing of borders, going beyond the limits of conventionality of socio-cultural norms and moral prohibitions. (Bataille).

So, transgression is directly associated with a boundary phenomenon. It implies the transition which breaks or erases a boundary (Foucault, 1994). In the course of transgression, different ways of the relations between a center and a periphery and between a center and borders are established. The center and the periphery are not opposed to each other. It is possible due to the unavailability of a uniform center. In fact, the temporarily localizable center can be different in every transgression process. It results in the impossibility to find out neither the hierarchical relations between discourse elements nor the main existential and semantic perspective.

If the uniform fixed and diffused center disappears, the status of the border changes. It gets transparent and unsteady. In the view of transgression, the unavailability of a clear boundary leads to the migration of one discourse to another. Then, it turns to be impossible to determine their borders. Instead of the certainty, the transgression sets the free variation of the significance, keeping away from invariance.

The concept “frontier”, in contrast to direct concept “border” and “limit”, acquired absolutely special sense in the humanitarian studies. A frontier is something that is beyond limits. This is the line behind which we do not know what is there. It is the life at the limit or beyond the limit of social traditions. It has no “borders”, and as “at border” and “abroad” do not have the same meaning, the life at a frontier fundamentally differs from the life beyond frontier (Yakushenkov, 2015; Yakushenkov, Romanova, Baeva, Khlyshcheva, Morozova, Yakushenkova, 2014).

We would like to point out that a frontier is a complicated and complex phenomenon. It comprises not only economic, geographical, political or historical,

but also philosophical, cultural, and spiritual-mental aspects. The matter is that borders are the most intense, potentially conflict and sense-making areas of the cultural space which determine the relations Own-Alien. It happens because of the greatest distance of this place from the center of the “own” world. Hence, a border is the space of the minimal influence of own defenses. This territory is the place where the laws of Different, the alien world are in effect. If borders are considered as the specific lines of differentiating sovereignties, societies, countries, nationalities, safety, cultures, economies, etc., a frontier is after all some kind of invisible and spatial line to which limits the community of population identity extends.

At this stage, a frontier is understood as a special system of cross-cultural communications that can appear in the area where different cultures contact (Romanova, 2015).

In addition, the frontier territory has the following features: a higher mobility in comparison with the interior territory, the movement of people's big groups, and new forms of cultural and social contacts. However, such zones are most vulnerable in terms of stability of poly-cultural society, bordering other territories and falling under the “migration pressure” (Khlyshcheva, 2013). This makes the findings of the studies, carried out by the Laboratory and dedicated to the problems of the Caspian Sea region frontier, more interesting and topical. The results of the social researches are of special interest and enable to obtain the up-to-date data on the issues of interest. The early studies which the authors of the article took part in were conducted in the period of 2010-2013 to explore the ethnic and religious self-identification and tolerance level in the university students' environment. The students of the Astrakhan city were a research object. The peculiarities of the ethnic identity in the poly-cultural region represented a research subject. The survey of the Astrakhan youth's opinion was chosen as the main research method (N = 200). The survey results were published (Dryagalov, Topchiev, 2014).

The detailed analysis of the results of one more complex sociological research, carried out by the authors within the framework of project MK-7152.2015.6 “The Socio-Cultural Analysis of the Religious Transgression Mechanisms in the Territory of Astrakhan Region as a Parts of the Caspian Sea Region Frontier” of the Russian President's grant for young scientists (Candidates of Sciences) is provided below. It should be emphasized that there are very few scientific papers on a complex research of the religious transgression in the territory of the Northern Caspian Sea region. The influence of the transgression processes on the formation of the religious identity in the frontier territories has not also been studied.

For a long time, the shifts from one religion to another remained a problem of that confession which the adherents left and depended generally on the internal preferences and conscious choice of the leaving adherents who had to overcome

numerous obstacles including moral ones. The modern aspect of the religious transgression was developed owing to its orientation to the information anarchy, generated by the Internet, the fashion for the religion affiliation and the incapability of modern Russian culture to react adequately to the persistent challenges of western culture which is actively passing through the postmodern phase, and literally bombing younger generation with more and more sophisticated simulated images through all the media, available to the attack. Currently, when transgression processes of the shifts to Islam of other confessions have intensified, mainly the shifts of the young representatives of ethnic groups who initially did not practice Islam, the analysis of the shift situation and the attitude towards it in poly-confessional frontier territories is getting very topical, especially due to the fact that this problem aspect has been poorly studied. The specificities of these processes at a frontier significantly differ from the course of the same processes in the regions with historically developed mono-ethnic and mono-confessional population.

The co-authors of the research analyzed the typology of transgressions in details in one of their previous papers (Yakushenkova, Yakushenkov, 2014). First of all, we were interested in the religious transgression that the authors have discussed in their research and defined as going beyond the religion limits and the shift to another religion. Objectively, such shifts can be found at all stages of the mankind existence therefore if we closely study religious texts, it will be possible to reveal the instructions and rules regulating the stage of “entry” of new followers to a religion and preventing the “exit” from it or the “shift” to another religion.

In this case, the individual and voluntary shifts were mainly emphasized. The authors hypothesized that the transgression processes become more active and form the tolerant attitude towards them in the frontier territories, in the areas of multiculturalism and the “mobility” of borders, in the situation of high confessional mosaicism. This hypothesis has been proved by the statistical methods.

