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Social Exclusion in Rwanda Under Different Leadership Regimes¹

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Abstract: There have been robust debates on the role that the different leadership regimes that have alternated in Rwanda have had on social exclusion, which have affected different ethnic groups before and after the independence of the country (1962). Literature and the media tend to project a rosy picture of the economic development, the inter-ethnic reconciliation, and the social inclusion that are said to have been taking place under the leadership of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF)-led government since 1994. The literature also tends to blame the two post-independence governments led by the two Hutu presidents and the Belgian colonisers for the social exclusion that has affected the different ethnic groups in Rwanda. This social exclusion is often associated with the inter-ethnic conflict that has taken place in Rwanda for many years and which culminated in the 1994 Rwandan genocide.

It is important to acknowledge the economic growth that has been achieved by the Rwandan government since taking power in 1994 (Uwizeyimana 2016). However, if we continue to ignore, or at worst, outright reject evidence that points to the fact that alternation of Hutu and Tutsi² and the colonial leadership to power in Rwanda has caused ethnic groups to accuse each other of practising social and economic exclusion, we run the risk of repeating the mistakes that led to the 1959 Hutu revolution and the RPF attack in 1990, which culminated in the 1994 genocide.

The purpose of this article is to discuss the developmental path of public leadership and development discourses in the Republic of Rwanda since precolonial eras to the present, and to assess the validity of claims that the leaderships of various ethnic groups have practised social exclusion that favoured members of their own ethnic groups at the expense of other ethnic groups.

This research follows a historical research approach. The methodology used in this research was mainly qualitative and relied on a robust literature survey of published and non-published print and electronic media, as well as a document analysis of the complex nature and processes of shifts in public leadership and social exclusion associated with these changes in Rwanda.

This study found sufficient evidence to support the conclusion that social exclusion targeting the three ethnic groups has indeed taken place in Rwanda when the leadership of the country changed from one ethnic group

to the other. Rwanda needs leadership that actively and deliberately promotes policies that take into account the interests of all Rwandans (Twa, Hutu, and Tutsi); not those that seek to divide them through social exclusion. Implementing the recommendations of this research could help in the building of a socially inclusive and ethnically united Rwandan society in which Twa, Hutu, and Tutsi live in harmony.

Keywords: Leadership, Social exclusion, Rwanda, Tutsi, Twa, Hutu, Rwandan genocide

1. INTRODUCTION

Historically there have been three distinct phases of ethnic-based leadership in Rwanda, with a number of sub-phases with unique characteristics. The first phase was the precolonial era, with sub-phases when the Twa were the only people in the country before the Hutu arrived (1st century) and the time of feudalism, or *Ubwami*, which existed from the arrival of the Tutsi in the 15th century until about 1880. The second phase was the colonial era (1800-1962) when the Germans and the Belgians alternated, with a combination of a monarchic system and colonial rule. The third phase is the postcolonial era (1962 to date), comprising the first republic ruled by the Hutu, which ended when the second republic re-established the current Tutsi regime in 1994.

The purpose of this article is to discuss the developmental path of public leadership and development discourses in the Republic of Rwanda since precolonial eras to the present era, and to assess the validity of claims that the leadership of various ethnic groups have practised social exclusion that favoured members of their own ethnic groups at the expense of the other ethnic groups.

Accusations and counteraccusations that one ethnic group loses public positions and military, school, and economic resources such as land and other forms of government when another ethnic group takes control of government have abounded among the three ethnic groups in Rwanda since time immemorial. While there are many publications on Rwanda's history and the genocide, no systematic research has been known to attempt to present evidence to assess the validity of claims of social exclusion levelled by the Hutu against the Tutsi or, for that matter, levelled historically by the Tutsi against the Hutu.

This kind of research is important because Rwanda's leadership has so far alternated between the Hutu and Tutsi in the precolonial, colonial, and postcolonial eras, and there was no time in Rwanda's history when one group was happy about being ruled by the other. Whether real or perceived, such ethnic-based social exclusion has created inter-ethnic conflicts in the past and is likely to do so again in the future if no corrective measures are taken to address it by the current and future leadership of Rwanda.

2. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK: SOCIAL EXCLUSION VS. SOCIAL INCLUSION

Silver (1994:531) defines the terms "social exclusion" or "social marginalisation" as "social disadvantage and relegation to the fringe of society of one group of society or individuals in that society by another group or individuals". The Adler University's Institute on Social Exclusion (ISE) defines the term "social exclusion" and its related concepts as "the process in which individuals or entire communities of people are systematically blocked from (or denied full access to) various rights, opportunities, and resources that are normally available to members of a different group in the same society, and which are fundamental for social integration within that particular society" (Adler University's ISE n.d.:1).

Society has understood the terms social exclusion or marginalisation for some time. According to Bhatnagar (1995:8), “the principle of inclusion-exclusion was used by Nicholas Bernoulli (a Swiss mathematician), who lived between 1687 and 1759, to solve the problem of finding the number of derangements”. It is believed that the term was later used widely in Europe, and specifically in *France* in the mid-1970s (Silver 1994:531). Abrams, Christian and Gordon (2007:194) argue that social exclusion was actually “derived from French republican political philosophy which views the state as the embodiment of the will of the people”. In this context, as Abrams et al. (2007:194) put it, “social exclusion only happens because of the breaking of the social bond between the state and society and the individual”. Social exclusion is said to take place because of the state or institution that ties the individual to the society (Abrams et al. 2007:194). However, despite Abrams *et al.*'s (2007:149) and Rawal's (2008:161) argument that the concept of social exclusion/inclusion figured prominently in the policy discourse in France in the mid-1970s, Pocock (1957:19) and Allman (2013:1) state that the anthropologists and sociologists who used the concept of social inclusion and exclusion more than 50 years ago argued that “the processes and practice of inclusion and exclusion have always been a feature of all social hierarchies”. While social exclusion was adopted as a key concept in the European Union social policy in the 1950s, it replaced the concept of poverty in the late 1980s (Rawal 2008:191). The argument in the 1950s was that social exclusion is likely to cause conflict between the included and the excluded because it causes poverty in those who are socially excluded (Rawal 2008:191). In all cases, the author of this article argues that this type of injustice has always been, and remains to this day, the result of bad, greedy, corrupt, and authoritarian leadership.

Both Young (2000:35) and Silver (2007:15) argue that social exclusion is a multidimensional process of progressive social rupture, detaching groups and individuals from social relations and institutions and preventing them from full participation in the normal, normatively prescribed activities of the society in which they live. Due to many elements involved in social exclusion, authors from a variety of disciplines such as education, sociology, politics, economics, and psychology have tried to explain it by looking at what its opposite – social inclusion – means (Silver 2013:191 citing Silver 1994:531).

According to Robo (2014:191), social inclusion, also known as “community inclusion, social connectedness, normalization, social integration, social citizenship [...] are terms used to relate to the importance of the links between the individual members of a society and the role of each person as a member of this group”. According to the United Nations (UN 2009:8), “there are different views in terms of how a socially inclusive society functions”. For example, Robo (2014:191) argues that “a socially inclusive society” is a society in which all people feel valued, their differences are recognised and respected, and where their basic needs are met so they can live in dignity”. In a “socially inclusive society, all people, irrespective of their gender, ethnic background, religious affiliation, or physical attributes, should be recognized and accepted by other members of society and the state and should have a sense of belonging” (Robo 2014:191). Since social inclusion is reasonably considered to be the opposite of social exclusion, or the two opposite sides of the same coin (Cappo 2002:11 in Rawal 2008:172), social inclusion is also often defined in relation to social exclusion (Robo 2014:191). Therefore, if “social exclusion is the process of being shut out from the social, economic, political, and cultural systems of the community” (Cappo 2002:11), then social inclusion is the process of “being involved, co-opted, integrated, being part of the inner circle, being at the centre” of society.

Besides inclusion often being considered the opposite of social exclusion, what compounds the ambiguous discourse on social inclusion is that it is often considered to be the response to social exclusion (Coleman 2013:2). The assumption that social inclusion is the solution to social exclusion explains why “social inclusion is often couched in descriptors such as ‘combating’ and ‘mitigating’ social exclusion” (Coleman 2013:2). That is, social inclusion is often considered to be the means to remove or reduce the impacts of social exclusion. This is arguably a mistake people make because while social inclusion might reduce the impact of social exclusion, it does not necessarily remove its negative consequences on the affected group or society. Social integration or social inclusion does not mean a uniformity of people; it simply means “a society which has room for diversity” and is “still able to foster engagement” among the different members (UN 2009:8). This might also explain why social exclusion and its associated terms became the subject of numerous political speeches on economic and social injustices (Coleman 2013:2). For political reasons, the definition of the term “inclusiveness/exclusiveness” was distorted and the solutions suggested by policymakers became subject to the desires of political juggernauts, who often end up giving all types of distorted meanings to suit their political ambitions (Coleman 2013:2).

2.1. Model of social exclusion or inclusion

The multiplicity of factors used to practise social exclusion has led some, such as Silver (2007) and *Jeboel-Gijsbers and Vrooman* (2007), to develop models to simplify the study of social exclusion factors. Silver’s (2007:15) model conceptualises social exclusion and inclusion “on a continuum on a vertical plane below and above the ‘social horizon’”. Silver’s (2007:15) model includes “ten social structures that impact on exclusion” and these ten factors fluctuate with circumstance and time. They include race, geographic location, class structure, globalisation, social issues, personal habits and appearance, education, religion, economics and politics. Others, such as *Jeboel-Gijsbers and Vrooman* (2007:1), however, have proposed an alternative conceptualisation which suggests that “social exclusion theoretically emerges at the individual or group level on four correlated dimensions: insufficient access to social rights, material deprivation, limited social participation, and a lack of normative integration”. These four dimensions are correlated and tend to combine the result of “personal risk factors” that are beyond human control such as age, gender, and race. Other personal risk factors include “macro-societal changes (such as demographic, economic and labour market developments, technological innovation, and the evolution of social norms); government legislation and social policy; and the actual behaviour of businesses, administrative organisations and fellow citizens” (Vrooman & Hoff 2013:1261).

Proverbs 29:2 indicates that “when the righteous king rules, the people rejoice; but when a wicked man rules, the people groan” (Good News Bible 1964). The fact that there are many factors that bad leaders can use to practise social exclusion suggests that there might be equally many things good leaders can do to create socially just and inclusive societies. For example, a good leader who wants to eradicate social exclusion or to create a socially inclusive society entrenches “respect for all human rights and fundamental freedoms, cultural and religious diversity, social justice and the special needs of vulnerable and disadvantaged groups, democratic participation and the rule of law” (UN 2009:8). As will be shown in this article, all leaders who have led Rwanda in the precolonial, colonial, and postcolonial era have been accused by members of other ethnic groups (and sometimes by members of their own ethnic groups) for failing to promote “social policies that seek to reduce inequality and create flexible and tolerant societies

that embrace all people” (UN 2009:8). They have all been accused of failing to use their policies and the national resources to promote social justice. This means there is a link between social inclusion and social justice. The term “social justice” is generally defined as “the principles, values and beliefs that every individual and group are entitled to fair and equal treatment, which is necessary for the achievement of a society in which all people have equal access to rights, not only under law, but in all aspects of life, and all people get an impartial share of the benefits as well as carry a fair share of the responsibilities of society” (UN 2009:8). An ethnically polarised society such as Rwanda needs an impartial leader; that is, a leader who is able to promote fairness and who shows lack of favouritism or prejudice based on ethnic affiliation. In brief, there is a need for leaders who are able to do justice to all the Rwandan people irrespective of their ethnic affiliation and who is seen by the different ethnic groups as doing justice in both action and words. It is important to build inclusiveness in an ethnically polarised society such as Rwanda because “an inclusiveness of society creates and maintains stability as well as a readiness to embrace change” (UN 2009:8), or alternation of Hutu- and Tutsi-led governments as has been the case in the past years.

As can be observed here, there are many things that can be done to achieve a socially inclusive or exclusive society; however, due to the limited space in this article, only a few central factors are selected; namely land, education, government posts, and support to the genocide survivors. These will be used to ascertain whether the leadership of Rwanda at different intervals, ranging from the precolonial to the postcolonial era, deliberately promoted socio-economic development plans/models that favoured members of their own ethnic groups and thereby socially excluded members of other ethnic groups.

