

## **IMPACT OF THE RUSSIA-UKRAINE CRISIS ON ETHNO-NATIONAL STEREOTYPES OF THE RESIDENTS OF RUSSIAN/UKRAINIAN BORDER REGIONS**

Valentin Pavlovich Babintsev\*, Gennadij Aleksandrovich Borisov\*,  
Lola Vladimirovna Kolpina\* and Evgenij Viktorovich Reutov\*

---

The present article studies the mutual stereotypes developed among the residents of Russian and Ukrainian border regions which impact their ethno-national self-identification. The authors argue that building of Russia and Ukraine as sovereign states is accompanied with the formation of an authentic national identity among their populations. This process is significantly influenced by the negative ethnic hetero- and positive autostereotypes. The Russia-Ukraine conflict triggered the negative heterostereotyping for the population of both states. The impact of the confrontational Russia-Ukraine relations is significantly stronger on the residents of Russian borderlands as accompanied with the growth of patriotic feelings, the opposition of Russia to the West and to Ukraine as its dependent. The research proves that Russians' ethno-national heterostereotypes concerning Ukrainians are more negative than the latter's stereotypes concerning Russian citizens. Yet, it does not result from the policy of discrimination, but shows, first of all, the underdeveloped ethno-national identity of the residents of Ukrainian border regions and their dependence on Russia in Russia-Ukraine communication.

**Keywords:** Russia-Ukraine conflict, Russian/Ukrainian border regions, ethnic stereotypes, national identity.

### **1. INTRODUCTION**

Ethnic and ethno-national stereotypes, along with other dispositions of the collective conscience, constitute an important factor of inter-ethnic communication. Ethnic stereotypes are a 'cognitive label' (Ajtony, 2011), a simplified image or a set of concepts regarding a specific ethnic or ethno-cultural group; they allow individuals, through minimum social reflection, to navigate through their attitudes towards their own or other ethnic communities and their members.

Therefore, the main function of ethnic stereotypes is identification. Stereotypes concerning members of one's own ethnos (autostereotypes) assist ethnic self-identification, if individuals find in themselves a set of traits which they share with other members of their ethnos. On the contrary, if such traits are perceived as negative, they may lead to distancing from the ethnos and rejection of the ethnic identity.

Stereotypes concerning members of other ethnic groups (heterostereotypes) can assist both the ethnic self-identification (through comparison with other ethnoses) and the supranational, civilizational identification reaching beyond their own ethnos, if an individual finds common cultural traits with other ethnic groups. Zhernovaya and Smirnova claim that the role of heterostereotypes is to determine

---

\* Belgorod National Research University, Pobedy Street 85, Belgorod, 308015, Russia

the relevant course in communication by creating an image of a nation. Such stereotypes are fluid because they are formed in a constantly changing environment of inter-state relations (Zhernovaja & Smirnova, 2014). Katz & Braly, the authors of a method of studying ethnic stereotypes, showed by experiments that ethnic stereotypes may not correlate with the reality (Katz & Braly, 1933).

Introduction of ethnic stereotypes into the public discourse, largely via mass media (Mastro & Tukachinsky, 2013), may lead to a wide range of spontaneous and well-managed mass events: from the struggle for compatriots' rights to ethnic cleansings. Such mobilizing function of ethnic stereotypes is usually well grasped by the politicians eager to manipulate the collective conscience by imposing the ethno-cultural discourse instead of wider social factors.

Ethno-national stereotypes, in their turn, contain the images of one's own ethno-cultural group and certain reference groups and allow individuals to identify themselves with the former and compare with the latter through the integrative concept of an ethnos and a corresponding political nation. In this case, stereotypes often extend beyond the dominating ethnos to embrace all ethnoses living within the specific territory. Essentially, ethno-national stereotypes represent the specific features of different cultures and relevant habituses, i.e. predispositions to specific behavioral models. Such expansion of stereotypes is typical for Russia and Ukraine. On the one hand, stereotypes concerning citizens of the Russian Federation often coincide with the stereotypes about Russians. On the other hand, Russians living in Ukraine are often viewed as Ukrainians. It is conditioned by a rather weak ethnic differentiation of the population of border regions in Russia and, especially, in Ukraine which often determines the specificity of Russia-Ukraine relations. The histories of Russia and Ukraine are inextricably intertwined and often inseparable. The concept of *Ukrainianness* as of belonging to a specific ethno-cultural group was formed rather late, at the *cusp* between the *19th and 20th centuries*. Even in the post-Soviet sovereignization, the majority of Russians have been treating Ukrainians as a part of the Russian world. Both Russians and Ukrainians (though to a lesser extent) viewed the neighbors as a 'fraternal', if not the same, ethnos with a certain cultural and behavioral specificity.

## **2. METHOD**

Building of Russia and Ukraine as sovereign states has intensified the process of formation of the corresponding ethno-national identities. The post-Euromaidan crisis in the Russia-Ukraine relations gave way to the creation of the negative heterostereotypes stimulating such identification processes.