METHODOLOGY OF RESEARCH

To prove the hypothesis, a large-scale social research was implemented at Astrakhan State University in November 2015 and in June and July 2016, that studied the opinion of over 900 students, including the students of the Master programmes, trained different specialties.

A frontier approach was applied as the core method that enabled to consider the Northern Caspian Sea region as a frontier territory, the “between” territory where the processes of active cross-cultural contacts and cultural borrowings have historically proceeded. Exactly here, the transgression processes in any sphere - cultural, political, religious - run more actively and more dynamically. Both diachronic and synchronous research methods were used for the study, as “frontier” is not only

historical category and keeps appearing and existing in various areas and spheres: network frontier (Morozova, 2016), megalopolis frontier (Dufoix, 2005), scientific frontier (Baeva, 2014).

The main methods of collecting and analyzing the empirical data of the survey were questionnaire survey, depth interview, focus group interview, analysis of one-dimensional and two-dimensional distributions, grouping of data, comparative analysis, analysis of central tendency measures, correlation analysis, dispersive analysis, and t-tests. The mathematical analysis of the data was accomplished, using professional computer program of statistical data processing: IBM SPSS Statistics 21.0.

Three focus group interviews were held with the representatives of various confessions and world view orientations: 1) with the students (eight participants: 2 – Christianity, 2 – Islam, 2 – agnosticism, 1 – pantheism, 1 – has refused to answer the question on the confession affiliation); 2) with the students of Master programmes (five participants: 1 – Islam, 1 – has refused to answer the question of the confessional affiliation, 3 – Christianity); 3) with foreign students, representing different confessions (3 – Orthodoxy, 3 – Islam). Six depth interviews with the representatives of various confessions (Buddhism, Islam, and Christianity) were carried out as well.

Available cluster sampling was applied in carrying out the social research. The sample size of the quantitative research made 433 respondents in 2015.

In 2016 the sample size of the quantitative research was 421 respondents.

To simplify the analysis, the sampling was divided into two parts:

1. The first 17-25 age group (under the age of 25) – (782 respondents);
2. The second 26-59 age group (over the age of 25) – (72 respondents).

RESULTS

The project has the following practical research goals:

1. to study the value orientations of the students and Master students of Astrakhan State University,
2. to determine the religiosity level of the students and Master students of Astrakhan State University,
3. to analyze the processes of the religious transgression among the students and Master students of Astrakhan State University.

To meet the first goal, the respondents were given the list of twenty-two value paradigms from which they could choose not more than five items that are the most important for them (Table 1).

TABLE 1: THE SUMMARY TABLE OF THE VALUE PARADIGMS

<i>November 2015</i>			<i>June 2016, under the age of 25</i>			<i>June 2016, over the age of 25</i>		
<i>Value</i>	<i>Rank</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>Value</i>	<i>Rank</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>Value</i>	<i>Rank</i>	<i>%</i>
Family	1	90.5	Family	1	90.5	Family	1	87.5
Health	2	72.6	Health	2	69.6	Health	2	86.1
Love	3	53.8	Love	3	55.9	Love	3	56.9
Congenial job	4	33.5	Money, material benefits	4	33.5	Congenial job	4	33.3
Freedom	5	31.3	Congenial job	5	30.9	Money, material benefits	5	31.9
Money, material benefits	6	28.1	Self-realization	6	28.4	Self-realization	6	29.2
Communication with friends	7	27.4	Freedom	7	26.9	Healthy life-style	7	23,6
Self-realization	8	26.4	Communication with friends	8	25.5	Freedom	8	20.8
Justice	9	19.8	Justice	9	19.5	Justice	9	20.8
God	10	14.9	Creative work	10	16.6	Communication with friends	10	16.7
Creative work	11	13.9	God	11	13.8	God	11	16.7
Native land, Motherland	12	13.4	Healthy life-style	12	13.5	Independence	12	16.7
Independence	13	13.2	Native land, Motherland	13	11.7	Native land, Motherland	13	13.9
Healthy life-style	14	12.7	Personal safety	14	11.7	Creative work	14	12.5
Religion	15	10.8	Religion	15	11.2	Commune with the nature	15	6.9
Personal safety	16	8.1	Honest life	16	10.3	Personal safety	16	5.6
Honest life	17	5.6	Independence	17	10.3	Honest life	17	5.6
Commune with nature	18	5.1	Commune with the nature	18	6.9	Religion	18	4.2
Prestige	19	3.4	Traditions	19	5.2	Traditions	19	4.2
Traditions	20	2.4	Power	20	4.0	Power	20	2.8
Power	21	2.2	Prestige	21	3.2	Prestige	21	1.4
Fame	22	2.0	Fame	22	1.4	Fame	22	-

By reference to the obtained data, we can assert that the axiological pyramid is topped by the triad, consisting of the combination “family” – “health” – “love”.

These values are fundamental and are propagandized by the government among modern Russian people. That is to say, the data confirm that the development vector, approved by the Russian government, is actively implemented and is high-priority for several generations at this stage.

The respondents' attitude towards the following categories is the most significant for achieving the goals of ours research (Table 2).