3. RESEARCH APPROACH, DESIGN, AND METHOD

In order to cast doubt on “official accounts” (Thomson 2013:45), most of which self-righteously divide the Rwandan society into “the good guys” and “bad guys”, the Them vs Us dichotomy, and instead establish a new theory of the “Us as a nation” that acknowledges the existence and complementarity of the three main ethnic groups that make up Rwandan society, this study applied the theory of social exclusion to analyse how the different successive Rwandan leadership in the precolonial and postcolonial eras used their powers and control of the state resources to exclude one another. Therefore, this research follows a historical research approach in which, according to Brynard and Hanekom (1997:6), “the researcher tries to give a rational explanation or the reason for a particular event or events [and] gives a logical interpretation of the effects of such event on the individuals and the society involved”. Brynard and Hanekom (1997:6) argue that historical researchers generally follow a qualitative approach that relies on original documents or the analysis of artefacts as the main sources of data. Only facts and data presented in original documents form the basis of analysis in this article. These include the speeches of different presidents at different occasions during their terms of office and other material in the public domain.

While the research discussed here was basic in the sense that it was not commissioned by any particular individual or organisation, it was applied research in the sense that its recommendations are offered in the hope of helping to build a united Rwandan society in which Twa, Hutu, and Tutsi live in harmony.

Considering that the Hutu are generally farmers (agriculturalists) and the Tutsi are generally pastoralists, it is possible to determine objectively whether the leaders aligned with one group promoted economic policies that advanced the interests of pastoralism at the expense of the interests of agriculturalists, or vice versa. Similarly, by analysing the allocation of space in schools and government posts (where statistics are

available), or economic and financial support, it is possible to find evidence that could help to confirm or dismiss claims of exclusion of one group by another.

Among the questions to be answered are the following: Did rulers from a pastoral group promote economic policies that advanced the interests of pastoralists at the expense of agriculturalists, or the reverse? Have access to education and government posts and support to the genocide survivors been allocated equitably to all who deserve them, irrespective of whether the leaders were Tutsi or Hutu? These are very important questions whose answers may explain why these ethnic groups often fight to remove each other from power and whoever is in power is accused of being biased towards members of his/her own ethnic group.

4. ALTERNATIVE LEADERSHIP PHASES IN RWANDA FROM THE PRECOLONIAL ERA TO DATE

The leadership of Rwanda from the precolonial era to the time of writing this article (2017) can be divided into three distinctive phases. The first phase is the precolonial era, which may be divided into three ethnic rule sub-phases: the Twa who lived in Rwanda's territories from time immemorial to the 1st century when the Hutu arrived, the Hutu kingdoms to the 15th century when the Tutsi arrived, and the Tutsi kingdom to 1895 when the German colonisers arrived. The second phase of Rwanda's leadership was the colonial era, which started with the arrival of the German colonisers in 1895, who were replaced by Belgian colonisers in 1919, and ended with national independence in 1962. It must be noted that while the German and Belgian colonialists weakened the Tutsi monarchy, they did not abolish it but used its existing structures and population control system to their own advantage. The third and current phase of administrative regimes is the postcolonial era, which is divided into two main sub-phases; namely the Hutu era (First Republic ruled by President Gregoire Kayibanda, 1962 to 1973, and the Second Republic ruled by President Habyarimana, 5 July 1973 to 6 April 1994). The second sub-phase started in 1994 until the time of writing this article (2017). The three phases are thus the precolonial era (feudalism or *Ubwami*) (pre-1880), the colonial era (1800-1962), and the postcolonial era (1962 to date). These different administrative systems and their sub-categories are summarised in Table 1.

Table 1
Rwandan administrative systems and their sub-categories

	PRECOLONIAL ERA (From 0 CE to 1895)		COLONIAL ERA (1895-1962)		POSTCOLONIAL ERA (1962-date)	
<i>Twa kingdoms</i>	<i>Hutu kingdoms</i>	<i>Tutsi feudalism (Ubwami)</i>	<i>Germany with Tutsi feudalism</i>	<i>Belgium With Tutsi feudalism</i>	<i>Hutu</i>	<i>Tutsi</i>
From time immemorial to the 1 st century	1 st century to 15 th century	From 15 th century to 1880	1895 to 1919	1919 to 1962	1962 to 1994	1994 to date

These successive eras will be analysed in order to discern whether their leaders practised social exclusion against other ethnic groups.

4.1. Mutual complaints between Hutu and Tutsi in Rwanda

In 1991, Nduwayezu published what could be considered the best synthesis of mutual complaints between Hutu and Tutsi in a document written in Kinyarwanda and published under the title *Imburagihana, Urubanza rwa Sebahutu na Sebatutsi*. Nduwayezu's summary was latter partially translated into French by Mugesera and published in the *Cahiers Lumière et Société* in 1999 (Mugesera 1999:10-13).

According to Mugesera (1999:10), Nduwayezu used a rather creative way of synthesising the many complaints that each ethnic group was supposed to have had against the other (Nduwayezu 1991:25). He presented the case as charges brought before the court and explained that this was the trial of both Hutu and Tutsi. The book's main message was that "[r]econciliation between the Hutu and the Tutsi will be impossible as long as they lack good advisers" (Nduwayezu 1991:1). In the book, Nduwayezu argues that "Sebahutu is the spokesman of the Hutu, and Sebatutsi speaks for the Tutsi, thus presenting the case from the point of view of each of Rwanda's two main ethnic groups" (Nduwayezu 1991:1). As Mugesera (1999:5-34) put it:

"Each spokesperson files a lawsuit against the other and thus against their ethnic groups. Each indictment of a group sets out in great length the criminal acts charged in the other group. Mitigating or aggravating circumstances are reported. Witnesses Sebatwa (Twa), Muzungu (Whiteman) and Mateka (Historic records) come to the bar where sit the Judge Mutimanama (Good Conscience) and Inararibonye (The one who has seen it all) as clerk of the court. The public is represented by Sebantutu (Entire Humanity)."

In this figurative court, or "trial of the century" (Mugesera 1999:5-34), Nduwayezu (1991) lists the following Sebatutsi charges against the Hutu:

- a) **"Uwareze** (complainant/accuser) = *Sebatutsi*/whose father is/*mwene Kanyarwanda ka*/of *Gihanga, na nyina*/and mother *Nyirabatutsi, utuye*/resident of *Rwanda akaba umunyarwanda*/Rwandan nationality (Nduwayezu 1991 in Mugesera 1999:11).
- b) **Uregwa** (defendant/accused) = *Sebahutu mwene*/whose father is *Kanyarwanda ka Gihanga* and mother (*na nyina*) *Nyirabahutu*, resident/*utuye i*/of *Rwanda, akaba umunyarwanda*/Rwandan nationality" (Nduwayezu 1991 in Mugesera 1999:11).

The *Ibirego* (charges against Gahutu/Hutu) as listed by the Tutsi spokesperson include the following:

- *"Yanyiciye abana* = murder of Tutsi;
- *Abandi arabakubita* = Tutsi beating;
- *Anyicira inka* = Killing of Tutsi cows;
- *Antemera urutoke n' Ikawa* = destruction of banana and coffee belonging to Tutsi;
- *Antwikira urugo* = Burning the houses of Tutsi;
- *Yampereje abana ishyamba* = opposition to the repatriation of Tutsi refugees;
- *Abana basigaye mu gihugu abisha inzara y'ibiryo n' ubwenge* = exclusion of Tutsis in economic matters and schools;
- *Kwita Gatutsi umunyamabanga* = Treating Tutsi as foreigners in their country;
- *Kwica Rudahigwa afatanije n' abazungu* = complicity with *Sebazungu*/whites to murder King Rudahigwa;
- *Gukoresha iterabwoba mu Matora is 1961* = use of intimidation during the 1960 elections;

- *Gufatanya na Logiest kwirukana Abatutsi no kwica Amatora* = collaboration with Colonel Logiest (a Belgian colonial administrator) to hunt Tutsis and distort the 1961 referendum;
- *Kwica Abatutsi muri 1973 nta Nyenzi zateye* = killing of Tutsi in 1973 in the absence of the *Inyenzi* attacks;
- *Guteza intambara mu kazi no mu mashuri muri 1973* = inciting disorder in schools and in services in 1973;
- *Kubura Abatutsi imyanya myiza mu mirimo y'igihugu* = exclusion of Tutsi in positions of responsibility in the country;
- *Gutindabaza Abatutsi mu birebana not ubukungu* = impoverishing Tutsi by means of discriminatory economic policies; and
- *Kugirira ishyari Umututsi* = jealousy against the Tutsi” (Nduwayezu 1991 in Mugesera 1999:11).

According to Mugesera (1999:11), it seems from the above list that the many accusations brought against Hutu relate to events of the 1950s that led to the end of the colonial era and the Tutsi-dominated feudal system it had supported, and the few years following Rwanda's independence in 1962. Before independence, the Hutu started agitating against injustices inflicted on them under the ruling feudal system. After independence and during the First and Second Republics with the Hutu at the helm of government, the complaints were about injustices faced on a daily basis by those Tutsi who had not gone into exile and by those who went into exile as a result of the abolishment of the feudal system in 1959 and the establishment of the democratic republic systems led by the Hutus in the 1960s.

The Hutu complaints, however, predate the colonial era and, as this article will demonstrate, many of these complaints have re-emerged today under the RPF government. In the reversed order, now *Uwareze* (complainant/accuser) being the Hutu and the *Uregwa* (respondent/accused) being the Tutsi, according to Nduwayezu (1991 in Mugesera 1999:11), *Sebahutu* made the following *Ibirego* against the *Gatutsi*/Tutsi:

- “*Kuba Sebatutsi yarasagariye abakurambere ba Sebahutu, akabanyaga ibyabo, akabigira ibye, akabibategekamo, bakamutura, akanyaga uwo* ashatse = the fact that Tutsi have expropriated all Hutu's and their children's property, and then enslaving them in their own country;
- *Kugira Abana ba Sebahutu abagaragu* = forcing Hutu children to become slaves of Tutsis;
- *Kugira Abakobwa be Abaja:* = enslaving the Hutu girls/females;
- *Gusambanya Abakobwa ba Sebahutu ku gahato* = raping Hutu girls and women;
- *Gusuzugura Sebahutu no kumukoresha Imirimo yo hasi* = degrading the Hutu and relegating them to humiliating tasks in society;
- *Guturwa Imyaka* = imposition of agricultural tax (*amakoro*) on land taken by force from Hutu;
- *Kubanga nta mpamvu* = despising Hutu without reason;
- *Kubaboba/ (kubashyira kungoyi)* = putting them in shackles;
- *Kubikoreza Inkangara* = imposing carrying chores;
- *Gufatanya n' abazungu gukubita ibiboko Sebahutu* = collaboration with white colonisers to whip the Hutu;

- *Gufatanya n' abazungu gukoresha bene Sebahutu Imirimo y'agabato (Uburetwa)* = collaboration with whites to impose Hutu forced labour;
- *Kubikoreza Imizigo* = imposing the carrying of heavy loads;
- *Kurarira Abatware bene Sebatutsi* = making Hutu the night guards of homes of Tutsi chiefs;
- *Gutonesha Bene Sebatutsi mu mashuri* = promoting Tutsi children in schools at the expense of Hutu children;
- *Gushyira Bene Sebatutsi bonyine mu mashuri y'ubutegetsi* = Reserving business and public administration schools for Tutsi children (*Groupe Scolaire d'Astrida*);
- *Gushyira Bene Sebahutu mu mashuri yigisha Imirimo y'amaboko* = relegating Hutu children to schools teaching manual labour/occupations only;
- *Gutera Sebahutu insburo zirenze Enye nyuma muri 1959* = attacking the Hutu-led regime over four times since 1959;
- *Guteta Sebahutu mu 1990 kandi yaramutumyeho Akanga gutaha* = attacking Hutu in 1990 after refusing to return peacefully (*RPF-Inkotanyi*);
- *Kumuteza Abanyamahanga bakicisha benshi* = employing foreign mercenaries to massacre many Hutu;
- *Kuba Atemera ko yamutegeka* = refusing to be ruled by Hutu;
- *Kwanga Gusaba Umugeni kwa Sebahutu* = thinking that it is degrading to marry Hutu girls; and
- *Gushaka Kugarura ubwami bwavuyeho muri 1961* = restoring the monarchy system which was abolished in 1961" (Nduwayezu 1991 in Mugesera 1999:11).

