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STATE AND RURAL URBAN TRADE IN EASTERN RAJASTHAN

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A significant feature of late pre-Colonial rural commerce in North India that first received an elaborate treatment in the seminal work or B. R. Grover[1] was the extent and the nature of state intervention and control over the market -

The general pattern of local rural trade that emerges from the studies, on the same, is an essentially vertical thrust of commodities moving out of the locality through a hierarchy of market linked by chains of intermediaries and the flow of commodities and credit.[2]

It has been suggested in[3] Rajasthan records of late 17th and 18th Century that crop sharing persisted as the dominant mode of revenue assessment for food grains, in particular, the peasant was obliged to remit the revenue in cash after commutation of the state's share of grain at current local prices. Thus, whether the revenue was assessed in cash or by the division of the grain heap, its ultimate payment as cash necessitated the marketing of agricultural produce by the peasant. The role of the Mughal State in commerce is thus seen to be limited to taxing traders through various sales and transit tolls or monopolizing the sale of certain commodities[4]. Instances of the direct intervention of the state in the regulation of grain trade have been noted in situation of scarcity and famine. Such intervention was by its nature sporadic - limited to times of crisis in food grain availability and keeping with popular expectations of a paternalistic ruler[5].

A careful analysis of Jaipur records however reveals a more direct and routine involvement in local trade by the local government administration. This involvement was articulated through the collection of revenue in kind, which constituted more than half of the total annual revenue proceeds. The collection by the state commission to cash by sale of grain organized by the state. The revenue collected in kind was marketed by the local revenue officials and not by the peasants.

Based on the Arhsattas and Jaipur records, Madhavi Bajekal in her article[6] , has given a panoramic treatment to states role in rural urban trade. In order to eleborate on this aspect of the state's of the state's interest in the grain market, it would be pertinent to trace the processes involved in the disposal of the grain revenues appropriately by the state.

State's Contribution in Storage

As far as storage is concerned, the state's contribution lay in the construction of host of storage pits[7] , in the villages for storage of state's grain share. Storage of

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grain in pits is regarded as the most important and efficient method of long-term storage in dry lands and continuous to be in used today. Tod's description of grain pit in the adjoining state of Kota in Eastern Rajasthan indicates that there were simple unlined structures in which grain was generally stored loose or unbagged. The recommended practice in such cases was for the Amil to arrange for its transportation to the state granaries in the qasba[8].

In view of the fact that efficient storage of the grain pending its disposal was as important as the collection of revenue, the revenue officials of the state were required to inspect village pits regularly.

If the stored grain was deteriorating, the Amil was instructed to make immediate arrangements for its disposal, either through the grain dealers at prices lower than those current in the bazaar, or the grain was distributed to the needy peasants as the *taccavi* loans to be recovered in kind at the time of next harvest.

Storage of grain was however just an interim process to its ultimate disposal. The state's need to convert its grain revenues into disposable income in cash as well as the fact that long term storage of grain was not feasible an inadvisable, due to risk of deterioration, meant that the bulk of the grain was sold to the local grain dealers during the current harvest. Some of the grain, was however, transported to forts for the provisioning of garrisons.

Taking of all the above factors into consideration, the upper and lower limits, to the proportion of the grain produce appropriated and marketed by the state in any pargana would have been about three to twelve percent of the gross grain production with the collections in the period 1730 - 1750. Control over a sizeable grain stock meant that the involvement of the state in the grain trade in the market was significant. The state participation in the grain market as a giant seller in conjunction with a political power that it wielded ensured its domination of the local grain market.[9]

State's Role in Price Determination

According to B. R. Grover, the state exercised formal control over the rural market through a policy of fixing prices on a regional scale. The state's need to fix prices has broadly been ascribed to its desire to ensure cheap food. The fundamental value implicit in this policy was the virtue claimed by and attributed to Mughal rulers during whose reigns low grain prices prevailed or who actively kept prices low in their central cities.