TABLE 2: BRIEF SUMMARY TABLE OF VALUE PARADIGMS

<i>November 2015</i>			<i>June 2016, under the age of 25</i>			<i>June 2016, over the age of 25</i>		
<i>Value</i>	<i>Rank</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>Value</i>	<i>Rank</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>Value</i>	<i>Rank</i>	<i>%</i>
God	10	14.9	God	11	13.8	God	11	16.7
Religion	15	10.8	Religion	15	11.2	Religions	18	4.2
Traditions	20	2.4	Traditions	19	5.2	Traditions	19	4.2

The data show that the respondents of the senior group chose the answer "God" more often unlike the representatives of the younger age group. It makes possible to assume if the research was conducted in the group of elder respondents, this category would be chosen more often. However, it just the assumption which requires to be proved. It is also necessary to mention the significant tendency in view of our research. In the younger age group, the religion dominates over the tradition, but in the senior age group the religion and tradition are perceived as a certain integrated coherent process.

To determine the level of the religiosity, the respondents were asked the relevant questions. Table 3 presents the following results, obtained from the respondents' answers.

TABLE 3: RELIGIOSITY

<i>Do you consider yourself to be a person who practices any religion?</i>	<i>November 2015</i>	<i>June 2016</i>	
		<i>under the age of 25</i>	<i>over the age of 25</i>
Yes	42.0%	35.5%	35.2%
Rather yes than no	23.3%	25.5%	28.2%
Rather no than yes	11.1%	14.0%	16.9%
No	16.9%	19.5%	14.1%
Hard to answer	6.7%	5.5%	5.6%

The obtained data tells about rather high degree of the religiosity of students in both age groups that gives the reason to state that the obtained data reflect a real situation about the Astrakhan students.

Indirectly, these data are supported by the distribution of the respondent's answers in the assessment of their agreement with the formulation "I believe in God":

- In November 2015, 46.4% of the respondents surely answered that they believe in God, 9.8% - have evaluated their confidence with "6" points from seven possible. That is to say it is possible to assume that the rate of the respondents who "sincerely believe" makes 56.2% (plus 8.6% of "believing respondents but a little doubting");
- In June 2016, 45.5% of the respondents from the first age group absolutely agreed with the statement that they believe in God, 7.9% - evaluated their confidence with "6" points from seven possible. We can hypothesize that the rate of "the respondents who sincerely believe" makes 53.4% (plus 7.6% of the respondents, "believing but a little doubting»).

Taking into account the characteristics of the sample, these distinctions are not essential and fall within a statistical error.

- At the same time it is worth paying attention to the second age group of 2016: the number of "the respondents who sincerely believe" is 58.1% (the distinctions from the other groups are not essential), but the numbers of the respondents, not believing and believing to a "medium degree", considerably differ. 25.9% of the respondents in November 2015, 28.7% of the research participants of the first age group in 2016 and only 15% of the respondents of the second age group indicated 1-3 points. At the same time 17.9% of the respondents in 2015, 15.5% of the respondents from the first age group of 2016 and 28.9% of the respondents of the second age group in 2016 evaluated their agreement with the statement at 4-5 points (Table 4).

TABLE 4: BELIEF IN GOD.

<i>To what extent do you agree with the statement "I believe in God"? Evaluate your answer using to a 7-point scale. 1 – strongly disagree, 7 – strongly agree</i>	<i>November 2015</i>	<i>June 2016</i>	
		<i>under the age of 25</i>	<i>over the age of 25</i>
1 – strongly disagree	9.8%	12.3%	3.0%
2	8.9%	8.2%	4.5%
3	7.2%	8.2%	7.5%
4	9.3%	10.3%	9.0%
5	8.6%	7.6%	17.9%
6	9.8%	7.9%	7.5%
7 – strongly agree	46.4%	45.5%	50.6%

Consequently, the obtained statistical results enable us to tell that the senior generation of the students is less atheistic and inclines to believe in God more than the younger students. It proves that people as they grow up gradually reanalyze their life experience and come from the simple keeping of the traditions within their religions to the realization of God and strengthening of their beliefs.

This assumption confirms the distribution of the opinions on the question of the confessional self-identification. In spite of the fact that all three groups have estimated the religiosity nearly equally, the affiliation to any religion in the second age group in 2016 was shown more essentially than in the others (Table 5).

TABLE 5: CONFESSIONAL SELF-IDENTIFICATION.

<i>What religion (world view) do you practice?</i>	<i>November 2015</i>	<i>June 2016</i>	
		<i>under the age of 25</i>	<i>over the age of 25</i>
Christianity	45.1%	40.8%	54.2%
Islam	30.6%	29.9%	36.1%
Buddhism	2.3%	3.4%	–
Judaism	0.5%	0.3%	1.4%
Atheism	8.1%	10.3%	–
Other	5.6%	5.7%	4.2%
Hard to answer	7.9%	9.6%	4.1%

The information on the atheistic interviewed students acquired from the survey is of special interest in this context. In 2015, 8.1% of the respondents affiliated themselves with atheism, 10.3% of the respondents did the same in the first group of 2016 but in the second age group of 2016 none of the respondents reckoned himself/herself among atheists. It proves once again that the second age group of the students (over the age of 25) tends towards the religion and belief in God more than the first age group of the respondents (aged 17-25).

A series of in-depth interviews found out that religiosity can be adopted as a result of family education (familiarization with ancestors' traditions from the early childhood that is followed by non-critical perception of religious dogmas) and conscious choice while obtaining life experience. The first type of religiosity adoption is more common for patriarchal families with traditional lifestyle pattern (village inhabitants in Dagestan and the Astrakhan region), the second one – for other social groups.

For the third objective of the research the respondents answered a set of questions. After analysis of their answers, we could make a conclusion on whether the hypothesis is true or wrong.

The first question dealt with the knowledge of the facts of religious transgression. The results are represented in the following table (Table 6).