As shown by this list, according to Mugesera (1999:12), unlike the accusations brought by *Sebatutsi*, which generally concern a more recent period (1959-1990), the accusations of *Sebahutu* against *Sebatutsi* cover a far longer period from precolonial times to the October War of 1990. They also affect a more varied field, ranging from the destruction of Hutu kingdoms, the establishment of the hated *Ubuhake* bondage system, collusion with the colonial system to enslave the Hutu even more deeply, having benefited from the colonial favouritism in the economy and schools, and numerous attacks by *Inyenzi* and *Inkotanyi* to remove the republican rule. The list of the Tutsi complaints could currently include the allegations that the Hutu carried out the genocide against the Tutsi, while the Hutu list could include items such as the following:

- Fomenting accusations of collective guilt in which the RPF accuses all Hutu of having been directly or indirectly involved in the killing of Tutsi in 1994 (Des Forges 1999:692).
- Fomenting the crime of "genocide ideology" and targeting Hutu with the laws of genocide ideologies in order to silence them (Des Forges 1999:692).
- Tricking and forcing some Hutu to admit to genocide crimes they have not committed.
- Imprisoning Hutu and subjecting them to forced labour such as TIG (*Travaux d'Intérêts General*) under the pretext of national reconciliation.
- Excluding Hutu survivors, especially orphans and widows, from all social assistance provided by government and foreign agencies, while making it available to all the Tutsi (Hakizimana & Endless 2009:4).

- Forcing Hutus into villages (*imidugudu*) and confiscating their land.
- Pursuing Hutu (and some Tutsi) into exile and murdering them.
- Denying Hutu the right to officially and openly remember the Hutu victims who perished during the 1994 Rwandan genocide and the killings of Hutu refugees in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) (United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) 2010:1).
- Denying Hutu justice by refusing to prosecute Tutsi, especially RPF members, despite evidence in reports such as the *Report of the Mapping Exercise Documenting the Most Serious Violations of Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law Committed within the Territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo between March 1993 and June 2003* that show that they have also committed war crimes and crimes against humanity (UNHRC 2010:1).
- Using *Gacaca* courts to prosecute Hutu only, while protecting Tutsis who also committed similar war crimes and crimes against humanity (Reyntjens 1996:240, Des Forges 1999:692; Davenport & Stam 2009:8-9).
- Replacing French with English as the dominant official language in order to force French-speaking Hutu intelligentsia into unemployment (Hakizimana & Endless 2009:4).

The following sections provide a detailed account of the historical leadership shifts between different administrative groups in Rwanda and how each could have contributed to the real or perceived social exclusion of others.

4.1.1. Twa kingdoms: From time immemorial to the 1st century

The written history of Rwanda has no records of the Twa (also known as *Abatwa*/*Abathwa*/*Batwa* or Pygmy) kingdoms. However, as elsewhere on the continent, the Twa were inhabitants of the forests in the area now called Rwanda before the arrival of Hutu agriculturalists in the first century (Vansina 2000:1). Given that Twa/Batwa lived in family clusters or larger sub-groupings (Firestone 2014:1), it could be reasonably argued that they had an organisation overseen by a chief or chiefs. In countries where the Twa social life has not been disturbed, they still have kings and chiefs. For example, the Twa living the dense forest of Bwindi in Uganda still have a king and a council of elders ruling their community (Firestone 2014:1).

Economically, Twa survived by “hunting small game using arrows, spears or nets and gathering plants and fruit in the rain forest” (Firestone 2014:1). After the arrival of Hutu agriculturalists from the 1st century onwards, the Twa of Rwanda continued to live their traditional lives in the deep forests bordering other Bantu (mostly farming) tribes. They also “provided the farming [Hutu] population with game in exchange for agricultural products” (Vansina 1990:1). According to Basanabo (2004:4), “[t]he Twa generally stayed out of the antagonisms and conflicts between the Hutu and Tutsi, [and] became helpless observers of these massacres”. After losing land and forest to the Hutu agriculturalists and Tutsi pastoralists, “many Twa in Rwanda resorted to making pottery” (see Figure 1), which they exchanged for money or agricultural and manufactured products such as clothes in order to make a living (*Ashdown 2013:1*). There have been no opportunities for the Twa to have practised social exclusion against the Hutu or the Tutsi because no Twa has ever ruled over Hutu or Tutsi ethnic groups.



Figure 1: Twa potters ferrying pots to the market

Source: Wikipedia (n.d.)

4.1.2. Hutu kingdoms: 1st century to 15th century

It is believed that the Hutu arrived from the regions near Lake Chad to settle in what is now Rwanda in the 1st century (Galloway 2010:1). Until the arrival of the Tutsi in the 15th century, the general social structure of Hutu was based on patrilineal affiliations or clan (*ubwoko*) and their small-sized kingdoms, which were scattered across vast areas (Gasabo 2004:115), were ruled by *Abahinza* (the Hutu king) (Twagilimana 2007:80).

Economically, the Hutu dynasty practised small-scale farming based on traditional primitive farming methods (see Figure 2). Initially, traditional farming methods included the use of fire (slash-and-burn agriculture), but they also used machetes for clearing new plots used for superficial tillage with hoes and planting by hand (Adekunle 2007:93). A brief account of the process of transferring land use from the Twa to the Hutu in the precolonial era is presented by Gasabo (2004:115):

“It is through agriculture that the Hutu were able to forge friendship with their Twa predecessors who gave them land for clearing and tilling in exchange of gifts (*cadeaux*). The chief of the Hutu family gave gifts called ‘*urwugururo*’ which were in the form of *ikibindi cy’inzoga* (a clay container containing traditional beer made of fermented banana juice known as *Urnagwa*) or *ikigage* (fermented traditional beer made of sorghum) accompanied with animal gifts such as goats (*ibene*) or sheep (*intama*).”

After the Twa king had shared the gifts with his chiefs and family and friends, a decision was made. The chief of the Twa accorded the Hutu chief, who had brought the gifts, a parcel of land with clear borders.

The Twa and Hutu kingdoms lived side by side, but were separate. Their neighbouring kingdoms each had its own territory, citizens, and leadership. They hardly depended on each other for anything, except that the Twa traded goods (clay pots and animal products) with the Hutu for agricultural products and land ownership rights (as discussed above).

4.1.3. Tutsi feudalism (Ubwami): From 15th century to 1880

Tutsi are believed to be members of the Nilotic peoples who arrived in the Central African region from Abyssinia (current Somalia, Ethiopia, and Eritrea in the horn of Africa) around the time of the 15th or 16th



Figure 2: A group of men and women practising traditional farming in Rwanda

Source: Republic of Rwanda, National Unity and Reconciliation Commission (2016)³

century (Batware 2012:3). Galloway (2010:1) recounted that the Tutsi moved their cattle herds westwards until they settled in *Gasabo* (current Gasabo District in Rwanda), around Lake Muhazi (Galloway 2010:1). There they established a feudal *nyiginya* dynasty which lasted for an estimated 400 years (Batware 2012:3). The relationship between the Hutu and Tutsi dynasties deteriorated in the early 19th century when Tutsi, who are said to have been living in warring bands (Murekatete 1994:1), used their advanced combat skills to acquire more grazing land from the Hutu. Part of the areas confiscated over many years of wars of conquest (from 1345 to the 19th century) constitutes what is now called Rwanda (from the verb *kwanda*, meaning to enlarge).

According to Reyntjens (1987:72), before the arrival of the German and Belgian colonialists, Rwanda was divided into about eight provinces or districts, each administered by two chiefs. One was in charge of the land, and known as *Umutware w'ubutaka* (chief of land) (Rurangwa 2013:6) and whose main function was the collection of tributes in foodstuffs and the *corvée* (tributes) from the Hutu farmers. The second chief, known as *Umutware w'ubukenke* (chief of pastures) (Rurangwa 2013:6), was particularly a Tutsi with jurisdiction over other pastoralists owing a tribute in meat, milk, and dairy products such as cream. The *Umutware w'ubukenke* was also responsible for ensuring that there was sufficient supplies to the king's courts. The role of this *Umutware w'ubukenke* was also to ensure that the king's cattle across the country and the cattle of every other Tutsi in general had sufficient land to graze on (Rurangwa 2013:6). Under these two chiefs were hill chiefs and neighbourhood chiefs. More than 95% of hill and neighbourhood chiefs were of Tutsi descent.

The two types of chiefs and the sub-chiefs were backed up by a Tutsi army chief, *Umutware n'ingabo* or *Umutware n'umubeto* (Rurangwa 2013:6), whose function was to protect the kingdom and to extend its boundaries by conquering neighbouring kingdoms (Rurangwa 2013:6). While the leadership positions were clearly held by the Tutsi chiefs, according to Rurangwa (2013:6), “all Rwandans (Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa) theoretically belonged to the army where they were subjected to the Tutsi army chief”. Because the king wielded supreme authority, all the chiefs were under his authority and were directly controlled by him.

4.1.3.1. Relationship between the Tutsi king and the Hutu peasantry before the colonial era

There are different opinions regarding the character of the Nyiginya dynasty that ruled Rwanda for 400 years. Some Tutsi say the dynasty was a unifying factor between Tutsi and Hutu, while Hutu such as Ngirira and Nzitabakuze (1991:19) describe that feudal system as “*une monarchie féodale [...] avec son cortège d'asservissement, feudal hiérarchisé, d'absolutisme exerce par l'ethnie au pouvoir, bref un régime dictatorial et rétrograde qui a laissé dans l'histoire de notre pays et dans la mémoire de la majorité hutu un souvenir horrible*”. That may be loosely translated as “a feudal monarchy [...] with its enslavement procession, feudal hierarchical, with absolutism exercised by the ethnic group in power, in short a dictatorial and reactionary regime that left a horrible memory in the history of our country and in the memory of the Hutu majority” (Ngirira & Nzitabakuze 1991:19). Some of the many horrible memories left were the torture and humiliation inflicted on the Hutu kings during the time of the conquest. For example, according to Kintu (2005:2), in the Rwandan kingdom “the Mwami (king)’s official drum, and symbol of royalty, known as *Kalinga*, was decorated with the dried penises of Hutu men”.

Thus, while the relationship between the king and the rest of the population was generally unequal and parasitic, the Tutsi were always well off compared to the Twa and Hutu. This is because, especially during the reign of King Mutara Rwabugiri approximately between 1853/1860 and 1895, according to Newbury (1974:181), the relationship between the ordinary Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa was based on a slavery-like system called *Ubuhake* (or bondage) (Amnesty International n.d.:1). While most Tutsi of today may sugar-coat the *Ubuhake* system as “a clientele system” about which the Hutu were happy and freely willing to subject themselves to, “[j]ournalists who have interviewed Hutu peasants have frequently been told that Tutsis look down on them as ‘subhumans’” (Keane 1997:1).

The *Ubuhake* system was an exploitative class system through which land and cattle were confiscated from the Hutu agriculturalists, and therefore power was entirely in the hands of the Tutsi minority. The Hutu majority (85% of the population), who previously owned land, worked on it, and lived on its produce, were turned into landless labourers for the Tutsi lords (Batware 2012:1). Batware’s description of the *Ubuhake* system is well supported by Midlarsky (2005:162), who argues that the Hutu were left with no other choice but to indenture themselves to the Tutsi lords in order to earn a living when the *Ubuhake* system was introduced. Midlarsky (2005:162) describes the impact of the feudal system on the Hutu agriculturalist as follows:

“As the kings centralized their power and authority, they distributed land among individuals rather than allowing it to be passed down through lineage groups, of which many hereditary chiefs [Abakonde] had been Hutu. Most of the chiefs appointed by the Mwami were Tutsi. The redistribution of land, enacted between 1860 and 1895 by Mwami Rwabugiri, resulted in an imposed patronage system, under which appointed Tutsi chiefs demanded manual labor from the Hutus in return for the right to occupy the land” (Midlarsky 2005:162).