Bayly[10] on the hand has argued that the fixing of bazaar prices by the state was more of a process of bargaining between the local merchants and the political authorities. In fact, the intervention of the state in negotiating retail prices with reference to the wholesale prices has been taken by Bayly as a mechanism to ensure smooth flow of grain into the city.

The evidence gathered from the "*nirakh bazaar*" documents as also chittis suggests that the state intervention in price setting was closely related to its role as the major seller of grain in the market with its annual revenues being dependent on the value of the produce appropriated in grain. The bazar prices recorded in the '*nirakh bazar*' documents for each qasba provided a benchmark for the state to determine the price at which it would sell its produce revenue to the grain dealers. The involvement of the state in the process of price setting can thus be seen as an index of official social policy as well as revenue considerations[11].

Besides storing the grain and determining its price state also assumed the role of the potential trader in grains. The Amil was responsible for the role of the state share of grains in his pargana (Abul Fazl's Ain-i-Akbari)[12] . He took several steps to ensure the quick disposal of state share of grains. For selling the grains, not only the local traders were approached but traders from different towns were also invited[13]. In the majority of cases the state grain was sold to the traders before harvesting the crop by entering into a sort of contract known as sati. Thus traders, under state agreements, undertook to buy the state grain on the basis of price current on the day the contract was made. The state revenue official could contract the sati for a village or a group of villages either before the commencement of harvesting season, as was the usual practice, or after.

Collection of revenue[14], If the contract was made before the collection of revenue the traders had to gather the state grain wither directly from the peasants or the local collecting authorities i.e., the patel or the zamindar. There are several instances of the traders being unable to collect the grain from the patels and the raiyat.

Efforts were also made by the state to put the grain on sale at an appropriate time when the prices were rising. The Amil was especially instructed to keep an eye on the price movement in the local market as also to obtain timely information on prices from other towns and make attempts to contact sati on favourable terms. It was at this state that the process of bargain between the state and the traders started in order to seek more profitable terms. The traders could have hoped to and did get profit out of difference in the price levels at different places or due to local price fluctuations in the light of price and demand. This can be highlighted by the instance at the year A.D. 1728 when the sati of village in pargana Chatsu was contracted with a Mahajan. However, the prices rose from the very next day and the trader earned profit even in the local market[15]. The Amil was blamed for not being vigilant in watching the price movement. Thereafter, the sale of the state share was made in the presence of *chaudhari*, with a view to reducing the possibility of misappropriation of the state revenue by the state officials on the one hand, and by the merchants through reducing the prices on the other.

In normal circumstances the traders who contracted *sati* with the state for the purchase of its grains were required to make payment as stipulated in the terms of agreement failing which they were liable to be charged interest. However, in case of glut or scarcity the state not only offered its grain to the traders on lucrative terms including interest free credit facility but also advanced cash loans to induce them to buy the grain. This reflects the eagerness of the state to dispose off its grain as early as possible in order to avoid accumulation of stocks for want of proper storage facilities.

Apart from taking recourse to *sati*, the state officials also invited local as well as outside traders to buy state grain. In an instance in the year 1727 we find the state officials of Amber selling 700,000 mounds of grain to the *vichhayat* traders[15] , sometimes the state did not dispose off its grain directly to the traders and handed it over to certain urban based big traders, who were instructed with the responsibility to sell state grain along with the personal stock on commission basis[16].

On several occasions, the state in its eagerness to sell off its grain, even tended to monopolize the trade in food grains by resorting to restrictive methods and harassing the traders especially in emergency situations. At the time of depression in the market, the pargana officials forced the traders to buy state share of grain according to their status and purchasing capacities.

