LITTLE BROTHER-BIG BROTHER RELATIONSHIP THROUGH MALAYSIA-INDONESIA SOSEK-MALINDO INITIATIVES: A CASE STUDY OF ENTIKONG-TEBEDU BORDER

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Cross-border trade between two neighbouring countries reflects socioeconomic ties between border communities. As such, this paper examines the socio-economic development of communities at the border of Entikong (Kalimantan Barat, Indonesia) and Tebedu (Sarawak, Malaysia). Development undertaken by the respective governments, through the Sosek-Malindo platform, reflects to a certain extent, the concept of a Little Brother-Big Brother relationship, in which each intends to provide assistance through development projects that benefit both communities through employment creation and income generation. This can improve their socio-economic level that has been trapped in poverty and underdevelopment.

Keywords: Cross border development; Tebedu, Entikong; Sosek Malindo; little brother-big brother

I. INTRODUCTION

Bilateral relations between two countries can take a win-win situation or a zero sum game in their effort to resolve conflicts. Malaysia-Indonesia bilateral relations often lead to win-win solutions because each believes the cost of conflict would be high due to economic interdependence on each other. In the context of this archipelagic relation, it may reflect the little brother-big brother (LB-BB) relationship since both countries derived from the same family lineage and share the same religion, Malay and Islam respectively. Indonesia is considered as the big brother from the Malaysian perspective since Indonesia achieved independence earlier, has extensive experience in overcoming colonialism, has a widely multicultural heritage, and it is a large country, in terms of geography and population (Kunaseelan, 1996).

The objective of this paper is to assess the strength of the LB-BB (adik-abang) in the Malaysia-Indonesia relations. In order to analyse the strength of this LB-BB relationship, this paper is divided into five parts. The second part highlights the history of politico-economic conflict between Malaysia and Indonesia. The third section describes the Malaysia-Indonesia bilateral cooperative platform at the Sosek Malindo level that aims to improve social cooperation, political economy of both countries. The fourth part is a case study of the economic frontier at the border between Malaysia (Sarawak)-Indonesia (Kalimantan), namely the Tebedu-Entikong

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village, to illustrate the concept of LB-BB bonds from the perspective of development in the border region. The fifth part is the conclusion of the study.

II. MALAYSIA-INDONESIA RELATIONSHIP

Malaysia and Indonesia have a significant relationship with each other in terms of religion, race, and culture because each was derived from the same ancestral/religious line, the Malay/Muslim lineage. These ties had been previously expressed by the Chief Minister of Malaya, Tunku Abdul Rahman Putra Al-Haj at the Meeting of Ministers in Jakarta on 8 November 1955, that explained "that cannot be denied by the world regarding the Malay international relations with the Indonesian race which at one time we were recognised as one (singular) race inhabiting the Malay Archipelago ... Although we are divorced in one aspect, we are united in another, which is culture" (extracted from Rohani & Zulhilmi, n.d.).

However, the Malaysia-Indonesia relations deteriorated five years later following the Indonesian confrontation over Malay Nation or Tanah Melayu (Malaysia) from 1961 to 1965, following the proposal to establish Malaysia by Tunku Abdul Rahman. The proposal was not agreed upon by President Sukarno. The Indonesian confrontation against Malaysia was resolved by peaceful negotiations in Bangkok in May 1966, under the administration of President Suharto. Indonesia formally ended the confrontation against Malaysia in 1967. President Suharto who replaced Sukarno took the approach of diplomacy to restore the LB-BB relationship. The establishment of ASEAN in 1967 witnessed the further strengthening of diplomatic relations between Indonesia and Malaysia. In fact, Indonesia has taken an active role to establish the ASEAN membership, which includes Malaysia, Thailand, Philippines, and Singapore.

The post-confrontation relationship had its ups and downs. It was dominated by the issues of borders, unfair treatment of Indonesian workers (Tenaga Kerja Indonesia – TKI) and illegal immigrants (Pendatang Antarabangsa Tanpa Izin – PATI) from Indonesia, maid abuse, and declaration of Indonesian culture ownership (song and dance) by Malaysia. When a conflict occurs, the leaders of both countries sought to resolve the issue through negotiations and diplomacy in order to avoid further sensation by third parties, such as the mass media, with the aim to minimise the cost of conflict and normalise relations between the two countries.