Not only did the Tutsi gain larger land to graze their cattle through the confiscation of land under King Rwabugiri, they also obtained free labour provided by the now landless Hutu who were forced to indenture themselves because of the *Ubuhake* system. Having no land and no cows or any other means of production, the Hutu became destitute but also despondent. Because of the parasitic nature of the system “[t]hose who were short and stocky, who worked the land, and who had neither cattle nor ties to the nobility became a distinct second class in Rwandan society” (Keane 1997:2).

4.1.3.2. *The promotion of cattle at the expense of the Hutu agriculturalist*

According to Human Rights Watch (1999:1), the Tutsi “scorned cultivation and depended on large herds of cattle for their livelihood”. Cattle formed an instrument for control and oppression of the Hutu. In terms of *Ubuhake*, an owner of Hutu servants (*shebujja* if it is a man, or *nyirabujja* if it is a women owner) promised some of his/her flock to a serf (*umugaragu*, a Hutu man) in exchange for years of services. There was no set limit of years to work in order to earn a cow from the Tutsi master and no guarantee that a cow would be given at all – it all depended on the Tutsi lord. The *shebujja* had the right to change his mind and take away the cow he had given to his Hutu slave if for any reason he was no longer happy with his servant. Thus cows were used not only as an instrument of economic and political power over the Hutu but also as means for Tutsi survival (meat, milk, cream, blood, and skin for dress/clothing).

Another example of how Tutsi valued cattle herding over the agriculture practised by the Hutu was the practice of setting cows to graze in the farms cultivated by the Hutu. This point was made by the Catholic missionaries in Rwanda at the time. For example, Father Arthur Dejemeppe recounted in “*Le Rwanda et le Colonel*” (Rwanda and the Colonel), a Belgian documentary researched by Bart Govaert in 2009, that:

“[w]hen a Tutsi needed a pasture for his cows, take a dry season for example, when there was less grass for the cows, it did not bother him absolutely sending his cows in the parts cultivated by the Hutu. No Hutu peasant could dare refuse an order which was formulated or issued by Tutsi chief or deputy chief” (Dejemeppe in Govaert 2009:1).

Dejemeppe’s views are also held by Keane (1997:2), who argues that “any Hutu peasants who opposed the [...] order (from the Tutsi masters) were treated with unmitigated harshness. Tutsi nobles showed no hesitation in massacring the occupants of rebellious villages and confiscating their properties”. Figure 3 depicts cows decorated with rich jewellery – a symbol of the prestige given to them during the Tutsi reign.

4.1.3.3. *Other forms of socio-economic exclusion practised during the Tutsi feudal era*

Other forms of social exclusion in Rwanda under the feudal system were expressed in the grievances forwarded to the UN and the Belgian authorities by the nine authors of the *Manifeste des Bahutu* (Manifesto of Bahutu) in 1957. These nine Hutu heroes were Grégoire Kayibanda, Maximilien Niyonzima, Claver Ndahayo, Isidore Nzeyimana, Calliope Mulindahabi, Godefroy Sentama, Munyambonera Sylvestre, Joseph Sibomana, and Joseph Habyarimana Gitara. Kayibanda et al. (1957:2-3) started their argument by posing the question, “What exactly is the racial problem in Rwanda all about?” and then argued as follows:



Figure 3: Traditional cow (*Inyambo*) decorated by the Tutsi

Source: Tabaro (2014:1)

“Some have questioned whether (the problem between *Mubutu-Mututsi*) is a social conflict or a racial conflict. We believe this is literature. In the reality of things and the thoughts of people, it is one and the other. However, one could specify that the problem is primarily a political monopoly that one race holds, the race Mututsi; political monopoly which, given all the existing structures becomes a social and economic monopoly; political, economic and social monopoly which, given the *de facto* selection in education, manages to be a cultural monopoly, to the despair of the Hutu who are condemned to remain eternal menial laborers, and even worse, after a possible independence they have helped to conquer without knowing what they do. The *buhake*, probably removed, but it will be replaced by total monopoly which largely causes the abuses that the Hutu population has been complaining about.”

The *Manifesto of Bahutu* was not the first or the only document written in the 1950s to denounce the injustice committed by the Tutsi ruling class. According to Mugesera (1999:7),

“[t]owards 1957, the publication of the ‘Manifesto of Bahutu’ many writings were launched against the indigenous power. They were sent either to the Mwami, or the Supreme Council of the country, and all had serious grievances against the native authority called ‘Tutsi’. In March 1958 V. Bendantunguka wrote a letter to publicly denounce the shocking inequality in compensation for public office, injustice and abuse of power... the exclusive enjoyment of privileges by the Tutsi group – the inequality of access to administrative and judicial posts – lack of representativeness of Hutus in public office” (See also Kayibanda *et al.* 1957:2-3).

In brief, these activists denounced the “political, economic, social and cultural monopoly” in the hands of the Tutsi minority (Nkundabagenzi 1961:22-23; Reyntjens 1985:230; Chrétien 1999:152 in Gasanabo 2004:56-57).

The socio-economic and political exclusions expressed in the Hutu Manifesto in 1957 later became the cause and justification for the Hutu revolution in 1959.

4.1.4. *Leadership in the colonial era*

Germany was the first country to colonise Rwanda. The Germans colonised Rwanda (and Urundi/Burundi) from 1895 until 1919 (Kayibanda 1962:23). When the Germans were defeated in WWI, the League of Nations mandated Rwanda-Urundi as a Belgian Protectorate on 23 August 1923.

As elsewhere in colonised countries, the Germans and the Belgians both wanted to rule indirectly, so they used the political structures created by the *Mwami* (Tutsi king) and his dynasty.

Therefore, while the Germans and mostly the Belgians who colonised Rwanda for over 60 years used the monarchic system they found in the country for their own benefit, the Tutsi king and his officials “were not helpless pawns but rather real players in the game of [colonial] administrative reform” (Human Rights Watch 1999:2). In order to maintain their bourgeoisie living standards, “[t]hey found ways to turn these new (colonial) requirements, such as building roads or planting cash crops, to their personal profit” (Human Rights Watch 1999:2):

“The Tutsi elite profited not just from direct European backing but also from the indirect and unintended consequences of the administrative changes. Under the old system of multiple officials, power-holders ordinarily limited demands on subordinates, knowing that those who felt unreasonably exploited could seek protection from rivals or could move elsewhere, even clearing new land in the forest, if need be, to escape exactions. In the 1920s and 1930s, the Belgians made it far harder for the weak to escape repressive officials; not only did they eliminate the multiple hierarchies but they also restricted changes in residence from one region to another and they prohibited new settlement in the forests. In order to guarantee the Tutsi privilege, the Belgian introduced the Identity Card in 1933” (Human Rights Watch 1999:2).

The introduction of a mandatory identity (ID) card system in 1933 deepened social divisions. Every Rwandan citizen was obliged to carry a card which stated his/her name and ethnic identity, i.e. Tutsi, Hutu, or Twa. According to Wilson (2012:2), “[i]t was under this indirect rule that “social relationships in Rwanda became more uniform, rigid, unequal, and exploitative than ever, with a clear hierarchy from Bazungu to Tutsi to Hutu to Twa, with each higher level having privileges denied to the lower level and with an ideology of racial superiority underlying this system of inequality”.

Both the ruling Tutsi and the Belgian colonists had a perfect partnership. There is no record of the Tutsi elite rejecting the ID document when it suited them (during the colonial era). The ID card made it easy for the Tutsi to maintain their privilege as the ruling class.

According to Keane (1997:1-2), “[i]t suited the interests of the colonists to rule through the existing Tutsi elite, who showed themselves to be willing and compliant, more interested in the preservation of their own privilege and material wealth than in any question of national identity”. In return for their cooperation and support to the colonial administration, “[t]he Tutsi overlords were given extended powers over the lives of the Hutus”. The colonial system became popular among the Tutsi ethnic group because it practically allowed even “minor Tutsi chiefs to exploit their Hutu ‘subjects’ and demand higher contributions of their crops and longer working hours” (Keane 1997:1-2). Therefore, while it is often argued that the power of the Tutsi king was somewhat curtailed under Belgian administration, evidence suggests the two

systems strengthened each other in many ways. Thus the Belgians relied on the Tutsi elites to administer the country but also with the Germans' and Belgians' help, "the Tutsi aristocracy's control over the land and the Hutu expanded profoundly" (Wilson 2012:1). Thus the Hutu were exploited by both the Tutsi and the colonisers, as argued below.

4.1.4.1. Combination of Ubuhake, Uburetwa (Akazi), and Shiku during the colonial era

While the Belgian authority modified the *Ubuhake* (selfdom) system and eliminated the paying of *corvées* to the Tutsi chiefs and the king, in 1934 they introduced an equally exploitative system known in Kinyarwanda as *Uburetwa*. This form of forced labour, or *Akazi*, was exclusively restricted to Hutu in the same way *Ubuhake* had been (Pottier 2002:2). All Tutsi, whether royalties or commoners, were exempted from *Uburetwa* (Murekatete 1994:2) but all of them benefited from it. While the labour due under *Uburetwa* was "originally set at one day out of five once the Belgian administration was in place, the Tutsi village chiefs often raised it to two or even three days per week", which meant that Hutu were left with few days to work for their families (Pottier 2002:2). The extra days demanded by the Tutsi chiefs from the community were used to do the private work of the chiefs. In addition to the *Uburetwa*, the Belgian colonisers also introduced heavy taxation in 1934 (Ndahiro, Rwagatare & Nkusi 2015:14).

Failing in these compulsory activities attracted heavy penalties. For example, some of the punishments meted to the person failing to meet the requirements of *Uburetwa* included public flogging (or *sjamboking*, *ikiboko*, a sentence of eight strokes with a stick or leather whip). Those who failed to raise enough money to pay tax were sent to prison until their relatives bailed them out (Gasanabo 2004:52). Since the Tutsi were exempted from paying tax or performing *Uburetwa*, they acted as the police to protect the interests of the colonisers.

Since Tutsi chiefs ("nicknamed *abamotsi* – barkers") (Kimonyo 2016:21) were responsible for administering forced labour, they performed the flogging and the administration of other forms of corporal punishments to their Hutu countrymen (Chossudovsky 1996:938). They were also the ones enforcing the payment of tax on behalf of the Belgians. These tax collectors were often accused by their Hutu countrymen of exacting manifold the official taxes mandated by the Belgians and for intimidating those from whom they collected taxes.

Flogging was done in public where the spectators often included the victims' family members (such as wife and children, mother, father, and other relatives), as well as neighbours, friends, and foes, in order to inflict permanent physical and psychological damage. Some Tutsi have excused themselves by saying that they were merely following orders; but the cruelty they demonstrated when flogging their victims is said to have been so bad that Kayibanda *et al.* (1957) argued that perhaps flogging, corruption, injustice, exploitation, and dehumanisation the Hutu faced at the hand of the Tutsi chiefs could have been less damaging if it had been done by the Belgians themselves – a view known as the *De duobus malis minus est eligendum* (of two evils, one has to choose the lesser) dilemma. According to the Hutu Manifesto: "Without the Europeans we would be doomed to a most inhuman exploitation than before, to total destruction. It is unfortunate even that it is not the European who becomes chief or deputy chief or judge; not that (we) believe the Europeans are perfect, but because of two evils, one has to choose the lesser" (Kayibanda *et al.* 1957: 4).

4.1.4.2. Catholic education and social exclusion during the colonial period

Munyangaju (1959:19 cited in Perraudin 2003) conducted a comparative study of how the Tutsi benefited, at the expense of the Hutu, from the education system that was introduced in Rwanda by the Belgian colonists and missionaries. His comparison of the number of Tutsi and Hutu children admitted to primary and secondary schools at the time of the feudal-colonial era in Rwanda showed that while Hutu made up the majority (67.7%) of pupils in primary schools, almost 100% of Tutsi children of school-going age attended primary school in 1957/1958. Tutsi children dominated in secondary schools (60.9%), while the Hutu made up 39.1%. Tutsi, who comprised only 9% of the population in the 1950s/1960s, were in the majority (61%) in secondary education, while Hutu, who made up about 90%, were only allocated 39% of seats in secondary schools. A study by Gasanabo (2004:49-51) on the Hutu/Tutsi division maintained by the Catholic Church found more impact in secondary education (where the Tutsi dominated), than in primary education and the catechumenate, where an increase of Hutu children was observed.