TABLE 6. POSSESSING INFORMATION ON A SHIFT IN RELIGIOUS ALLEGIANCE FROM ONE RELIGION TO ANOTHER

<i>Do you know any cases of shift in religious allegiance from one religion to another?</i>	<i>November 2015</i>	<i>June 2016</i>	
		<i>Under 25 years old</i>	<i>Over 25 years old</i>
Yes	53.3%	59.6%	63.9%
No	46.7%	40.4%	36.1%

It is important to note that 63.9% of respondents from the second age group know about such cases, that is 4.3% of respondents more than from the first age group, which was interviewed in 2016, and 10.6% of respondents more than from the same age group interviewed in 2015. Though the differences are not statistically significant, while interpreting the data, it is important to consider different information sources of analyzed groups. Our research results prove this (Table 7).

TABLE 7: MAIN INFORMATION SOURCES OF NEWS ON RELIGIOUS TOPICS BY AGE

<i>Please, tick, which sources of information you use when you run into news on religious topics more often?</i>	<i>Under 25 years old</i>	<i>Please, tick, which sources of information you use when you run into news on religious topics more often?</i>	<i>Over 25 years old</i>
Television	67.2%	Television	67.6%
Social networks on the Internet	54.9%	Parents, relatives	43.7%
Parents, relatives	33.9%	Social networks on the Internet	39.4%
Friends, acquaintances	28.4%	Newspapers, magazines	26.8%
Newspapers, magazines	17.2%	Newspapers, magazines	25.4%
Religious organizations representatives	14.7%	Religious organizations representatives	15.5%
Specialized websites	6.6%	Specialized websites	11.3%
Radio stations	5.7%	Radio stations	9.9%

In this way, the obtained data prove the fact that expanding of informational space and development of multinational network structures influence worldview and value system of today's youth.

A wide range of data has proven that a shift of worldview paradigm depends on age. Particularly, the social distance from transgression facts was studied to analyze respondents' possession of information on a shift in religious allegiance (Table 8).

TABLE 8: SOCIAL DISTANCE FROM TRANSGRESSION CASES

<i>Where particularly have you encountered situations of shift in religious allegiance from one religion to another?</i>	<i>November 2015</i>	<i>June 2016</i>	
		<i>Under 25 years old</i>	<i>Over 25 years old</i>
In your family	11.3%	4.5%	7.0%
In the family of your relatives	7.8%	7.0%	7.0%
Among close friends and acquaintances of your family	10.4%	14.6%	16.3%
Among your friends	21.6%	26.1%	30.2%
Among your friends' acquaintances	47.2%	46.2%	37.2%
Other	1.7%	1.6%	2.3%

A noteworthy aspect is that the respondents who identify themselves as Christians faced shift cases mainly in the “outer circle of communication” (80.2%), i.e. among the acquaintances and strangers who do not have social ties with the respondents. We see another situation among Muslims: the “outer circle” still has the largest number of shift cases but with less margin – 60%; the “inner circle” records 21.4% of cases and the “middle” one – 18.6% (Table 9).

TABLE 9: SOCIAL DISTANCE FROM TRANSGRESSION CASES BY CONFESSIONS

<i>Confessional identity</i>	<i>Social environment</i>		
	<i>Inner circle</i>	<i>Middle circle</i>	<i>Outer circle</i>
Christianity	12.3%	7,5%	80,2%
Islam	21.4%	18,6%	60,0%

As a result, we can note that much more often the respondents who identify themselves as Muslims encounter shift cases directly, in the circle of their close friends and relatives with whom they have close social ties and have an opportunity to assess consequences of such an event more objectively.

Predominant shift vector is a shift in religious allegiance from Christianity to Islam, the second is a shift in religious allegiance from Islam to Christianity (23%-28.9%). Year and age group differences are not statistically significant (Table 10).

TABLE 10: TRANSGRESSION VECTOR

<i>Which shift in religious allegiance was it?</i>	<i>November 2015</i>	<i>June 2016</i>	
		<i>Under 25 years old</i>	<i>Over 25 years old</i>
Christianity-Islam	70.4%	63.2%	68.5%
Islam-Christianity	27.7%	24.2%	24.1%
Christianity-Non-traditional religions	6.6%	6.0%	3.7%
Christianity-Buddhism	2.8%	8.2%	5.6%
Islam-Buddhism	2.8%	2.7%	1.9%

<i>Which shift in religious allegiance was it?</i>	<i>November 2015</i>	<i>June 2016</i>	
		<i>Under 25 years old</i>	<i>Over 25 years old</i>
Buddhism-Christianity	2.3%	0.5%	–
Christianity-Judaism	1.4%	0.5%	1.9%
Islam-Non-traditional religions	1.4%	2.2%	7.4%
Non-traditional religions-Christianity	1.4%	0.5%	–
Christianity-Christianity	0.9%	0.5%	–
Non-traditional religions - Islam	0.9%	0.5%	–
Islam-Islam	0.5%	2.2%	9.3%
Buddhism-Buddhism	0.5%	–	–
Buddhism-Islam	0.5%	1.1%	–
Judaism-Christianity	0.5%	–	–
Judaism-Non-traditional religions	–	0.5%	–
Judaism-Islam	–	0.5%	–
Non-traditional religions-Judaism	–	0.5%	–

A noteworthy aspect is a distribution of residence geography as the respondents who were not born in the Astrakhan region can be divided into two large groups representing two different regions: European (Crimea, East Ukraine, Central Russia) and Asian (North Caucasus regions, Kalmykia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan).