In 1728, when there was a glut in the market the Amil of Pargana Amber resorted to coercion in order to compel other traders of Amber town to buy state grain.[17]

Quite often the state officials imposed parna on the panch mahajans of the qasbas there by compelling them either to buy the grain or pay a cess in the form of fine. According to the customary practices only grain merchants were liable to the imposition of parna but in many cases we find the panch mahajans and even the patel and the raiyat protesting against the imposition of parna. The monopolistic attitude of state with regard to grain trade can also be judged from the fact that the pargana officials were not to permit other traders to sell their stocks in the market unless the state grain was wholly disposed off. Thus the state emerged as a strong competitor to the professional grain merchants.

However, this is not to imply that the role of state in the grain trade was simply monopolistic. (emphasis mine) On the contrary in fact we come across instances of the state giving instructions to the Amils not to send food grains to Delhi, Agra, etc. but to divert it to Amber where it was hoarded in the anticipation of further rise in prices.[18]

Further, the state had advanced *tagai (tagavi* loans) to the raiyat in the preceding year in the form of food grains on the condition of its repayment in cash according to the price of the day on which *tagai* was granted. However, in the following year the prices shot up and the state insisted the raiyat repaying *tagai* in kind so that it could take the benefit of the rise in prices.[19]

In fact, in a number of cases we find the state instructing its Amils to hoard grains whenever they anticipated shortages due to some reason or the other. This was because of scarcity of rainfall and anticipated substantial rise of agricultural prices in the near future, which led the state to undertake this move.

Due to the lack of rainfall, scarcity of food grains, the anticipated rise in prices of grains, in 1707 A.D. was 50% within 5 to 6 days, the state also constructively utilized the situation by selling off the old grain so as to balance out the demand and supply of grain.

Even during the famine years, when there was a scarcity, the state made attempts to regulate the prices of foodstuff in the internal market through the instrument of panch mahajans who were instructed to regulate prices at appropriate level.[20] In its effort to the severe drought and grain scarcity of 1738. food canteens (langars) were opened towards which a sum of rupees four thousand was sanctioned[21]. In addition, a ban was imposed on the export of grain from the region while imports were encouraged through the cancellation of all transit and sale taxes for all grains except wheat and seasme.

Thus, the state besides extending financial and material support to the rural sector in extension and improvement of agriculture and releasing surplus stock for the villages affected by scarcity also emerged as the most important agency for upholding law and order, which was crucial for smooth flow of trade between countryside and towns.[22] (emphasis mine)

State Involvement in Transportation of Grain

Though the evidence is not clear yet, in certain years we have instances of states involvement in the transportation of grain. B. R. Grover,[23] states that the transmit of official grain to the mandi for sale was arranged by the local revenue. officials. On occasion we do find instances where the state did arrange for large quantity of grain from the region to be sold in distant markets.

In 1726 [24], the Amils of Parganas Phagi, Chatsu and Amber were instructed by the diwan to arrange for professional carters to transport the rabi grains, wheat, barley and gram for sale at Delhi. (Arhsatta Qasba Chatsu)

There is a similar evidence of the state organizing the transport of salt worth two lakh rupees from Sambhar Lake to the newly established salt Katla (wholesale market) in Sawai Jaipur to be given to the salt dealers there. Five thousand rupees were spent by the state for the transport of salt, over thirty-six-mile distance between the lake and qasba Sawai Jaipur, which was later recovered from the salt dealers.[25] The state and administration also had a substantial stake in marketing of food grains. Although the state did not monopolize the sale of grain, the appropriation of revenue in kind for grain must have restricted the flow of goods and services through the state and administration had a substantial stake in marketing of food grains.