Mbonimana's (1981:71) comparative analysis of the ethnic composition of students admitted to the Minor Seminary of Kansi (Butare in 1912) found that this missionary school hosted many Hutus and Tutsis. *Petits Séminaires de Kansi* (i.e. secondary schools for the training of future priests before they entered the Major Seminary) were established using grants from the Belgian State; the first being founded by the Brothers of Charity (*Frères de la Charité de Gand*) in 1932. However, Mbonimana (1981:71) argued that there was a big difference in terms of the level of educational content provided to schools where many Hutu were admitted and schools where many Tutsi students were admitted. For example, the *Groupe Scolaire of Astrida*, which was basically established to educate future Tutsi chiefs, "dispensed a rather vocational education in so far as it trained them to become future administrative assistants, future chiefs, medical assistants, agronomists, monitors, assistant veterinaries, etc." On the contrary, the *Petit Séminaire de Kansi*, where future priests were prepared before they entered the Major Seminary, favoured a classical education based on science (mathematics) and languages (Latin, Greek, and French). When they reached the Major Seminary, students were taught Philosophy and Theology – which have nothing to do with becoming future chiefs or with vocational and technical learning.

A comparative study of ethnic disparities at what could be considered the University of Rwanda at the time (*Groupe Scolaire d'Astrida*) and the seminary schools which was conducted by Gasanabo (2004:49-51) found that Hutu students had access to the *Groupe Scolaire d'Astrida* but that it enrolled mostly children of Tutsi chiefs. For example, according to Mbonimana (1981:71):

- In 1932 the *Groupe Scolaire d'Astrida* included 45 Tutsi students (including Baganwa from Burundi), 14 Congolese, and only nine Hutu students;
- The intake of 1946 had 44 Tutsi students (or Baganwa Tutsi from Burundi), eight Hutu from Burundi, and only one Hutu from Rwanda; and
- The intake of 1954 had 63 Tutsi from Rwanda or Baganwa from Burundi, three Congolese, only three Hutu of Rwanda, and 16 Hutu from Burundi.

These statistics show that while there were many Hutu in primary schools, their numbers diminished in secondary schools and Hutu were almost excluded from attending the only school that gave the possibility of a paid job in the public administration, *Groupe Scolaire d'Astrida*. Only three Hutu attended the *Groupe*

Scholaire d'Astrida (Butare) in 1954 (Nzabirwa 2009:160). The school system was highly discriminatory, to the point that they had to select only from the Tutsi at the expense of the Hutu (Kayibanda et al. 1957:7). Most Hutu were not allowed to study beyond the fourth year of secondary school, while only Tutsis were allowed to complete secondary school (six years).

4.1.4.3. Exclusion of Hutu from all public administration and political posts during the colonial era

In the absence of higher institutes for administrative and vocational training, the graduates of the Petit Seminary, predominantly Hutu, were not able to gain employment like their Tutsi counterparts who graduated from the more career-oriented *Groupe Scholaire d'Astrida/Butare* (Gasabo 2004:49-51). Through the different schooling systems, the vocational training for the Tutsi and the non-career-oriented training for the Hutu, the Catholic missionaries managed to consolidate the almost irreversible socio-economic imbalances that had already existed before the colonisers arrived (Gasabo 2004:49-51).

One of the biggest supporters and promoters of Tutsi supremacy over the Hutu and therefore a major contributor to the socio-economic imbalances between the two ethnic groups was Bishop Classe, who in his letter to Governor Morteau on 21 September 1927, wrote:

“If we place ourselves at the point of practical view and seek the true interest of the country, we have in youth Mututsi incomparable elements of progress which no one who knows Rwanda can underestimate. We asked Bahutus if they prefer to be ordered by commoners or nobles, the answer is not in doubt; their preference is for Tutsi, and for good reason. Heads-born, they have a sense of command” (Classe 1927:1).

In 1930, the same Bishop Classe claimed that

“[t]he greatest harm the [Belgian] government could do to itself and the country would be to remove the Mututsi caste. One such revolution will lead the country straight to anarchy and hatefully anti-European communism. Far from promoting progress, it will annihilate the action of the government. Generally, we will not have better leaders, more intelligent, more active, and more capable of understanding progress and even accepted people as Tutsi” (Gasabo 2004:49-51).

Because of these false beliefs of *natus ad imperium* and *superioris generis* in favour of the Tutsi, some Belgians missionaries deliberately and systematically supported the discrimination against and socio-economic exclusion of the Hutu, which explains why the Catholic missionaries failed to train and equip them for the tasks of running the country (Wilson 2012:2).

Table 2
The number of students who attended primary and secondary schools by ethnic group: 1957/1958

Group	<i>Ecoles Primaires</i>		<i>Ecoles Secondaires</i>		<i>Groupe Scholaire d'Astrida</i>					
	1957/1958	%	1957/1958	%	1932	%	1946	%	1954	%
Tutsi	14 211	32.1	1 740	60.9	45	83.3	44	85	63	95.5
Hutu	29 953	67.7	1 116	39.1	9	16.7	8	15	3	4.5
Twa	30	0.2		0	0		0		0	
Total	44 196	100	2 956	100						

Source: Based on Munyangaju (1959:19 cited in Perraudin 2003) and Mbonimana (1981:71)

Table 2 compares the numbers of Tutsi and Hutu children at primary and secondary schools in the years 1957 and 1958. The choice of the years 1957 and 1958 is very important for the analysis in this article because it helps to determine whether the Hutu, who were at that time agitating for the removal of social and economic injustices imposed upon the Hutu, had valid grounds.

4.1.4.4. *Belgium's contribution to democracy and Hutu emancipation*

According to Gasanabo (2004:51-51), “[t]he Catholic Church was not foreign to the socio-political development of Rwanda and thereby the construction of collective memories and exclusive identities”. For example, in his 1959 Lenten pastoral letter, Bishop Perraudin spoke of “the problem of races” and warned that ignoring the continued plea for the Hutu to be included in the running of the country was going to cause serious problems (Chrétien 1999:145). Where Bishop Classe had wanted the monarchical power to promote his evangelisation, Bishop Perraudin, in contrast, needed to achieve the same objective through Hutu leaders because Hutu were the majority (Gasanabo 2004:52).

For example, it was Father Dejemeppe who in 1950 took Grégoire Kayibanda, a young Hutu school teacher who had just graduated from the Junior Seminary School at Kansi (with a few years in *Grand Séminaire de Karubanda*), with him as a Young Catholic Worker (*Jeunesse Ouvrière Catholique* or JOC) to a conference in Brussels, where he spent two months living with Dejemeppe’s family. It is during this visit that the young Kayibanda made important contacts with Christian socialists and trade unions as well as Belgian politicians who later supported him in the fight for the liberation of his people from the bondage of *Ubugake* imposed by the Tutsi and overthrow of feudalism in 1959 (Longman 2010:67).

Grégoire Kayibanda was the first elected president of the Republic of Rwanda and was the last to be democratically elected through a multiparty electoral system in 1968 and 1972 (The Pulitzer Centre 2011:1). It was *Grégoire Kayibanda* who “led Rwanda’s struggle for independence from Belgium, and replaced the Tutsi monarchy with a republican form of government. He asserted Hutu majority power” (The Pulitzer Centre 2011:1).

According to Gasanabo (2004:56-57), “the arrival of the Deputy Governor General Harroy in Rwanda in 1955 and the Bishop Perraudin’s coronation in 1956 contributed to changes in the social vision and political life”.

Of this era as Deputy Governor General of Ruanda-Urundi, Harroy (1984) wrote:

“The attitude that the Belgians had in Rwanda during the fifties, relying as long as possible, by obligation on the part of Tutsi, to introduce the necessary reforms measures in agriculture (especially the fight against famine), public health, education, etc. was gradually forced to change their pro-Tutsi behaviour as, firstly, the Hutu claims appeared more justified and more urgent, and then, the former Tutsi aid in development dwindled in the extreme case to pure sabotage” (Harroy 1984:244).

In his *Déclaration gouvernementale prononcée devant l’Assemblée Législative, le 26 Octobre 1961*, President Kayibanda (1961:13) lamented that Belgium made the error of using indirect administration for 40 years (from 1919 to 1959), which had oppressed and exploited the majority of Rwanda’s population; but expressed his gratitude to all Rwandan citizens for the support that he and his few colleagues who had led the Social Revolution in 1959 had received from the Belgian government, the Catholic missionaries, and certain individuals. He stated:

“Here I turn to those who helped the Republic of Rwanda to achieve its independence. It is first Belgium, in the name of all the Rwandan people, I express the most sincere and deepest gratitude for all the efforts that as administering power, has deployed to assist and guide our country to self-determination [...] I can say without fear of contradiction: the friendship that people keep in Belgium will be, in large part, the result of humanitarian action of Colonel Logiest, we will gladly keep in our midst” (Kayibanda 1961:13).

Therefore, while the Belgian government’s colonisation has been rightly blamed for bringing ethnic division through its introduction of ID cards in 1932, and for maintaining the predatory and exploitative feudal system existing in the country, it should also be commended for helping to dismantle and finally abolishing that feudal system and for establishing a democratic system based on republicanism during the years before Rwanda’s independence.

4.1.5. Leadership in the post-independence era (from 1962)

The leadership in post-colonial Rwanda can be divided into three sub-phases: the Dominique Mbonyumutwa/Grégoire Kayibanda post-independence era (1961 – 5 July 1973), the Habyarimana intra-Hutu revolution (or post-post-independence era) (5 July 1973 – 6 April 1994), and the RPF regime (1994 to date). Each of these three leadership phases and the developmental approaches associated with them will be briefly discussed in the next sections.

4.1.5.1. Leadership of Grégoire Kayibanda and social exclusion (1961 – 5 July 1973)

A main purpose of the *Révolution Sociale Rwandaise de 1959* (Rwandese Social Revolution of 1959) was to reject any continuation of the Tutsi domination over the Hutu masses and the impression that has been created by some Catholic missionaries such as Bishop Classe that the Tutsi were born to rule (Paternostre de la Mairieu 2009:1). Kayibanda et al. (1957:2) argued that the Rwandese Social Revolution which they led in 1959 was against “the social virtues of Mututsi which present him” as “*natus ad imperium*” or any myth which presented Tutsi as “*superioris generis*”, i.e. born to lead, while presenting Hutu as born to be enslaved (Kayibanda et al. 1957:2).

Grégoire Kayibanda, often considered as a man of fascinating simplicity, exceptional wit, a philosopher, a man whose *raison-d’être* was “*Libertatem filiorum Dei*” or “Freedom of the sons of God”, was the leader of the *Mouvement Démocratique Républicain-Parti de l’émancipation de la Masse Hutu* (PARMEHUTU) who became the first democratically elected president following Rwanda’s independence in 1962. Ngirira and Nzitabakuze (1991:7) argued that the first Rwandan parliament during President Kayibanda’s administration was a classical and unique parliament in the sense that it was formed out of many political parties. Kayibanda reorganised the country into prefectures to replace the territories, chiefdoms (*chefferies*), and sub-chiefdoms (*sous-chefferies*) which had existed under the previous feudal-colonial system (Republique Rwandaise 1962:6).

A closer look at the first speech of President Grégoire Kayibanda on 26 October 1960 in the National Assembly summarised the main immediate concern of the new government:

“The objective of the Rwandan government is simple: first the pacification of the country [...] As for the economy, a national plan will be established by the responsible ministries while our immediate policy, during the coming months, will seek the balance of immediate consumption. For social development, democratization of education will be for our country, of paramount importance. My government will also see to it that the people can be democratically educated” (Kayibanda 1960:8-9).