This distribution shows that a shift in religious allegiance from Christianity to Islam is most common in the Asian region (83.3%), where Islam is a dominating religion and in the villages of the Astrakhan region (72.9%).

There is no shift in religious allegiance from Islam to Christianity in the Asian region. The shift from Christianity to Non-traditional religions is noted most often in the European region where one will not find many Islam followers (however, it should be noted that the majority of respondents from the European region have been living in Crimea where Islam is represented by the Crimean Tatars ethnos and it is not marginal) (Table 11).

TABLE 11: TRANSGRESSION VECTOR BY RESIDENCE GEOGRAPHY

<i>Transgression vector</i>	<i>Residence geography</i>				
	<i>Astrakhan</i>	<i>Astrakhan region towns</i>	<i>Astrakhan region villages</i>	<i>European region</i>	<i>Asian region</i>
Christianity-Non-traditional religions	5.9%	–	4.2%	25.0%	8.3%
Christianity-Islam	69.6%	66.7%	72.9%	58.3%	83.3%
Islam-Christianity	30.4%	33.3%	31.3%	8.3%	–
Islam-Non-traditional religions	0.7%	–	2.1%	–	8.3%
Islam-Islam	–	–	–	–	8.3%

We should note that during focus group interviews the majority of respondents also told about familiar shift cases from Christianity to Islam and Islam was considered in a broad sense without clarifying its certain branch or movement. There is a case described by an informant (an adult woman with in-depth religious knowledge). At first, she indicated a shift from Christianity to Islam and later she specified it was the shift to “the most radical Islam movement, Wahhabism”. It means, basing on scientific evidence we cannot know what respondents meant in “Islam” category (classic, “radical” movements or branches related to “sectarian” and “destructive” ones) as, firstly, they were not qualified enough to diversify movements; secondly, they did not have enough information to make any judgement and considered only external signs which they could identify.

Analyzing respondents' attitude to various types of transgression vectors we can note that a greater part of the research participants is neutral towards such cases (Table 12).

TABLE 12: ATTITUDE TO SHIFT FROM TRADITIONAL RELIGION TO TRADITIONAL ONE

<i>What is your attitude to people who have changed their religion or worldview?</i>	<i>November 2015</i>	<i>June 2016</i>	
		<i>Under 25 years old</i>	<i>Over 25 years old</i>
Extremely negative	6.3%	6.6%	3.3%
Negative	8.7%	8.0%	7.9%
Neutral	70.5%	66.4%	47.6%
Positive	8.2%	11.6%	19.0%
Extremely positive	1.2%	1.0%	6.3%
Difficult to say	5.1%	6.4%	15.9%

Unanimous censure of the shift to non-traditional religions by all informants should also be noted. However, we should point out that the second age group representatives is more positive about such a shift than respondents from the first one (Table 13).

TABLE 13: ATTITUDE TO SHIFT FROM TRADITIONAL RELIGION TO NON-TRADITIONAL ONE

<i>What is your attitude to people who have changed their religion or worldview?</i>	<i>November 2015</i>	<i>June 2016</i>	
		<i>Under 25 years old</i>	<i>Over 25 years old</i>
Extremely negative	13.9%	11,7%	14,5%
Negative	22,1%	18,7%	22,6%
Neutral	56,7%	61,7%	38,7%

<i>What is your attitude to people who have changed their religion or worldview?</i>	<i>November 2015</i>	<i>June 2016</i>	
		<i>Under 25 years old</i>	<i>Over 25 years old</i>
Positive	1,7%	1,7%	6,5%
Extremely Positive	1,5%	–	4,8%
Difficult to say	4,1%	6,3%	12,9%

The next table also shows prevalence of neutral attitude to the transgression process (Table 14).

TABLE 14: ATTITUDE TO SHIFT FROM NON-TRADITIONAL RELIGION TO TRADITIONAL ONE

<i>What is your attitude to people who have changed their religion or worldview?</i>	<i>November 2015</i>	<i>June 2016</i>	
		<i>Under 25 years old</i>	<i>Over 25 years old</i>
Extremely negative	6.1%	3.7%	3.2%
Negative	4.2%	6.1%	6.5%
Neutral	62.7%	63.0%	45.2%
Positive	20.1%	18.5%	21.0%
Extremely Positive	2.7%	2.0%	6.5%
Difficult to say	4.2%	6.7%	17.7%

Respondents are mostly neutral to those who have become atheists. Nevertheless, the junior age group is more judgmental to such cases and we admit it can be caused mainly by their intemperate youth speaking. Representatives from the elder age group were more often unsure about answering the question that can be ascribed to any personal reasons (Table 15).

TABLE 15: ATTITUDE TO THOSE WHO HAVE BECOME ATHEISTS

<i>What is your attitude to people who have changed their religion or worldview?</i>	<i>November 2015</i>	<i>June 2016</i>	
		<i>Under 25 years old</i>	<i>Over 25 years old</i>
Extremely negative	14.9%	16.5%	8.3%
Negative	13.2%	9.4%	16.7%
Neutral	58.7%	58.9%	50.0%
Positive	5.9%	6.4%	5.0%
Extremely Positive	4.6%	3.4%	1.7%
Difficult to say	2.7%	5.4%	18.3%

Information from focus group interviews also proves data given above. The majority of informants did not think cases of religious allegiance shift are matters

for concern. They explained it was a personal choice of someone conducted transgression and religion has a little impact on life of a modern human. It leads to the fact that the shift does not seriously affect neither behavior nor worldview of a person. He or she may become Different for the society but not Alien. The majority will consider him or her "the same" so it does not cause concerns or misunderstanding of other people. On the other hand, religious informants (Christians) were negative about such an experience. They could not explain their point of view that means their reaction was only emotional. It is worth analyzing respondents' answers distribution on their confessions on that question.