(A) Border Conflict

Border issue is related to the appropriation of Pulau Sipadan and Litigan, as well as Ambalat. The Sipadan and Litigan islands appropriation issues between Malaysia and Indonesia had erupted since the 1960s. However, the issue has been resolved with the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in 2002, where the judgement was in favour of Malaysia. Malaysia gets title to sovereignty over the island.

(B) TKI Conflict

Unfair treatment by employers over TKI workers who work in Malaysia is also a source of conflict between the two countries. The number of TKI workers in Malaysia at the end of June 2007 was about 1.2 million people or 61% of total foreign workers (Che Hashim, 2009). In addition to these registered TKI workers, there are about 1.5 million Indonesian workers who are classified as illegal immigrants (PATI), i.e., those who do not have valid travelling or identification documents (Rohani & Zulhilmi, n.d.).

Based on data from the Indonesian National Agency for Employment (Badan Nasional dan Penempatan Tenaga Kerja Indonesia – BNP2TKI), since 2005, acts of violence against migrant workers by employers in Malaysia reached 173 cases. According to press reports by The Star Kuala Lumpur, there were 39 cases of violence against migrant workers in 2005; 2006 increased to 45 cases while in 2007, 39 cases were reported, which rose to 43 cases in 2008; 2009 had 9 cases. Based on data from the Indonesian Embassy in Malaysia, up to 2010, there were a total of 354 workers who faced the death penalty in Malaysia (The Indonesia Institute, 2010).

Unfair treatment of migrant workers again by the Indonesian mass media, sensationalised the issue and triggered negative sentiments among the people of Indonesia regarding the Malaysian government. In general, the issue of migrant workers has always been a source of tension between the people of Malaysia and Indonesia. Negotiations between Kuala Lumpur-Jakarta administrations are carried out to safeguard the welfare of TKI migrant workers in Malaysia.

(C) Cultural Conflict

Issues of cultural ownership also contributed to the conflict between Indonesia and Malaysia. Table 1 shows that the claim of culture by Malaysia, but in fact they originated from the Indonesian culture. The issue of *pendet* dance became controversial and polemic in 2009, which was again provoked by the Indonesian social media. It all started with the broadcasting of a 30-second tourism advertisement in the channel Asia-Pacific Discovery Channel Network, titled "Enigmatic Malaysia" produced by KRU Studios (Ali & Reevany, 2014).

The Indonesian government explained that the *pendet* dance is a good example of Indonesian culture and not Malaysian culture. However, the issue of cultural ownership was resolved by every stakeholder—advertising publishers, the Malaysian and Indonesian governments— clarifying the real situation to reach a settlement.

Malaysia-Indonesia relations were also affected by the royal family crisis between Cik Puan Temenggong Manohara Odelia Pinot and Tengku Temenggung of Kelantan, which received widespread coverage among the Indonesian citizens. This royal family crisis was sensationalised by the Indonesian mass media which created tension in the relations between the peoples of the two countries (Bernama, 2009).

TABLE 1: TYPES OF CULTURAL CLAIM BY MALAYSIA

No	Cultural Name
1	Manuscript from Riau
2	Manuscript from West Sumatera
3	Manuscript from South Sulawesi
4	Manuscript from southeast Sulawesi
5	Rendang form West Sumatera
6	Rasa Syaange song from Moluccas
7	Reog Ponorogo dance from East java
8	Soleram song from Riau
9	Injit injit Semut song from Jambi
10	The Gamelan musical instrument from Java
11	Kuda Lumping Dance form East Java
12	Piring dance form West Sumatera
13	Kakak Tua Song from Mollucas
14	Anak Kambing Saya song from Nusa Tenggara
15	Batik Parang motive from Yogyakarta
16	Badik Tumbuk Lada
17	Indang Sungai Garinggiang Music from Sumatera Barat
18	Ulos apparel
19	Angklung musical instrument
20	Jali-Jali song
21	Pendet dance from Bali

^{a.} Source: The Indonesia Institute, Center for Public Research Institute (2010)

Indonesia-Malaysia conflict in the post-confrontation era was dominated by border issues, TKI workers, PATI immigrants, maid abuse, and culture. These sparked issues became polemic and critical when it was provoked and sensationalised by the Indonesian social media which increased even more the negative sentiments of the Indonesian people toward Malaysia. This Indonesian-Malaysian conflict, however, was resolved through negotiations and diplomacy with the spirit of LB-BB relationship at the government level.