It is often said that “desperate times call for desperate measures” (Shields 2016:1), but could these challenges justify that Kayibanda continued with policies that were interpreted as promoting revenge against the Tutsi? For example, it was pointed out that the first government of President Kayibanda was made up of only Hutu, without a single Tutsi represented on it (Allardt, Kinlock & Mohan 2005:175). It is also alleged that those Tutsis who remained in the country were targeted through inequitable distribution of natural and social resources from pastures and cattle to education and employment opportunities (Allardt et al. 2005:175).

4.1.5.2. Introduction of quota systems in schools and public services

One of the main acts of the Kayibanda administration was to attempt to redress the injustices done by the Tutsi feudalists and the colonial administration his government had replaced. With that aim, Kayibanda sought to introduce a form of affirmative action and what is generally known as “fair discrimination” which favoured the disadvantaged community at the time, namely the Hutu. To do so, Kayibanda and his government introduced quotas to attempt to increase the number of Hutu in schools and the civil service. In proportion to their demographic size (they were only 9% of the total population), the Tutsi percentage in schools was gradually adjusted to reflect the democratic composition of the country, as shown in the table below.

Table 3
Number of students in secondary schools (1962-1981)

<i>Year</i>	<i>Hutu (%)</i>	<i>Tutsi (%)</i>
1962/1963	62	36
1963/1964	66	33
1964/1965	69	30
1965/1966	71	28
1966/1967	71	28
1967/1968	76	23
1968/1969	79	20
1969/1970	81.6	18.2
1970/1971	83	16
1971/1972	84.7	13.8
1972/1973	87.2	11
1973/1974	89.7	8
1974/1975	88	9
1975/1976	87	10.7
1976/1977	87.4	10.3
1977/1978	87.4	11.2
1978/1979	87.5	11.3
1979/1980	86.4	12
1980/1981	86	12.4

Source: Adapted from Mugesera (2004:312-313) and Nzabalirwa (2009:164)

These quotas also extended to the civil service where most of the Tutsi public officials were replaced by Hutu as a result of government restructuring and the exile of Tutsi officials to neighbouring countries (Nzabalirwa 2009:158). The Kayibanda government was also criticised for continuing the Belgian colonial government's policy of requiring ethnic ID cards (Nzabalirwa 2009:158). While the quotas introduced in schools by Kayibanda had good intentions, they were seen by the Tutsi minority as a form of exclusion from all the privileges they had enjoyed during the 400 years of feudal system and 60 years of colonialism. However, seeing that the Tutsi, who viewed themselves as rightfully trained to run the government, were being replaced by Seminaristes who had been given a more general education, did not sit well with the Tutsi elite.

4.1.5.3. Paysannats before, during, and after Belgian colonisation

Allardt *et al.* (2005:175) incorrectly argued that Kayibanda introduced *paysannats* (*Imidugudu in Kinyarwanda*), a form of rural settlements, in the 1960s and 1970s in order to take land from Tutsi owners for redistribution to the Hutu. The literature shows that *they were actually introduced by the Belgians in the early 1930s* to encourage the growth of cash crops (coffee, tea, etc.) 30 years before the country's independence. It is not clear whether the Belgians discriminated against the Hutu or Tutsi in sending people into these settlements, but it is possible that only *Hutu and some poor Tutsi were the main people sent to paysannats under Belgian rule. There are also no records to show that the ruling Tutsi elite objected to the paysannats policies at the time.*

However, the Rwandan government led by Kayibanda has been criticised for not abolishing *paysannats* after independence. It has been alleged that his government used them to accommodate those Tutsi who had been displaced in the ethnic violence that erupted during and after the Rwandan Social Revolution in 1959. The Kayibanda government continued to encourage both Hutu and Tutsi to stay in *paysannats* in order to find land for redistribution to both those Hutu who had lost land as a result of the *Ubuhake* system introduced by King Rwabugiri and to those Tutsi who had initially gained it from the Hutu through the *Ubuhake* system but later lost it during the 1959 revolution. It is not certain how effective the *paysannats* system in Rwanda was because until 1994 most Rwandans were still living in "homesteads scattered on the hills" (*Human Rights Report 2001:1*).

There was no *paysannats* policy during Habyarimana's rule (1993-1994). While President Habyarimana encouraged people to build houses near the roads or economic centres in order to speed up economic progress and if possible to build houses closer to where other people lived, he never forced people to stay in *imidugudu* or invested public funds to settle people in them.

On the contrary, the *paysannats*, which had been last heard of during the feudal-colonial era and Kayibanda regime, were reintroduced by the ruling RPF elite in 1994.

A review of the history of *imidugudu* shows that each ruling group criticised the policy of another government when they were not the beneficiaries, but they were quick to do the same to punish opponents. For example, according to Rwanda's Ministry of Infrastructure (2009:1), *imidugudu* human settlements were reintroduced in order to accommodate the returning refugees; some having left their land as a result of the war of October 1990-1994. This war led to millions of Hutu refugees in the neighbouring countries such as Tanzania, the DRC, Uganda, etc. Many of these refugees returned home in 1997 to find their properties (land, houses, coffee plantations, banana plantations, etc.) have been confiscated by the new

government led by the RPF, or have been taken over by the 1959 refugees. This was confirmed by the *Ministry of Infrastructure* (2009:10-11): “As they returned, some of the former 1959 refugees’ occupied land and property that had been abandoned by the Hutu refugees who fled the country in 1994.” However, not only those who fled the country in 1994 lost their land and properties at the expense of the 1959 refugees. Even those who did not go into exile as a result of the 1990-1994 war lost their properties and were forced to settle in the *imidugudu* villages as a result of what was called “government policy of plot sharing”. Plot sharing was also forced on the people who survived the 1990-1994 war and who did not leave their properties “to allow old case refugees of 1959 to get a piece of land to survive” (*Ministry of Infrastructure* 2009:10-11).

With imidugudu settlements, all the returning Hutu refugees were forced to abandon claiming back their land from the 1994 returning refugees, who had become the new owners (Kanyesigye 2012).

Considering the evidence presented in this section, there can be no doubt that while the current Rwandan government might be the first to denounce the practices of its predecessors and label them as a violation of human rights, it does the same with clear intention to take from those who benefited from the previous government and to give to its own supporters.

4.1.6. Leadership of Habyarimana (Second Republic July 1973 – 6 June 1994)

General Juvenal Habyarimana took power through a military coup which he and ten colleagues in the High Command of the National Guards carried out on the night of 4 July 1973 (Nsabimana 2014:1).

During his 21-year reign, Habyarimana developed a habit of sending his best wishes to the Rwandan population on New Year’s Eve (31 December of every year). It was also during the New Year’s Eve ceremony that the president proclaimed the New Year’s resolutions. It is during his New Year’s Eve speeches that President Habyarimana announced the theme he selected to guide the government’s plan of action and consequently the actions of all Rwandans in the upcoming year. The themes adopted for particular years paint a revealing picture of what really was going on in the head and heart of the president. To understand the policies of Habyarimana’s regime and the political and ideological philosophy behind them, one must analyse his many speeches and New Year’s resolutions. The following table summarises how the concepts of “auto-sufficiency” and “auto-development” were manifested in the theme given to each year that Habyarimana was in power (1973-1994).

Table 4
Thematic classification of Habyarimana’s New Year’s resolutions

Year	Annual theme
1973	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 5/7/1973: Habyarimana and the military command overthrow President Gregoire Kayibanda. Main focus: Peace, unity, and development.
1974	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Year of Agricultural Production / <i>Umwaka w’ubuhinzi</i>. Main objective: To increase both staple food and also export products (coffee, tea, pyrethrum, etc.). The establishment of <i>Umuganda</i> (communal work).
1975	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Year of augmentation of agricultural production / <i>Umwaka wo kongera umusaruro</i>. The founding of MRND (<i>Umwaka wa Muvoma</i>). The institution of the “Day dedicated to planning trees” (<i>Isyirwabo ry’umunsi w’Igiti mu Rwanda</i>).

1976	<p>The year for MRND.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The president announces the start of <i>Umuganda</i>. • The MRND becomes the only official political party in the country. Everyone in Rwanda is made a member of MRND.
1977	<p>The year of improving human habitat.</p> <p>Objectives:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Improve conditions of human dwellings. Use corrugated iron and tiles and get rid of mud-and-straw houses. • Encourage people to build their houses near the road or means of transport. Encourage, but not force, people to build houses in <i>paysannats</i>.
1978	<p>Promotion of animal (livestock) farming / <i>Umwaka w'ubworozi</i>.</p> <p>Objectives:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • To increase domestic animals (cows, goats, pigs, chicken, sheep, rabbits, etc.) according to the abilities and capacity of each individual in order to get meat, milk, and other animal products but also fertiliser for the farms. • “<i>Ukena ufite itungo rikakugoboka</i>” / “When you are poor you can sell your domestic animal” – Common saying in Rwanda.
1979	<p>The year of education / <i>Umwaka w'uburezi mu Rwanda</i>. Focus on education reforms.</p> <p>Main actions:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Primary schooling, which usually lasted for six years, is extended to eight. The two extra schooling years (7th and 8th year) are added on the primary school in order to teach manual labour (<i>imyuga / imirimo y'amaboko</i>) to children before leaving primary school. Among the practical skills taught to the children in the 7th and 8th year were masonry, agriculture, animal husbandry, bricklaying, couture, and cooking skills. • Establishment of <i>Les Centres d'Enseignement Rural et Artisanal Intégré</i> (CERAI). Three years of post-primary education mainly focusing on teaching manual labour / technical education to mostly children from poor families who were not permitted to proceed to secondary public schools and who cannot afford private schools.
1980	<p>Soil conservation / <i>Umwaka wo gufata neza ubutaka no kurwanya isuri</i>.</p> <p>Main actions:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Creation of anti-erosive terraces and strengthen them with grass. • Reforestation of hills and unused land. • Fertilisation of soil/farms.
1981	<p>Promotion of utilisation of clean water to fight waterborne diseases and to improve health / <i>umwaka wo gushyamba no gukwirakwiza amazi meza</i>.</p>
1982	<p>Focus on taking care of the soil. Fight against soil erosion / <i>Umwaka wo gufata neza ubutaka</i>.</p>
1983	<p>The year of the tree (planting trees / reforestation / <i>Umwaka wo gutera amashyamba</i>).</p> <p>Objectives:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Strengthening what has been done in previous years in terms of anti-erosive activities (taking care of the soil). • Among other things, reforestation would also achieve the objective of combating soil erosion. • It was also expected that the planted tree would provide wood necessary to manufacture certain items people need in their homes. Plantations of trees would also help in taking care of the soil.

1984	The year dedicated to increasing farm production of agricultural products / <i>Umwaka wo kongera umusaruro w'ibibingwa (ngandurarugo n'ioherezwa mu mabanga.</i>
1986	The year of agriculture and animal husbandry / <i>Umwaka w'ubuhinzi n'ubworozi bwa kijyambere</i>). Here the importance of combining agriculture and domestic animals became a priority. The aim is to use animal fertiliser to increase farm production.
1987	The end of giving annual themes on New Year's Eve.
1988	12/1988: The last presidential and parliamentary elections in President Habyarimana's regime.
1989	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Women are specifically excluded from performing <i>Umuganda</i>. • Abolition of the "Animation" – praise singing and glorification of Habyarimana.
1990-	Focus on political reforms. Pressure from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank to institute
1994	economic reforms and financial austerity. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The war crisis take centre stage because of the RPF attacks from Uganda.

Source: Adapted from Republic of Rwanda (2012:61-63)

4.1.6.1. Evidence of Tutsi exclusion in Habyarimana's New Year's resolutions

Habyarimana's focus on increasing agricultural production was interpreted by Verwimp (2006) as his means to exclude the Tutsi and give advantage to the Hutu who were traditionally linked to agriculture, as opposed to the Tutsi who were traditionally linked to cattle pastoralism. But pastoralism was no longer the prerogative of Tutsi during Habyarimana's regime because an increasing number of Hutu owned a large number of cattle. Furthermore, a closer review of the annual themes between 1974 and 1994 presented in Table 4 shows that the annual themes covered different issues such as education, agriculture, reforestation, improving human habitats, and using clean water which were not directly associated with one ethnic group. Except for education, where a quota system applied as discussed above and below, there were no specific aims to disadvantage Tutsi.