Although the state did not monopolize the sale of grain, the appropriation of revenue in kind for grain must have restricted the flow of goods'and services through private marketing channels in an economy where grain production and revenue in kind predominated. The state by enforcing upon the local traders a collective responsibility to purchase the state grain at fixed prices in effect made the traders the agents of the state for the disposal of its grain stocks. The restrictions on private trading and the movement of grain till such time as the grain stocks were sold must have also restricted the stocks available for private trading in the period of state trading. In so far as the measures succeeded on raising post harvest prices, the purchase price paid by the traders included a large element of taxation. Traders on the other hand would adjust the supplies that they were prepared to release to the market once state trading was over, in order to profit from the expected seasonal fluctuation in prices the four-month period allowed between the delivery of the grain or the signing of contracts and the deferred payment was in effect a form of interest free loan incentive. The disposal of the grain revenue by the state therefore involved three policy variables - controlling the price of sale, forcing the merchants to purchase grain stocks and lastly allowing for a margin of profits to the traders through the mechanism if deferred payment.[25]

It's not only with respect to the local grain trade that we find evidence for the direct control exercised by the state in the market. In fact, rural commerce as a whole was also subject to indirect controls and regulations through taxing markets, establishing tolls, and controlling the location and periodicity of markets.

Before summing up the discussion on state's role in the rural-urban trade, it's however important to outline certain trends in agricultural taxation for, a detailed analysis or the formulation of the Zabti rates and the proportions of the produce levied in batai reveals their close relationship with the state control and productivity.

There were two modes of revenue assessment prevalent in the region from at least the mid 17th Century. These were firstly the crop sharing method or batai based on a physical division of crop in an agreed proportion - between the peasant and the state, and secondly - a cash assessment per unit area of land or the Zabti system. These two methods co-existed for each qasba and village and for each harvest. Before we discuss the working of these two distinct forms of revenue realization its necessary to examine the rationale for their adoption by the state.

It was the type of crop grown, rather than a quality of soil or the nature of land tenure which determined whether the crop was assessed by the zabti or batai method, or sometimes interchangeably by both. The crops invariable assessed by the Zabti system were the cash crops in both kharif and rabi harvests. These include cotton, the dye plants, sugarcane, tobacco, spices, vegetables, poppy, maize and sun-hemp. These constituted the pukki zabti crops or the crops that were never assessed by the crop sharing method.[26]

The crops generally assessed by the "*batai* method" included all the major food grains - millets, pulses oil seeds, barely, wheat, rabi and mixed grains. In accordance with the Mughal policy of taxation, each of letter food crops could be assessed by the crop sharing method or by zabti method, the choice theoretically being left to the peasant[27]. Such crops were classified as kutchi zabti perhaps to indicate the flexibility in the form of assessment possible with respect to these crops.

In an area of dry farming that was prone to indifferent harvests, crop sharing was clearly of advantage to the cultivator as the preferred mode of discharging his revenue obligations. Crop sharing ensured that while the risk of harvest shortfalls was shared between the state and the peasant in proportion to their respective shares in the output that of local price variations was borne by the state alone.

However, the transaction or the supervision costs involved in the tasks, such as policing to prevent pilferage, prior to the harvest, the actual weighing and division of the crops and the arrangements to ensure the sale of the produce, were undoubtedly in the batai method. In the respects, cash assessment had the clear advantage of making the assessment and collection of revenue administratively easier from point of view of the state.

As stated in the "Ain-i- Akbari", the cash rates per bigha crops assessed by the Zabti system were fixed in accordance with the prices and average productivity of the crops in each dastur circle / mahal[28]. However, the Arhsattas and dastur amals for our region indicate that there was no uniform cash rate for each crop in the areas within a simple dastur circle as identified in the "Ain-i-Akbari". In practice the differences in the quality of soil, location of field, duration of fallowing of the field sown and the degree of capital and labour investment were incorporated to formulate a complex schedule of graded tax rates for each crop.

The interplay of diverse factors that affected the cash rate can best be shown by the examples of the variation in the crop specific 'Zabti' rates on sugarcane and cotton cultivation in qasba Sanganer.

Cotton cultivation in qasba Sanganer was also taxed according to the sliding scale of revenue rates per bigha depending upon the quality of soil and irrigation method. There were six basic categories into which cotton acreage was divided. The highest rates were-levied on good quality soils that were irrigated by wells having an abundant supply of water. These lands were manured and often lay adjacent to the inhabited sites. The next category comprised ordinary soils irrigated by wells located at reasonable distance from the inhabited area.