In addition to the bilateral relationship conflict, efforts are also underway to strengthen the relationship between Indonesia and Malaysia. Socio-economic development issues at the bilateral levels were more formally and structurally discussed under the platform of Working Committee/ Malaysia-Indonesia Socioeconomic Work Cluster (also known as JKK/KK Sosek Malindo). Arguably, Sosek Malindo is a manifestation of the LB-BB relationship between Indonesia and Malaysia. Through this Sosek Malindo platform, controversial issues can be handled prudently.

III. ESTABLISHMENT OF SOSEK MALINDO

Border cooperation between the two countries started from the security aspect since 1967 with the signing of the Agreement on Security Rules in Border Areas/Agreement Regarding Arrangement in Border Area Peace. This was the basis of the formation mechanism for General Border Committee Malaysia-Indonesia (GBC-MALINDO). In 1972 this agreement was reviewed and subsequently in 1984 this agreement has been revised again to suit the demands of the current moment in time that puts forth security as the key factor to shape the approach to border management cooperation between the two countries. Until now this mechanism works well in its role regarding border management of both countries. There are three stages of JKK-KK Sosek Malindo:

- Central JKK and JKK/KK at the Sarawak-KALBAR level: State/Provincial Level Sosek Work Committee for the first time formed under JKK/KK Sosek Malindo Centre Level is the JKK/KK Sosek State Provincial Level for Sarawak-Kalimantan Barat in 1985. This is the first Sosek-Malindo platform that has given way to the establishment of other platform in the future.
- JKK/KK Sabah-KALTIM Level: Next, the JKK/KK Sosek Malindo cooperation spread to the East, with the formation of JKK/KK SOSEK State/District Level Sabah- East Kalimantan Cooperation in 1996.
- JKK/KK Johor/Melaka-Riau/KEPRI Level: Then, the JKK/KK Sosek Malindo cooperation also spread to the border areas of Sumatera and Peninsular Malaysia with the establishment of JKK/KK Sosek Malindo cooperation Riau District Level-Johor/Melaka in 2001. This cooperation developed to become the JKK/KK Sosek Joint Venture at the District Level of Johor/Melaka-Riau/Riau archipelago in 2009.

The vision of JKK/KK Sosek Malindo is to achieve harmony and continuity of socio-economic development for the mutual benefit, particularly in the border areas between the two countries, through the Sosek Malindo cooperation. Its mission is to improve the socio-economic development cooperation in the border areas of both countries to achieve prosperity and harmony in the border areas.

(A) Security

In the context of security of Malaysia-Indonesia relations, retention rights and sovereignty of the territory is a major issue and always attracts attention. Nowadays, it is an issue that will affect the ebb and flow of government relations and people of both countries. National sentiment of each country regarding the national border region of each country will be the biggest challenge in the Malaysia-Indonesia relations in the future. Maturity and wisdom of leaders from both countries are needed to maintain special ties between Kuala Lumpur and Jakarta. These ties are

much sought after because of issues related to the borders of both countries which will get a variety of differing and accepting reactions and perceptions by the people of both countries.

In this connection, close cooperation at the global policy-maker and strategic implementation levels between Kuala Lumpur and Jakarta would enable confidence and trust to be maintained even if there are issues that became a detriment in relations between the two neighbours. The Malindo General Border Committee and the Malindo High Level Committee platforms and the work groups under them bring these two aspirational confidence into the operational and field levels. Hence this platform continues to be relevant to the core and the driver of the process of building confidence (Confidence Building), specifically related to safety aspects of the two countries in general, in border regions in particular.

Sosek Malindo is under this mechanism based on the history and importance of the stability and security factors to be addressed, before any other action can be implemented. Confidence in the safety and security of the border region itself will be provided to enable socio-economic activities to be carried out for the purpose of improving the border region.

Security issues are a shared problem (common problem) on both sides for the longest time. Starting with traditional threats in the form of an armed movement (communist), now the issue of security has been replaced with non-traditional threats, which seems vague and ambiguous in determining the actual opponent and real threat. This is due to the threat of identity not coming from any clear country, institution, or organisation. The issue of security at the border is now more dynamic and globalised due to economic demand factors (smuggling, human trafficking, illegal immigrants) in addition and not forgetting the geostrategic threats (terrorism, ideological differences, the influence of the major powers).