4.1.6.2. Quota system in schools and public services during Habyarimana's regime

Habyarimana's regime has been blamed for having continued with the ethnic quota system introduced by Kayibanda. However, while the Tutsi felt that they were the only target of Habyarimana's quota system in education, the Hutu, especially the peasants and particularly those who did not come from Habyarimana's home province of Gisenyi, were also negatively affected by the quota system. Habyarimana's regime was often accused internally of favouring Hutu from the northern part of the country (his home area of Gisenyi and Ruhengeri) and discriminating against anyone (both Hutu and Tutsi) from the central and southern parts of the country. For example, in 1987, Habyarimana's Minister of Education, Colonel Aloys Nsekarije, made it clear that no one was admitted to secondary schools solely because they had passed the admission exams but that those who got spaces in secondary schools were those whom he had "allowed to do so". He also stated that the child of a farmer/peasant (*umwana w'umuhinzi* / cultivator) could not get a space in a secondary school before the child of a minister, burgomaster, or a businessman (Rushyashya.net 2015:2).

Therefore, without denying that the Tutsi were disadvantaged in the process of admission into government high schools, the target was generalised to the poor peasants and during the Habyarimana

regime those were generally, although not exclusively, the Hutu. Therefore, while the Hutu did indeed benefit from the quota-based school admission practice of Habyarimana's regime, the Hutu who benefited were generally those from Ruhengeri and Gisenyi, rather than every Hutu – as often portrayed in the newspapers or Western media. A look at the following table showing the students admitted at the National University of Rwanda demonstrates that the quota system was indeed used and the percentages of students who had been admitted fairly corresponded to the official ethnic population statistics in different years; with the exception of the Twa, who were consistently underrepresented and in some years had no single student at the university (1984/1985 and 1985/1986).

Table 5
Number of students at the National University of Rwanda during the Habyarimana regime: 1981-1987

<i>Academic year</i>	<i>Hutu</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>Tutsi</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>Twa</i>	<i>%</i>
1981/1982	987	85.31	168	14.52	2	0.17
1982/1983	1112	87.14	164	12.85	1	0.01
1983/1984	1189	89.26	142	10.67	1	0.07
1984/1985	1360	88.48	177	11.52	0	0
1985/1986	1340	87.64	189	12.36	0	0
1986/1987	1250	86.27	198	13.66	1	0.07
Total	6325	85.85	1037	14.08	5	0.07

Source: Adapted from MINESUPRES (1989:49) and Nzabalirwa (2009:165)

4.1.6.3. Economic and Public Service exclusion of Tutsi during the Habyarimana regime

It is a well-known fact that the quota system was applied across sectors such as education and public offices. For example, Habyarimana's cabinet always had at least one Tutsi member (one in ten) as Habyarimana believed that he would rather have "*l'équilibre*" than "*desequilibre*" in the country. However, he seems to have been concerned more with paying back the injustices visited by the Kayibanda government on the Hutu from the north than on the Tutsis. As Wilson (2012:2) pointed out, during 1974 Habyarimana was accused by the Hutu, especially from his area of origin, of favouring the Tutsi by giving them positions in almost all sectors of politics and economy. In 1974, a public outcry developed over Tutsi overrepresentation in professional fields such as medicine and education, and led to rumours of Habyarimana having connived with the Tutsi to overthrow Kayibanda.

Furthermore, there are some, such as Wilson (2012:2), who believe that "Habyarimana was "very lenient toward the Tutsi" especially in business and private education. It was argued that "the tacit agreement was: Do not meddle in politics, it is the prerogative of the Hutus" (Prunier 2014). "As Tutsis were within this, they were generally left in peace. [...] The system, although authoritarian, was somewhat debonair and it worked economically" (Jones 2010:73).

Therefore, while Verwimp (2006:3) argued that Habyarimana "glorified the peasantry and pictured himself as a peasant" and that "in his ideology of rural romanticism, only the Hutu were the real peasants of Rwanda; the Tutsi were the feudal class closely associated with colonialist occupation" and that according to this Hutu ideology, the Tutsi refused to till the land and were considered "petty bourgeoisie" (Verwimp

2006:3). Thomson (2013:186) argued that this was not necessarily the case. In reality, according to Thomson (2013:186), “the Habyarimana regime (1973-1994) enjoyed considerable support among ordinary Rwandan peasants – Hutu and Tutsi alike – because they felt that its development policies served their interests, which in turn gave the regime greater legitimacy at the grass roots than the policy of national unity and reconciliation currently being implemented” by the RPF regime (1994 to date).

4.1.7. Leadership during the RPF regime (1994 to date)

According to Sennoga and Byamukama (2014:12), “Rwanda made notable gains in reducing poverty and income inequality during the first Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy (EDPRS 1, 2008-2013). The government’s own data indicate that headcount poverty declined from 57% in 2005/2006 to 44.9% in 2010/2011. That would “represent a graduation of one million people from poverty and a reduction of inequality in household consumption as measured by the Gini coefficient from 0.52 in 2006 to 0.49 in 2011” (World Bank 2016:1). Rwanda’s Gini coefficient is expected to be at 0.350 in 2020, but this would only be possible if the economy continues to grow at a rate of 8% until 2020 and the benefits of that growth were shared equitably among the Rwandan people in urban and rural areas. In order to understand how the RPF-led government’s policies affect the Hutu ethnic groups, one can look at urban versus rural disparities, the allocation of social and economic support to the poor, the orphans, the widows, and the survivors of the 1990-1994 war and how these affect the different ethnic groups.

4.1.7.1. Rural/urban population mirror ethnic socio-economic disparities in Rwanda: post-1994

According to the 2014 World Bank report, 75% of Rwanda’s population lived in rural areas in 2011, 74% in 2012, 73% in 2013, and 72% in 2014, and it is expected to remain around 70% in 2020. According to Hakizimana and Endless (2009:4), poverty in Rwanda affects the rural population more than urban populations. Of the 5.38 million poor in Rwanda in 2006, 4.98 million lived in rural areas on less than \$0.44 (RWF 250) per day. In terms of “urban-rural” disparity, according to Ansoms (2007:4), “the incidence of urban poverty is considerably lower (e.g. 10.4% in Kigali city and 17.8% in other towns)”.

The urban-rural divide in Rwanda currently reflects an ethnic divide. While not every Tutsi lives in urban areas, the majority of returning Tutsi refugees settled in urban areas, while Hutu dominate rural areas, as confirmed by Thomson (2013:40 citing Waldorf 2006:76-457). IBUKA (in Kinyarwanda, “to remember”, the main survivor organisation) estimated that 70% of survivors relocated to urban areas. AVEGA (Association of Genocide Widows) estimated that 65% of survivors had relocated to urban areas (Waldorf 2006:76-457 in Thomson 2013:40). The World Health Organization report in 2015 stated that 81.1% of Rwanda’s total population resides in these underserved rural areas. Seeing that the Hutu are the majority (85%) in Rwanda and the majority of Tutsi have relocated to urban areas, it can safely be concluded that the majority of people living in the impoverished rural areas are the Hutu (Culture of Rwanda Forum 2006).

4.1.7.2. FARG is funded by all Rwandans yet only Tutsi receive assistance

In response to the genocide survivors’ crisis, “the Rwandan government created the Genocide Survivors Assistance Fund (or *Fonds d’assistance aux rescapés du génocide* – FARG), with a view to provide education, health care, and housing assistance services to genocide survivors” (Hakizimana & Endless 2009:8). FARG

was created in 1998 (Verpoorten 2014:1). Unfortunately, as the following paragraph shows, only the Tutsi survivors received this support from government.

According to Agency Hirondelle News (2008:1), the first census carried out by Rwandan authorities and many associations of survivors, notably IBUKA (“remember”) and the National Institute of Statistics of Rwanda (NISR) found that there were about 309 368 genocide survivors. According to the Official Gazette (no. 45 of 11/11/2013) of the Government of Rwanda (2013:68), Article 2, the term ‘survivors/ rescapés/ *abarokotse jenocide*’ refers to the “survivors of the genocide against the Tutsi committed between 01 October 1990 and 31 December 1994”. The use of the term “Tutsi” in this definition strategically suggested that being a Tutsi equates to being a “genocide survivor”. It also suggested that being a Tutsi was the only criterion for selecting the beneficiaries of support from FARG. If the number 309 368 is correct, and considering that there are currently over 12 000 000 people in Rwanda; then FARG-assisted survivors would represent only 3% of the population. The funding of FARG with 6% of the National Budget for the Tutsi survivors (309 368) is almost comparable to the 10% used for funding agriculture, which accounts for more than 90% of the labour force and supports over 11 million Rwandans, of which 85% are Hutu and of which 65% live in rural areas where little, if any, development is taking place.

If one uses the 6% allocation to FARG and 10% allocated to the “Rural Development” thematic area of Vision 2020, it appears that FARG received over RWF 100.7 billion in the 2013/2014 financial year out of the total government budget of RWF 1677.7 billion (Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning 2014:28), growing to RWF 105.20 billion in the 2014/2015 financial year and RWF 106.10 billion in the 2015/2016 financial year. Over the same periods, the thematic area, which includes agriculture, received RWF 167.77 billion, RWF 175.33 billion, and RWF 176.82 billion respectively. Therefore, here we have an estimated 309 368 Tutsi survivors receiving 6% of the national budget, while nothing went to the Hutu survivors, widows, and orphans. While FARG funding received a 6% share of the government budget, 47% of social security expenses went to Tutsi survivors, while all other vulnerable groups shared less than 25% (World Bank 1997 cited in Hakizimana & Endless 2009:8). According to Hakizimana and Endless (2009:8), “[o]ne of the hardest-felt economic impacts of this discrimination between assisted Tutsi and unassisted Hutu survivors is the placing of orphans from both ethnic groups on diametrically opposing success paths for their future, with young Tutsis being afforded easy access to education and a chance to break the poverty cycle, while young Hutus are left with no future beyond the under-financed agriculture sector” (Hakizimana & Endless 2009:8).

4.1.7.3. Exploiting the genocide to sideline Hutu from government positions

Although the population distribution in Rwanda is 84% Hutu, 15% Tutsi, and 1% Twa, Hakizimana and Endless (2009:10) reported that “out of 34 high-ranking officials at the presidency and in government in 2003, only 15 officials were Hutus and 19 were Tutsis”. There seemed to have been some form of intra-Tutsi discrimination because the majority (i.e. 16 out of the 19 Tutsi officials) were former refugees and only three were not. Adopting the Rwandan Government’s value of 309 368 genocide survivors (i.e. counting only the Tutsi who were not in exile before 1994) (Agency Hirondelle News 2008:1), one can argue that even though the Hutu are underrepresented in the current government, most Tutsi from exile also hold disproportionately more senior government positions than those in the country in 1994.

According to Hakizimana and Endless (2009:10), “given the fact that Rwanda’s population in 2003 was 8 911 902”, it is easy to see that “the representation rate of Tutsis in government was seven times higher than that of Hutus, who are six times more numerous than Tutsis”. A deeper analysis of these data shows “that ethnic composition at the top tier of public service in Rwanda allows for one Hutu executive per 500 000 Hutus and one Tutsi executive per 70 000 Tutsis”. Hakizimana and Endless’ (2009:10) analysis showed that the Hutu-Tutsi ethnic representation gap was even wider in the military where “of the 46 high-ranking officers (ranked General, Lieutenant-General, Major General, Brigadier General, and Colonel) in the Rwandan army in 2006, only five were Hutus (11%) and 41 were Tutsis (89%)”. Accepting that the population in Rwanda was 9 464 241 in 2006, these data indicate that the ethnic composition of the Rwandan army high command allowed for one Hutu senior officer per 1 590 000 Hutu and one Tutsi senior officer per 34 600 Tutsi (Hakizimana & Endless 2009:8-10).