Islam representatives are much more positive about a shift in religious allegiance from Traditional religion to another Traditional one. This fact can be explained that Muslims instinctively know the predominant transgression vector (from Christianity to Islam) and the lack of risks threatening the confessional security. There is exactly the opposite situation with Christians. They instinctively feel risks threatening the confessional security (high religiosity level of Islam representatives, high amount of shifts from Christianity to Islam), which causes an aggressive defense mechanism.

Significantly, a shift to atheism is criticized by both confessions, much more than a shift in religious allegiance to another Traditional religion. However, Muslims show most intolerance.

During focus group interviews informants indicated the following main reasons for a shift in religious allegiance from one religion to another (it should be noted that the reasons refer to cases of transgression from Christianity to Islam, as other shifts were not familiar to informants):

- a shift to future husband's religion by a young woman, who decided to marry Islam representative. The transgression is conducted mostly under partner's and/or his family pressure. The majority of respondents were negative about such reason for religion shift as, firstly, the shift is conducted under pressure and, secondly, it indicates her casual attitude to the religion issue;
- a shift to Islam by a young man based on a conscious choice. The transgression was indicated for men aged 25-30. It could be conducted during reinterpretation of their lives and age-related value paradigm shift accompanied by vigorous activity of Islam representatives, who managed to persuade neophytes their religion corresponds to a person's changed value paradigm;
- a shift to Islam by teenagers who grew up in cross-ethnic families where religion either was not determined by his/her parents and the child had a right to choose confession at the age of reason or the determined religion did not correspond to his/her religious identity and he/she decided to

change confessional affiliation to the one that met his/her value system and worldview.

While discussing the topic of a conscious religion choice by a child, the vast majority of respondents was positive about such experience and did not consider it as unordinary.

These findings were used to carry out the factual analysis and draw relevant conclusions.

DISCUSSION

Regional researchers note historically formed devout religiosity among population of the North Caspian Sea region. (Romanova, Topchiev, 2011) The research conducted in 2010-2013 showed that 51.9% of respondents said religion was the main ethnos unity force. (Dryagalov, Topchiev, 2014, P. 101). Our studies in 2015-2016 showed that the religiosity level in the region had even slightly increased (56.2%).

However, in recent times the confessional landscape of the North Caspian Sea region changed, particularly in the Astrakhan region. In the late 19th century the Astrakhan County Statistic Committee estimated there were about 66% of Christians in the region (including Orthodox Christians, Catholics, Protestants, Old Believers and others); 25% of Buddhists and 8% of Muslims. Thus, the whole population of the Astrakhan region belonged mostly to three world religions. Other confessions (for example, Judaism) accounted for less than 1% of population, so we can talk about stable confession allocation among three world religions (Romanova, 2005; Romanova, Baeva, 2007, P. 65-66). After comparing these figures with global ones in 1900 the proportion of the main world religions can be represented this way: Christians – 34%; Muslims – 13.3%; Buddhists – 7.7%; nonreligious – 0.3% (Tul'skij, 2001, P. 111-113). As a result, we see that by the beginning of the 20th century the confessional landscape of the Astrakhan County differed from the global one.

By the beginning of the 21st century, considering the approximate ratio of followers, the confessional landscape in the Astrakhan region significantly changed: Christians – 30%, Muslims – 25%, Buddhists – 1%, nonreligious – 40% (Victorin, Idrisov, 2004). The fact that Islam became the second according to the number of followers is proved by conclusions of the expert group of the Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology of the Russian Academy of Sciences under guidance of V.A. Tishkov, the member of the RAS. (Tishkov, 2013)

Despite the fact that Islam is historically traditional for this region, Muslim communities intensified in Astrakhan only after the Perestroika period in the USSR. Before 1991 there were just 7 communities, there were 43 of them by 2000 (Socio-economic development, 2001) and in 2008 there were 61. Whereas the increase of Muslim communities in the Astrakhan region was more significant than in some

other regions of the North Caucasus. The North Caspian Sea region registered 20 communities, North Ossetia – 19, Adygea – 14 and Ingushetia – 6. (Chernous, 2001)

Recently the Muslim communities not only increase their representation in the North Caspian Sea region but according to our research, Muslim representatives show more devout religiosity. All studied confessional groups have similar core values (family, health, love) but the value structure differs. The Muslim worldview considers religion to be more significant than Christians' and nonreligious' do. The Muslim religious identity is more stable. Only one third of respondents know about cases of transgression to other confessions.

We should note that in recent times the diachronic aspect of the religious transgression in its literature or art aspects attracted many experts (Rostad, 2006; Lee, 2012). The confessional transgression is studied both in local spaces (Mendonça, 2012) and as a part of history of events (Oosterbaan, 2011), as an impact of new cults on the traditional religious landscape (Collins-Kreiner, 2008).