(B) Prosperity

Prosperity of the border region is translated by the existence of peace and stability that allows the daily activities of border residents to be performed safely without threat. Cross-border economic activity allows survival of the border can be done in both parts of Malaysia and Indonesia for the survival of rural communities. From the beginning of these activities for the purpose of survival, they have developed to create demand and supply, which generate and drive the development of trade between the two countries on a larger scale. Economic activity is not only concentrated in the bordering regions directly, but it has a spill-over effect onto the regions and cities that are located far from the border area. These factors will generate a growing interaction between the people of both countries and will be the driver of progress in areas that were previously withdrawn and left out of the current development trend.

(C) Social Stability

The core of activities in the border region is the actual residents in the bordering areas bordering themselves. The survival ability of border communities will be able to determine whether they can continue live and prosper, or overshadowed by a life of misery when tomorrow comes. Without the support and affiliation of neighbouring countries, it would be difficult for survival to be achieved and it could potentially lead to instability in the border community. Thus, social instability will lead to fundamental threat to the stability of the border areas, namely security.

Border communities have centuries of activity in the region. Bureaucracy of the modern world that create boundaries and passports for citizens only come later and has caused some social affairs which need to be realigned with the demands of the new age. However, the fact is that life should be continued (life goes on), and social sustainability should also be endure. Social relationships, especially family relationships of border communities continue amidst the dividing boundary lines and become central to social stability in the border areas.

However, social stability needs to be seen and studied from wider aspects, because migration is not performed by citizens of the indigenous or original inhabitants of the border region whom had settled earlier on in this border region. The inclusion of citizens from other places in Indonesia to the border areas of Malaysia-Indonesia and also people from the Peninsular Malaysia moving to the Sabah and Sarawak regions, will affect the change in social values in the region, in relation to the perception, culture, and way of thinking that is different from the original inhabitants of the border region.

Perceptions and values held by residents of the border are mostly made by those in remote areas who are left far behind in many aspects, which differ from the people who live in more developed areas, especially in the central government areas (Kuala Lumpur/Peninsular and Jakarta/Java). Thus the issue and negative sentiments at the national level does not necessarily translate to become a critical matter in the eyes of the population at the border.

If in large cities and other regions, the competitive sentiment between countries (inter-nation rivalry) that comes with the feeling of patriotism, shapes public acceptance of both countries; population in the border region also view the people who live next door as needing cooperation and mutual aid in order to assist each other to achieve their respective survival factors. Basic needs of education, health, and development of basic facilities, are still dependent on the support of the outside world, whether it comes from internal national sources, or from the help of neighbours on the other side. Thus the social outlook of cross-border cooperation tends to vary depending on the locality of the issue observer.

(D) Politics, Diplomacy, and Bureaucracy

Political stability in Malaysia and Indonesia will allow relations between the two countries continue to flourish, and can be translated into close cooperation at the lower agency levels to the communities in the border areas. The second national challenge is how perceptions at the federal government level (Kuala Lumpur and Jakarta) can be shared at the State/Province level. Political power in both countries also will shape the foreign policy and thus determine the approach in diplomacy of the two countries. Malaysia sees the relationship with Indonesia as the "most important" and always wants to maintain harmony between the two countries. Indonesia is also seen to be consistently accepting Malaysia as a regional strategic partner with similar diverse interests.

The JKK/KK Sosek Malindo platform is the best platform and has been proven effective (proven workable) in managing provinces and areas bordering Malaysia and Indonesia. It balances the demands of security management, generates economic activity, meets the community survival needs, and most importantly catalyses cooperation that has larger contexts for the two neighbouring countries. It has great potential to continue to grow, but will only be achieved when both parties understand each other, better accommodate each other, and try to accept the differences that exist across the border. There are differences in the values held by the leaders and people of both countries, but in spite of these differences, there are many similarities that still have a strong dependence on each other. Hence with the existence of the Sosek Malindo in the management of border areas of both countries, under the auspices of GBC and HLC Malindo, the gap can be reduced and understanding can be nurtured to generate prosperity in both Malaysia and Indonesia.

IV. TEBEDU-ENTIKONG – ECONOMIC COOPERATION AT THE BORDER

The economic border of Tebedu-Entikong at the Malaysia (Sarawak)-Indonesia (Kalimantan) border is used here as a case study to illustrate the LB-BB relationship between Indonesia and Malaysia and in the same process, translates the concept of Sosek Malindo at the border region.