4.1.7.4. *Parallels between the methods used by the Tutsi monarchy and those presently used by the RPF*

Hakizimana and Endless (2009:11) argued that despite the RPF-government’s rhetoric about reconciliation and economic development, the “current situation in Rwanda regarding ethnic representation in government closely mirrors that which prevailed on the eve of the social revolution in 1959”. For example, the Tutsi, who represented only 9% of the population during the colonial era, dominated the *Conseil Supérieur du Pays* (the local parliamentary council); their representation being 90% in 1953 and 97% in 1956 (Frohlich 1964:100). According to Munyangaju (1959:126 cited in Hakizimana & Endless 2009:11), “out of 1 786 public administration positions in 1957” as many as “1 577 were held by Tutsis (88%) and only 209 by Hutus (12%)”. Adopting the same ethnic proportions as today (84% Hutu, 14% Tutsi, and 1% Twa), Hakizimana and Endless (2009:11) calculated that the Tutsi representation rate in government was 46 times higher than that of the Hutu – an unacceptable overrepresentation which they noted was “identical to today within the Rwandan military high command”.

Hakizimana and Endless’ (2009:10) analysis was well supported by a number of long-term RPF insiders of Tutsi ethnic background “such as General Kayumba Nyamwasa, the former Chief of Staff of Rwanda’s armed forces; Colonel Karegeya, the former Chief of external security/spy services; Major Rudasingwa, Kagame’s former Director of Cabinet and Rwanda’s first postgenocide ambassador to the US, and Gerald Gahima, Rwanda’s former Prosecutor General and Vice President of the Supreme Court” (Gasana 2010:10). Nyamwasa, Karegeya, Rudasingwa and Gahima (2010: 15-16) summarised the challenges that faced Rwanda in the aftermath of the war and genocide as follows: “The Hutu community is marginalised from a meaningful share of power” because “the Hutu who serve in RPF-led government are only surrogates of the RPF who lack legitimacy in their community”. Such people “are kept in office, often for very brief periods, for the sole purpose of giving the government an appearance of embracing political pluralism”.

According to Smith (1996:1), “those few Hutus who have been elevated to high-ranking posts are usually empty suits without any real authority of their own. They are known locally as *Hutus de service* or Hutus for hire and sometimes called *idiot utile* or useful idiots”.

The analyses by Hakizimana and Endless (2009) and Nyamwasa et al. (2010:15-16) cannot be easily dismissed because these authors have occupied senior officials positions in the Rwandan government and army and had direct access to the policies and practices as well as the tactics used by the party to manipulate the Hutu and the international community. Their arguments are also confirmed by recent independent

researcher Thomson (2013:63), who argued that just as Rwabugiri, the feudalist who introduced the *Ubuhake* system, “freely disposed of incumbents and appointed chiefs directly dependent on him”, Kagame has done the same thing “in appointing *and disposing* [emphasis added] RPF loyalists at the local level”.

According to Hakizimana and Endless (2009:12), the second and equally dangerous similarity between the past feudalism and the current Rwanda’s regime is the driving of Hutu children out of schools by keeping them in poverty and resorting to skilful manoeuvres, sometimes even outright moral persecution before independence (Perraudin 2003:131), which “resembles the present poverty situation forced on a majority of Hutus, and echoes the ill-defined law on ‘genocide ideology’ currently targeting Hutu children and teachers in secondary schools” (Human Rights Watch 2008 cited in Hakizimana & Endless 2009:12). Therefore, during the colonial era, Hutu children were not allowed to go to schools that teach how to run the country because they were not born to rule and they were also not funded post-1994 because they are the offspring of people accused of having committed the genocide. In 2005, President Kagame was quoted in the *Jeune Afrique l’intelligent* (2005) as stating his position about Hutu children in his country thusly: “Children born from parents who committed genocide, and raised in the genocide ideology, are possibly as dangerous as their parents... In any case, regarding them, we have a duty of prevention” (cited in Hakizimana & Endless 2009:12). Because the Rwandan leadership tends to see the children of Hutu as potential future *genocidaires*, it tends to not think it its duty to educate them.

4.1.7.5. Practice of the victor’s justice through the different laws of genocide ideology

Hakizimana and Endless (2009:12) argued for other striking parallels “between the methods used by the Tutsi monarchy before independence, and those presently used by the RPF to monopolize power”. The first of these parallels was drawn between “the denial by King Mutara Rudahigwa in June 1958 of a Hutu-Tutsi ethnic problem, as well as his evasive answer to Hutu leaders seeking a solution at the country’s Superior Council, that division and opposition amidst its people is the direst obstacle to a country’s progress” (Perraudin 2003:167), as being parallel “to the current muzzling of the public on the matter by the RPF, through the vague law on ‘divisionism’ or ‘law of genocide ideology’” (Human Rights Watch 2008:2 cited in Uwizeyimana 2014: 2372).

The term “genocide ideology” (also called *ingengabitekerezo ya jenocide* in Kinyarwanda) is a term coined by the RPF-led government in 1994. “Law no. 84/2013 of 11/09/2013 on the crime of genocide ideology and other related offences” has been used to sentence Hutu to long-term prison sentences or to execution (Uwizeyimana 2015:125). The law has also been used by the government to shield Tutsi from being prosecuted for the war crimes and crimes against humanity they committed against the Hutu during and after the 1994 genocide. Any Hutu who dare point a finger to the Tutsi who committed crimes is guilty of genocide ideology and is liable to a long prison term. Amnesty International (2010:92) and Garrison (2010:3) have argued that the genocide fears or genocide ideology are “frequently used as a means of control over the Hutu majority by the minority government” (Hakizimana & Endless 2009:12). This confirms Des Forges’ (1999:728) early argument that “while the Rwandan government’s effort to reshape Rwandan political culture to eliminate divisiveness has been widely lauded, other political motivations have influenced the government’s political program and undermined the government’s ability to unify the country”. Not only is this law used to silence political opponents, most Hutu believe it has been used to carry out political vengeance acts known as victors’ justice. The term “victor’s justice” (*Siegerjustiz* in German) is a situation in

which “an entity or a person who was part of the conflict makes himself a complainant and judge over the opponent who loses the conflict. That is, the victor (in this case the Tutsi-led government) prosecutes the conquered enemies (i.e. Hutu)” (Butt 2003:1).

5. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

As indicated in the introduction of this article, the objective of this study was to assess to what extent claims about social exclusion made by the different ethnic groups in Rwanda against each other have been justified.

In summary, one can conclude with confidence that the leadership of Rwanda at various times, from the precolonial to the postcolonial era, deliberately promoted socio-economic development plans/models which favoured members of their own ethnic groups at the expense of the interests of members of the other ethnic groups. The nature of socio-economic exclusion claimed to be experienced by one ethnic group when the leadership of the country was from a different ethnic background included land dispossession and enslavement of the Hutu through *Ubugake* during the feudal system era, the exploitation of Hutu by Tutsi and the colonial masters through a combination of *Ubugake* and *Ubugereza*, and the exclusion of Hutu and Twa from accessing schools during the colonial era. Social exclusion did not stop with the abolition of the feudal and the colonial systems; indeed, the mechanisms and strategies employed by President Kayibanda have been interpreted by the Tutsi as forms of exclusion against them. These continued during Habyarimana's regime through the quota system in schools and public services.

However, the social exclusion practised during Kayibanda and Habyarimana's regimes included a regional, north-south component. The nature of social exclusion during the post-1994 Rwandan government strictly benefitted the Tutsi at the expense of the Hutu and included issues such as systematic underfunding of agriculture and rural areas, using FARG to discriminate against Hutu survivors, exploiting the genocide to side-line Hutu from government positions, applying collective guilt to the Hutu, and stigmatising Hutu children as potential *genocidaires*.

The Tutsi ruling class in Rwanda and the international community should avoid repeating the same mistake, knowing very well the results and consequences are going to be the same. There is no doubt that perceptions of social exclusion were prevalent among the Hutu under the Tutsi feudalism and that the Tutsi felt the same when the Hutu took over during the first and second republics. However, while each of the two main ethnic groups that have ruled Rwanda claims to have been the victim, instead of being the perpetrator of such exclusion, the findings in this article reject this view. Social exclusion targeting the three ethnic groups has indeed taken place in Rwanda during the different ethnic leaderships that have governed Rwanda during the different periods. As General Kayumba Nyamwasa argued, “in Rwanda they are neither saints nor devils, it is in between the saints and devils” (Nyamwasa 2014, cited in Umurungi 2014:1). This article thus agrees with the conclusion drawn by Nduwayezu (1991), who argued that the Hutu have committed sins against the Tutsi and the Tutsi have also made mistakes against Hutu, and that therefore they should forgive each other (Nduwayezu 1991 cited in Mugesera 2004:1). Therefore, as things currently stand, and according to John 8:7, “Whoever one of them who has committed no sin, let him be the first to throw the first stone” (Good News Bible 1964). The main recommendations of this research is that there is a need for Rwanda's leadership to actively and deliberately promote policies that take into account the interests of all ethnic groups (Twa, Hutu, and Tutsi); instead of those that seek to exclude

them. The current and future leadership of Rwanda should seek to eradicate all forms of social exclusion that have been experienced by other ethnic groups when the leadership changed from one ethnic group to another. Such social exclusion has been the major cause of conflict between the Hutu and Tutsi and is likely to keep causing inter-ethnic conflict in Rwanda if nothing is done to address it.

The past is gone and there is no way former leaders can correct their mistakes. The baton is now in the hands of current and future leaders to create a Rwanda in which all Rwandans are socially included. Among the recommendations of this research that could help whoever leads Rwanda in the building of a socially inclusive and ethnically united Rwandan society in which Twa, Hutu, and Tutsi live in harmony are the following:

- The ruling group in Rwanda should appreciate that genuine reconciliation cannot happen until justice is done and is seen to be done by all Rwandans (both Hutu and Tutsi) (Uwizeyimana 2015:115).
- Entrench democratic rule and stop victor's justice practices. Ethnic violence and civil war between Hutu and Tutsi are unavoidable unless the RPF starts sharing power in a concrete and genuinely democratic way (Bizimungu 2002 cited in Uwizeyimana 2012:153).
- Practise equitable allocation of funding for school children and do not use ethnic affiliation to allocate FARG funding or to allocate social support (Hakizimana & Endless 2009:10; United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 2015:54).
- Do not force Hutu off their land and properties so that it can be allocated to Tutsi and do not exclude Hutu from decision making and public employment. *Imidugudu* has been criticised by all ethnic groups (Human Rights Report 2001:1) and exclusion of Hutu from gaining jobs in public offices and education were some of the main causes of the 1959 Social Revolution, which led to the overthrow of the Tutsi monarchy and forced most Tutsi in exile. A fool has been defined as someone who does the same thing over and over again and expects different results. Hence history tends to repeat itself, and it would therefore be unwise to practise social injustice against any ethnic group in Rwanda knowing very well that such injustice will inevitably lead to inter-ethnic conflict in the future.
- Establish an official day for remembrance of the Hutu who have been killed by the RPF soldiers and make sure to provide justice to those whose relatives have been killed by the RPF soldiers (Corbin 2014).
- Tread carefully with the use of TIG; since the Hutu are the only ones forced to do it, it has the potential of being interpreted as the return of the *Ubuhake* and *Uburetwa* systems – which led to the Social Revolution of 1959. TIG confirms the fear held by most Hutu that the return of the RPF in Rwanda would bring back the *Ubuhake* system to which the Hutu ancestors have been subjected during the 400 years of feudal system discussed in this article.

NOTES

1. The author is aware that reference to Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa as ethnic groups under the RPF government is prohibited. However, while Rwanda's policy of national unity and reconciliation states that Rwandans are no longer allowed to

refer to their ethnic background, it also refers to Tutsis as being the victims of violence and only ethnic Hutu as killers. The Constitution of Rwanda also refers to the 1994 genocide as the genocide against the Tutsi, or *Jenoside yakorewe abatutsi* in Kinyarwanda,, which suggests that Tutsi are still officially recognised as an ethnic group in Rwanda (Republic of Rwanda 2010:3).

2. Available at: http://www.nurc.gov.rw/index.php?id=75&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=31&cHash=59a3dbb4cdc9027b1fddb8eae58aa (Accessed: 04 October 2017).

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