In the frontier territory of the North Caspian Sea region there is a high percentage of religious transgression cases. Now, the main transgression vector is a shift in religious allegiance from Christianity to Islam whereas these processes are reported in the inner circle; it means the respondents are familiar to those who have changed confessional affiliation. R. Sulejmanov, the researcher of the "Russian Islam", distinguishes four types of such neophytes: ideological, family, opportunists and war prisoners (Sulejmanov, 2016). The first two types are typical for youth of the North Caspian Sea region as a diachronically polyconfessional region. The main shift reason in the first case is a profound comparative analysis of religious dogmas, dissatisfaction by certain contacts with Russian Orthodox Church, ideological searches that is proved in in-depth interviews. The second case is caused by marriage and formalized or true Islam adoption.

A shift from Christianity to Islam is not massive at the moment but some experts assess that transgression factor along with demography will play their significant role after taking into consideration predictable 75% increase of Muslim population by the middle of the century (Lipka, Hackett, 2015).

CONCLUSION

The research results show that the majority of respondents are neutral and tolerant to the shift experience. Such attitude is typical to almost all religions but for non-traditional. The attitude to transgression to Islam also differs from all-Russian. Experts think "neophyte will never be considered as Own by ethnic Muslims but he or she will not be a Russian for the Russian society anymore". (Sulejmanov, 2016) However, in-depth interviews showed that in the polyconfessional region the majority of respondents are receptive to shift experience from the traditional religion to another traditional one but they are more negative about atheism-oriented population.

Acknowledgements

The article was supported by the Grant from the President of the Russian Federation for young scientists (candidates of science). Project MK-7152.2015.6 “Sociocultural analysis of the religious transgression mechanisms in the Astrakhan region as a part of the Caspian Sea region frontier”

References

- Arweck, E. & Nesbitt, E. (2010). *Young people's identity formation in mixed-faith families: continuity or discontinuity of religious traditions?* Journal of Contemporary Religion, 25: 67-87.
- Baddeley, J. (2013). *Zavoevanie Kavkaza russkimi 1720-1860 g.* The Russian conquest of the Caucasus. Moscow: Tsentrpoligraf.
- Baeva, L.V. (2014). *The typology and problems of studying the Southern Russian frontier.* Science Journal of Volgograd State University. Philosophy, 2: 32-38.
- Barreth, T. M. (2000). *At the Edge of Empire: the Terek Cossacks and the North Caucasus frontier, 1700-1860.* Amerikanskaja rusistika. Vohi istoriografii poslednih let. Imperskij period: Antologija by M. David-Fox. Samara: Samara University.
- Bataille, G. *Taboos and transgression.* Date Views: 10.06.2016 <http://vispir.narod.ru/bataj2.htm>
- Billington R. A. (1960). *Westward Expansion: A History of the American Frontier.* New York: Macmillan.
- Blanchot, M. (1994). *Limit-Experience.* Tanatography of Eros. Saint Petersburg: Mifril, pp. 63-79.
- Chernous, V.V. (2001). *Islam in ethno-confessional situation in North Caucasus.* Rostov-on-Don: SKNTS VSH, p. 183.
- Collins-Kreiner Noga. (Apr., 2008), *Religion and Politics: New Religious Sites and Spatial Transgression in Israel.* Geographical Review, 98(2): 197-213.
- Dryagalov, V.S. & Topchiev, M.S. (2014). *Students' ethnic and confessional identities under the conditions of worsening problems of cultural and confessional safety of the multicultural region.* Human. Society. Management, 3: 96-112.
- Dufoix, S. (2005). *More Than Riots: A Question of Spheres.* Date Views: 10.06.2016 <http://riotsfrance.ssrc.org/Dufoix/>
- Ennaji, M. (2005). *Multilingualism, Cultural Identity, and Education in Morocco.* Boston: Springer Science & Business Media.
- Foucault, M. (1994). *Transgression.* Tanatography of Eros. Saint Petersburg: Mifril, pp. 110-132.
- Khlysheva, E.V. (2013). *Frontier as a border between "own" and "alien".* The Caspian region: Policies, Economics, Culture, 2: 237-242.
- Khodarkovsky, M. (2011). *Bitter Choices: Loyalty and Betrayal in the Russian Conquest of the North Caucasus.* Ithaca, NI: University Press.
- King, V., Elder, G.H. & Whitbeck, L. B. (1997). *Religious involvement among rural youth: An ecological and life-course perspective.* Journal of Research on Adolescence, 7: 431-456.
- Kundakbaeva, Zh.B. (2005). *The Russian Empire policy towards peoples of the North Caspian Sea region in the XVIII century.* Extended abstract of the D.Sc. (History) thesis. Lomonosov Moscow State University, Moscow, p. 42.
- Lee, J. (2012). *Transgression in Roman Religion.* Dissertation. YALE UNIVERSITY, p. 195.