In general terms, the indexed values for all the parganas reveal a basic pattern of high rates on cash crops and lower rates on the food crops relative to cotton. Comparison with the indexed rate for the dastur circle of qasba Chatsu recorded in "Ain - i- Akbari" (1595) and the rates given for pargana Chatsu for 1712 show that the rates of all crops except indigo, sunn-hemp, cumins and onions were higher in the early 18th century taken relative to cotton. The 'batai' system was less complex as method of appropriation primarily because it did not take into account variations in the type of soil, location of field, local price levels or the type of crop. The highest proportion of the produce taken was a half share for both kharif and rabi crops. However, a few of the crops in the kharif harvest that were invariably irrigated like course rice called "Sali" were taxed at 2/5th of the gross produce. In the rabi harvest on the other hand, all the 'batai' crops were differentially assessed depending upon whether or not they were irrigated. The irrigated rabi crops were liable to a lower assessment in terms of the proportion of the produce. In the majority of parganas for which we have data, the standard assessment of irrigated crops was 2/5th of the produce. In Chatsu, however, it was as little as a third.

It's important to note that while it was a policy of the state to encourage the extension of irrigation, its improbable that the state would be willing to pursue a policy that would be detrimental to its revenue returns. this anomaly is further reinforced when we compare the cash rates levied on irrigated and unirrigated wheat and barley. A sample survey of the "Zabti" rates applicable in a few villages of pargana Toda Bhim for the rabi harvest of 1693 shows that the highest rates are for crop irrigated by permanent wells and lowest for unirrigated crops.

A vital element of the taxation policy that derived from social and political considerations rather than specificities of crops production were "preferential rates" granted to certain privileged sections of village inhabitants. In the formulation of the produced proportion, the *dastur amals* make an explicit distinction between the "*raiyati"* and the "*riyayati*" dastures[29].

While the former constituted the highest proportion of the produced that could be levied on the resident cultivator in the village, the *riyayati* schedule was lower and was further differentiated. The *riyayati* or concessionary rates were applied on the revenue paid in kind by the hereditary village officials - the *patels*, the *patwaris*, *chaudharis* and *kanungos* as well as distinct caste groups like *rajputs, brahmans*, *kayasthas* and *mahajans*. The granting of advantageous terms of revenue payment to the local administrative functionaries was a method of remuneration that has a parallel in the allocation of revenue free or *''inam*" lands in the 18th century Maharashtra. The inclusion of the *pahis* in the *riyayati* schedule was primarily part of the state policy of offering fiscal inducements to migratory cultivators who were generally given a wasteland or poorer quality land of the village to cultivate. The *pahis* thus irrespective of their caste was assessed at concessional rate and thus a rationale for their inclusion in the *riyayati* schedule was quite different form of their groups.

The preferential rates accorded to the village officials and the higher castes varied between parganas. However in each pargana the *chaudhuris, kanungos* and *zamindar, bhumias* paid the lowest rate of the quarter and the *patels* the highest at 2/5th. These formed the upper and lower limites of the range of preferential rates.[30]

However, unlike the arhsattas of other *qasbas*, those of qasba Malarna, record a single zabti rate allowing no variation of productivity or the status of cultivator although the revenue obtained in kind was levied at two different rates. It possible that these two rates were applied to irrigated and unirrigated crops and did not represent preferential taxation.[31]

The questions that arise next are whether all the members of the non-agricultural castes were accorded concessionary rates, and if so whether there were any restrictions imposed on the extent of their privileged holding and the degree to which these were effective. It has been argued by Dr. Dilbagh Singh that all members of the privileged section or caste were granted concessionary rates of revenue on their entire holdings.[32] This inference is supported by the manner in which the *dastur amals* specify caste as the condition for the award of the preferential rate.