Cross-border trade between the Sarawak-Kalimantan informally occurred before the existence of the Malaysia Indonesia Border Traffic Agreement in 1967. Under this 1967 agreement, the Sarawak/Malaysia Immigration issued border passes to those who settled along the border to allow visiting relatives in Kalimantan within 5 km of the border. Similarly, the Indonesian Immigration issued crossborder passes (PLB) to local residents who want to visit Sarawak within 5 km of the border.

Under the Malaysia-Indonesia Border Trade Agreement 1970 (BTA 1970), both sides agreed to establish barter trade, provided service to their local community

to carry out the purposes of trade in goods, and create overland routes along the border.

(A) Tebedu

The Tebedu-Entikong international entrance began operations on 1 October 1989 and upgraded to an international gateway on 27 May 1995. It was the first between Malaysia (Sarawak) with Kalimantan. Tebedu-Entikong now has the facilities and infrastructures including very well maintained Customs, Immigration, Quarantine and Security, and CIQS.

Under the 1970 agreement, the communities in both countries is only allowed to bring in goods worth RM600 (maximum value) every month without taxes for every border pass holder. The type of goods that can be brought into Malaysia is temporary agricultural products, while entering Indonesia; any household goods are accepted, except for electronics. However, this requirement does not generate growth in cross-border trade because the trade is limited. Negotiations related to the expenses are currently being performed between Malaysia and Indonesia to boost cross-border economic activity (Jakarta Post, 2010).

In terms of trade, although the Sarawak foreign trade with Indonesia is small, 90% of the total trade with the Sarawak-Kalimantan is through Tebedu-Entikong. Type of products exported through Tebedu is snack food, electrical appliances, and electronic household goods, and construction materials (such as nails). Meanwhile, major imports from Kalimantan is seafood, vegetables, and fruits (Bernama, 2011).

Tebedu also is one of the five entrances for timber trade that is endorsed by the Sarawak state government, while the other main entrances are Sematan, Biawak, Batu Lintang, and Lubuk Antu. Import-export activity of timbre through Tebedu is managed by Harwood Timber Sdn. Bhd., which is a subsidiary of Sarawak Timber Industry Development Corporation (STIDC).

(B) Entikong

Entikong is Transboundary Postal Inspection (Pos Pemeriksaan Lintas Batas – PPLB) which is the first of its kind in Kalimantan for entry and exit of individuals and export-import goods. PPLB Entikong also has other functions

- Entry-exit gate for traditional border crossers and population in border areas:
- Valid entry-exit gate for non-traditional border crossers;
- Gateway for international vehicles; and
- Main border gateway.

Entikong also has economic functions along with security functions, which is performing as a:

- Border area growth centre that functions as the National Strategic Activity Centre (Pusat Kegiatan Strategi Nasional – PKSN).
- The back district service centre that functions as an economic centre that a product seller in the rural area of Entikong can market their wares to Entikong village. Entikong also provides other services including education, health, recreation, entertainment, and religion.
- Inter-district relations centre where rural products that are marketed in Entikong will be marketed elsewhere.
- Industrial centre where Entikong will become a raw material processing centre.

The PPLB Entikong development has gone through several phases, which are (www.setda.sanggau.go.id)

- Level 1 implemented on 1 October 1989 with PPLB Entikong operating daily from 05.00 West Indonesia Time (WIB) to 17.00 WIB and allowed vehicles are government owned vehicles (Dinas) and private vehicles.
- Level 2 implemented on 2 January 1993 and allowed vehicles include public vehicles like taxis, rented buses, tourist buses, and international express buses.
- Level 3 implemented on 27 May 1995 which established that international trade can be performed through PPLB Entikong. Other allowed vehicles were trucks/goods cars, box cars, pickups, and tankers.

On 25 May 2005, the President of the Republic of Indonesia, Susilo Bambang Yudoyono, together with his delegation visited and reviewed Entikong PPLB situation and its surrounding areas. From the result of the visit, the location of the PPLB Entikong will be moved back \pm 500 metres from the Indonesia-Malaysia border, to serve as a Free Trade Zone (Gatra, 23 June 2005).

However, the construction of a new Entikong PPLB has yet to be implemented. The purpose of moving back the PPLB location is to create a free trade zone and provide visitor facilities from Malaysia and Brunei to shop at Entikong.