- Lipka, M., Hackett, C. (2015). *Why Muslims are the world's fastest-growing religious group*. Date Views: 10.06.2016 <http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/04/23/why-muslims-are-the-worlds-fastest-growing-religious-group/>.
- Manakov, A.G. (2002). *The geocultural space in the North-West of the Russian Plain: dynamics, structure, hierarchy*. Pskov: "Renaissance" Center with the assistance of OCST.
- Mendonça, P. (2012). *Religious orders and transgression in colonial Maranhão*. Date Views: 10.06.2016 <http://dx.doi.org/10.1590/S1413-77042012000100006>
- Morozova, E. & Miroshnichenko, I. & Rjabchenko, N. (2016). *The network society frontier*. World economy and international relations, 60(2): 83–97.
- Oosterbaan, M. (2011). *Samba Gospel: Carnival, Media and Religious Transgression in Rio de Janeiro International RC21*. Date Views: 10.06.2016 <http://www.rc21.org/conferences/amsterdam2011/edocs2/Session%2014/RT14-2-Oosterbaan.pdf>
- Phinney, J.S. & Ong, A.D. (2007). *Conceptualization and measurement of ethnic identity*. Current status and future directions. Journal of Counseling Psychology, 54: 271-281
- Romanova A., Topchiev M., Baeva L. (2014). *The Caucasus as an Eternal Frontier*. ICASSR 2014. 2nd International Conference on Applied Social Science Research July 10-11. Shanghai, China ATLANTIS PRESS. PARIS –AMSTERDAM–BEIJING August 2014, pp. 35–39.
- Romanova, A.P. & Baeva, L.V. & other (2007). *Astrakhan – the XXI century: the sociocultural region studies*. Monograph. Astrakhan: Astrakhan University, p. 376.
- Romanova, A.P. & Yakushenkov, S.N. & other (2014). *The frontier of Lower Volga: cultural memory and cultural heritage*. Teaching medium. Astrakhan: Sorokin Roman Vasil'evich, p. 236.
- Romanova, A.P. & Yakushenkov, S.N. (2012). *The frontier territory: the new approach to comprehension of socio-political and economic situation in the Russian South*. Innovatics and expert examination, 2: 74-80.
- Romanova, A.P. & Topchiev, M.S. (2011). *Confessional policy and confessional security in the Caspian Sea region* (p. 104). Monograph. Astrakhan: Sorokin Roman Vasil'evich.
- Romanova, A.P. (2005). *Asrakhan at the religious intersection (concept contemplation)*. Russia and the East. Learning society and sustainable social development of the Caspian Sea region. Astrakhan, 2: 105-108.
- Romanova, A.P. (2007). *Intellectual potential impact on cross-confessional and cross-ethnic tolerance of population in South Russian polycultural regions*. Russia and the East: A problem of tolerance is in the dialogue of civilizations. Part 2. Astrakhan, pp. 340-344
- Romanova, A.P. (2014). *Specifity of early frontier in the Caucasus*. Scientific Journal of KubSAU, 102: 446-458.
- Romanova, A.P. (2015). *Specific character of intercultural communications within frontier territories*. The Caspian region: Policies, Economics, Culture, 3: 266-271.
- Rostad, A. (2006). *Human transgression – divine retribution. A study of religious transgressions and punishments in Greek cultic regulations and lydian-phrygian reconciliation inscriptions*. Doctorate thesis submitted in accordance with the requirements of the Dr. Art. degree Department of Classics, University of Bergen.
- Savchenko, S.I. (2010). *The confessional space peculiarities of the Stavropol region*. Geography and local studies issues: materials of the 3rd Conference of the Russian Geographical Society in Stavropol department, 3: 141-144.

- Socio-economic development of the Astrakhan region in 2000* (2001). The Official report of the Administration of the Astrakhan region. Astrakhan. Date Views: 10.06.2016 <https://www.astrobl.ru/sites/default/files/soc-reports/doklad-2010.pdf>
- Sulejmanov, R. *The Russian Muslims*. Date Views: 10.06.2016 http://ruskline.ru/analitika/2016/03/03/russkie_musulmane.
- Syzranov, A.V. (2012). *Islam in Lower Volga*. Monograph. Astrakhan: Astrakhan University, p. 177.
- Tishkov, M. (2013). *Cross-ethnic and confessional relations in the Southern Federal District. Expert report*. Edited by V.A. Tishkov. Moscow: SKFU.
- Tul'skij, M. (2001). *Religious affiliation modification of the world's population in the last 100 years*. *Russia and the muslim world*, 3: 11-113.
- Turner F.J. (1996). *The frontier in American history*. New York: Courier Dover Publications.
- Victorin V.M. (2000). *Ethno-religious Minorities and Islamic Thought: the Volga region and Northern Caucasus*. *The Cristian-Muslim Frontier: Chaos, Clash or Dialogue?* New York: I.B. Tauris & Co LTD Publ, pp. 99-113.
- Victorin, V. & Idrisov, E. (2004). *The Astrakhan world: former and new aspects of cross-ethnic unity and cooperation*. *Astrahan news*. 29.01.2004.
- Victorin, V.M. (2008). *The Islam in the Astrakhan region. Socio-political edition* ("The Islam in Russia" series. "MION – INO – Centr" program and other). Moscow: Logos.
- Wijeyesinghe, C.L. & Jackson, B.W. (2001). *New perspectives on racial identity development*. New York: NYU Press.
- Yakushenkov, S.N., Romanova, A.P., Baeva, L.V., Hlyshheva, E.V., Morozova, E.V. & Yakushenkova, O.S. (2014). *Frontier as a heuristic model of cultural cognition*. *The materials of roundtable discussion*, 4 (41): 304-314.
- Yakushenkov, S.N. & Yakushenkova, O.S. (2014). *Transgression in a condition of frontier heterotopia*. *The Caspian region: Policies, Economics, Culture*, 3: 276-284
- Yakushenkov, S.N. (2015). *Frontir kak kul'turnaja paradigm*. *The Caspian region: Policies, Economics, Culture*, 1(42): 288-298.
- Zeletdinova, Je.A., Lagutkin, O.Ju. (2008). *Social consciousness focuses in religious and confessional sphere in the Astrakhan region (conflictology aspect)*. *Polis*, p. 72.