The formulation of the basic revenue demand was therefore extremely complex and varied, incorporating within its structure differentials in productivity of the land, labour and capital as well as recognizing the superior requirements of the socially and politically dominant section of rural society.[33]

The payment of the basic revenue demand was undoubtedly the chief financial burden on the peasantry However, the revenue records to not reveal the entire range of additional payments made by the peasants under numerous heads, which can broadly be categorized as protection and transaction charges. All of these charges, which accrued to the state, were generally recorded under the category of "Sair Jihat" taxes and where the Jaipur Raja also held *zamindari* or *bhomia* rights under the specific accounts of *bhomi* dues.[34]

In 1723, a pargana was issued by the Jaipur darbar to the Amils of all pargans. If it began with a statement that the expenses from common fund had become so high that cultivation was falling off to the detriment of the state revenue. The Amils were therefore instructed make a concerted effort to encourage and *patels* the *raiyatis* of the parganas to extend cultivation by offering them a reduction of the fourth of the stipulated on new land brought under the plough along with an offer of the state loans or tagai to enable them to do so. Further as a mark of royal favour the *patels* of the large villages were to be honoured with the presence of good quality cloth while other were to receive turbans. It was impressed upon Amils that on no account should they allow any further impositions, fines or presents to be from the village, Further if the village had previously taken a loan from the money lender, either collectively or individually in order to meet their obligations they were not to be coerced into repaying the outstanding amounts until permitted by the state.

State's Role in Relief and Agricultural Development

Intrinsic to the taxation policy of 18th century Jaipur state were measures to promote agricultural expansion and investment. As we have seen, taxation schedules were structured to distinguish the natural fertility of the soil and the higher yields brought about by individual efforts and investment so that cultivators who improved their fields retained a larger share of the output. In order to expand production, taxes were scaled down to facilitate cultivation of '*banjar*' cultivable waste and tax rebates were granted for the restoration of the depopulated lands and the construction of the wells.[35] Peasants were persuaded to cultivate higher value crops through loan to finance the purchase of seed and through tax incentives. Official policy with regard to agricultural development was primarily composed of fiscal measures such as those, which aim to encourage productive investment, by the rural elite.

While a risk in the rural productivity was an important consideration of state policy, its overriding concern was with maintaining continuity in the production. The incorporation of the *batai* mode of taxation for food grain production shows how deeply this concern was built into the system of taxation - while in the batai mode of taxation the revenue demand adjusted automatically to the quality of the harvest, specific allowances had to made to adjust output to the tax demand in the case of cash assessed crops. Allowances were made for a partial failure of the harvest or destruction caused by a marching army through a deduction in the revenue demand in proportion to the extent of damage. In the years of exceptionally poor harvest there was a general deduction in the cash revenue rates and much of the assessed revenues were written off if only because they irrecoverable.[36]

The provision of the state loan or *tagai* loans went some way in providing rural entrepreneur badly needed capital to rehabilitate villages to construct dams, dig wells and purchase seed and cattle. However, as we have seen *tagai* loans were generally distributed in the response to a production crisis rather than as a part of a long-term policy that sought to stabilize or expand production through effective state intervention and control. Considering the importance of the *tagai* loans during periods of crisis, they should be seen primarily as a part of the states relief measures to enable the rural population to tide over situations of exceptional distress. The restricted supply of credit in conditions of draught or political conflict meant that the state had to provide a form of social subsidy in order to prevent large-scale migration form the regions

An evaluation of the impact of the system of revenue taxation on agricultural productivity in pre-colonial period by the modern historians has yielded conflicting viewpoints: The historians of the colonial period emphasize a flexibility and the responsiveness of the pre-colonial tax structures to the welfare of agriculturalists and contrast this to the rigidity of tax system imposed by the British.[37] A leading historian of the Mughal economy, Professor Irfan Habib, on the other hand has emphasized inherently regressive nature of Mughal taxation of its tendency to "subvert superior cultivation" though excessive exploitation.[38]