The number of tourists to KALBAR showed an increasing trend of 22,262 tourists (2007) to 30,619 tourists (2011). Malaysia is a major tourist provider with visitors comprising almost 80% of the total number of tourists to KALBAR. In addition, 24,237 Malaysian tourists (2011), about 81%, used the Entikong entrance, as compared to 19% who use Bandara Supadio to KALBAR. This shows Entikong, thus Tebedu, to be the main gateway for Malaysian travellers to KALBAR (Pemprov Kalbar, 2012).

(C) Border Development Comparison

There exists a significant development gap between Tebedu/Sarawak and Entikong/ KALBAR towns. Entikong can be viewed to be less developed and backward as compared to Tebedu. Thus, two major projects were planned under the Sosek Malindo to recover and generate economic growth at the boundary, which are to develop inland ports and build industrial estates.

Projects under the Indonesian government include creating a free trade zone in the Entikong border. The proposed project is to take advantage of the wealth of raw material resources and manpower available in their respective areas. The wealth generated in the future can be shared by local residents of both townships.

For Inland Port, TIP Malaysia has begun to operate while EIP Indonesia has not been developed. This is because the PT Borneo Putra Lestari developer withdrew because the view is not yet clear in the legal form from Jakarta in connection with inland port relations with foreign countries, whether from the aspect of law and legality, regulation, or government regulation of central government ministries. EIP Indonesia's absence has affected the capacity of TIP's ability to operate cargo throughput in full or at the level of 100% (Equator, 2012).

For industrial estate, the Sarawak government has prepared a light industrial estate infrastructure for Tebedu (EPRT) in 2012. The major investor in the EPRT was SM Inland Port Sdn. Bhd. (SMIP), which operates the TIP and liaises with important investors in the industrial estate. Now, the Sarawak government actively promotes the Tebedu industrial estate to domestic and foreign investors in order to attract investment to Tebedu and create employment opportunities for the local population, as well as Indonesian workers (TKI). Even the KALBAR workers have built settlements (rusunawa) to put migrant workers to work at the Tebedu industrial estate.

On the Indonesian side, the Entikong industrial estate still has not been realised. Under the BDC Master Plan, the estate has an area of 33 ha. with development costs of US\$103 million. Its function, in addition to carrying out manufacturing/processing of product, it also is a terminal for goods, which is also in-line with the proposal to establish the EIP (Indonesia-Middle East Update, n.d.).

The proposal by Indonesia to withdraw the PPLB Entikong approximately \pm 500 metres from the Tebedu border entrance is so as to create a free trade zone. It is a positive step to revive the Entikong economy and attract new businesses from the Entikong and KALBAR to trade in this zone. Zones can also take advantage of the number of Malaysian tourists bustling through the Entikong entrance en route to KALBAR. However, relocation of PPLB Entikong thus the formation of the free business zone has not been realised yet.

(D) Border Development Rubrics

The development in Entikong is backward compared to in Tebedu. Planned development in Entikong needs to be facilitated by the KALBAR to improve the implementation commitment and attract local investment for cross-border economic development. In the meantime, the Indonesian authorities should expedite the

development of industrial estates, land investment, and free trade zones as planned under the BDC and Sosek Malindo. Development issues in cross-border Tebedu-Entikong can be discussed under the platform of JKK/KK Sosek Malindo.

Tebedu-Entikong economic border villages have the potential to be developed because it is related to the Sarawak Corridor of Renewable Energy 2008-2020 (SCORE), Borneo West Economic Corridor (WBEC) under BIMP-EAGA 2012-2016 Master Plan, and the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) under ASEAN by the year 2015. It is important that there is a link between development at the border and central places to prevent the development gap between regions in Sarawak and KALBAR. In the meantime EIP projects, Entikong industrial estates, and free trade zones can be freely put into motion.

V. CONCLUSION

The Sosek Malindo platform can show the strength of the LB-BB relationship between Indonesia-Malaysia, and Tebedu-Entikong can be used as a case study of economic cooperation of border towns. Bilateral relations between Indonesia-Malaysia always take a win-win situation through negotiation and diplomacy towards efforts in resolving the conflict. Each country is in view that the cost of conflict is very high due to the high economic interdependence with each other. Lineage factors (Malay) and same religion (Islam) further strengthen LB-BB ties and facilitate further negotiation and diplomacy can be achieved when conflicts appear in the Indonesia-Malaysia relations.

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