On the other hand, the fact that the taxes were levied at the standard rate and were not linked to individual resources certainly highlights the regressive nature of the structure of the taxation. In Eastern Rajasthan this feature was further accentuated by granting of tax rebates and concession to the privileged section of rural society. Further more to the extent that taxation drew out scarce capital from countryside, the system of taxation inhibited the diffusion of superior cultivating practices to all levels of rural society. The objective of the state to maximize its revenues on the other hand could not be achieved through a system of taxation that did not allow the producers sufficient resources to meets their needs for continued production. The states need to attract and retain labour imposed further limits to any policy aimed at short-terms revenue maximization. In a dry farming area where the production conditions were unstable and variable investment in order to stabilize and expand production in the long term as well as to provide relief to overcome seasonal shortfalls in production.

Thus, the agrarian policy of the state, as Madhavi Bajekal[39] has pointed out, "was a coherent and complex amalgam of interrelated element that aimed to achieve an acceptable balance between interlocked and contradictory interest in rural society." The agrarian policy attempted to meditate between the revenue demands of state on one hand and the social reproduction of primary producers on the other, along with need to reconcile these two primary interests with the conflicting and often competing demands of traders, moneylenders and the landed aristocracy. A measure of the effectiveness of these policies was the sustained growth and agrarian prosperity during the reign of Sawai Jai Singh when the active implementation of state's agrarian policy coincided with favourable economic trends and a phase of relative political stability. Climatic imbalances during this period resulted in famines but the destructive impact of such crisis in production was *contained by state intervention which aimed to restore incentives to stimulate production and which enabled a relatively rapid recovery. (emphasis mine).*

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33. N.A. Siddiqui, Land Revenue Administration under the Mughals, 1700-1750, Pg. 42-48
34. According to Ain-i-Akbari during the Mughal Age the State imposed custom duties (mahsul)

on imported goods and other cesses of various kinds on arts and crafts manufactured by artisans. Cesses imposed on sale and purchase in the rural qasba market covered commodities like articles of food, grains, commercial crops, oil, cloth, skin... under the revenue heading of state income -all these cesses formed a part of Sair-Jihat and Sair-ul-Wajah. Akbar abolished various miscellaneous cesses like tamgha, zakat, baj ; Jahangir too abolished Zakat on transit goods, river tolls and some other cesses which were being realized by jagirdars in their territory. Later Aurangzeb also abolished transit duties (rahdari) on gram and vegetables which were being levied per maund. In fact, strict orders were issued by the government to the local officials to refrain from charging rahdari from traders moving in the deficit regions.

35. Chitti pragana Malarna VS 1791 AD 1734, Chitti dt. Asoj Vadi 12 VS 1767/AD1710, pargana chatsu (no. 358)

36. William Foster edited "The English Factories in India 1630-33" - "The indigo business of bayana was so lucrative that the Mughal State started giving monopoly of its sale to the contractors/indigo farmers. The Mughal State even financed the contractors for purchasing indigo from the various local mandis and entered into an agreement with the latter, keeping its stipulated share in the profit of the sale proceeds. It also offered quite reasonable terms to the indigo farmers who in case of little profit would be obliged to return only the state loan. The indigo armers had the monopoly on sales of indigo to local merchants and foreign trading companies. This resulted in the rise on indigo price and greater returns for the state". (Jahangirs India" : translation of Francisco Pelsaret's Remonstrantee by W.H.Moreland and P. Geyl Pages 47-50)

37. Asiya Siddiqi, "Agrarian Change in a North Indian State : Uttar Pradesh", 1819-1833

38. Irfan Habib, "Agrarian Relations and Land Revenue : North India " CEHIL, Pg 240. One can also see the views of Satish Chandra in his article "Some Institutional Factors in providing capital inputs for the improvement and expansion of cultivation in medieval India" Indian Historical Review, Vol 3, No. 1 (1976), Pg 83-98

39. Madhavi Bajekal, "State and the Rual Grain Market in 18th Century Eastern Rajasthan…"