In view of the above mentioned, in our study we understand ethno-national stereotypes as stable images of Ukrainian and Russian populations based on the perception of their members as representatives of different cultural systems determined both by ethnic and geopolitical disparities.

The objective of the present study is employ the data of social polls to determine a set of mutual ethno-national stereotypes formed in Russia and Ukraine and the influence of such stereotypes on the ethno-national identification.

The bulk of the data base come from a social poll conducted among the residents of Russian and Ukrainian border regions (2015, N=1,000 (500 respondents from each side) as a part of the project “Research of the processes of formation of cultural and civilizational identities in border regions of Russia and Ukraine” headed by Prof. V.P. Babintsev.

### 3. RESULTS

Both real and mythological mutual claims and complaints, geopolitical factors backing the policy of confrontation which was assumed by the Ukrainian elites and no clear strategy for relations with Ukraine among the Russian decision-makers have shaped the Russia-Ukraine relations in the post-Soviet period as a series of crises and attempts to resolve them. The attitudes of Russians towards Ukrainians were significantly influenced by Euromaidan, which was perceived by the majority of Russian citizens as a betrayal rooting back (at least in the Russian collective and partially elite conscience) to the declaration of the independence by Ukraine. The essence of this perception can be seen in the poem by I. Brodsky “To the Independence of Ukraine”.

52.4% of the Russian respondents admitted that their attitude to Ukrainians has changed since Euromaidan. Moreover, the majority of changes were negative, ranging from the loss of trust (16.8%) to emergence of fears (12.4%), loss of respect (8.6%) and even hostility (6.6%). The total share of negative connotations reached 44.4%. At the same time, the positive changes in their attitudes towards Ukrainians after Euromaidan were reported only by 5.0% of the respondents. It should be emphasized that these responses were given by the residents of Russian border regions with traditionally strong and comprehensive ties with Ukraine.

The current attitudes of the two nations towards one another are the worst in the whole post-Soviet period, which is proved by the nationwide monitoring. For instance, a poll by Levada-Center (March 2015) showed that the share of Russians whose attitudes towards Ukraine range from ‘negative’ to ‘very negative’ has reached 55% (while the total share of those who treat Ukraine ‘positively’ and ‘very positively’ has made up 31%) [Otnoshenie k drugim stranam, 2015]. The extremely negative key of media coverage concerning the neighbor state has quickly revived the past offences.

As it was stated before, the building of Russia and Ukraine as independent states is accompanied by the formation of authentic national identities of their populations which involves dissemination of mainly negative hetero- and positive autostereotypes. The Russia-Ukraine conflict has provided grounds for negative heterostereotypization by the population of both states. As to the positive

autostereotypes, which should become a basis for identification of the Ukrainian citizens with the Ukrainian cultural patterns, the internal controversies, the volatile situation in Ukraine together with the traditional socio-cultural gaps hamper their formation. In this context, the residents of the Ukrainian border regions have found themselves in even more confusing situation because of the significant Russian influence due to its structural and psychological dominance in familial Russian/Ukrainian networks. The structural prevalence can be seen from our poll which shows that 20.6% of the residents of Ukrainian border regions and 31.2% of their parents were born in Russia, while the corresponding shares for Russian border zone dwellers and their parents are 6.4% and 7.4%. Besides, 72.8% of Ukrainian respondents admitted to have relatives in Russia, while the share of Russians with relatives in Ukraine is almost twice lower and makes up 39.8%. An evident display of imbalance in ethnic self-identification is the fact that 45.6% of the Ukrainian respondents feel Russians and only 13.0% - Ukrainians.

Residents of Russian border regions live in a situation of a greater economic, political and socio-cultural stability. A big role in stabilizing public moods is still attributed to patriotic sentiments, based on the 'Crimean consensus' and the opposition of Russia to the West. According to Levada-center, 80% of Russian citizens in a representative national sample (N=1,600) believe that the contemporary Russia has enemies. Answering the question "Do you believe that Russia is really threatened by numerous external and internal enemies or are such talks spread to scare the population and make it a stooge for the power-holders?" the absolute majority of the respondents (54%) consider this threat real [Ekspress-vypusk, 2015]. Such mindset leads to formation of both positive autostereotypes and negative heterostereotypes in the conscience of Russians and of the border region residents.

Among indicative characteristics of auto- and heterostereotypes we can name concepts of the national character, its specificity revealed in typical personal traits of the citizens of own and the adjacent state. Stereotyped images of such traits become a basis for positive or negative identification of the population with a specific group or a community, while their absence proves little relevance of such traits for identification.

In view of this, it should be noted that the absolute majority of the respondents in Russian and Ukrainian border regions believe that their cultures have typical positive and negative personal traits. Only a small share of the respondents disagrees with this statement: 3.6% of Russians and 8.0% of Ukrainians, while 17.8% and 14.4% could not answer this question.

#### **4. DISCUSSION**

The absolute majority of Russians (62.0%) and Ukrainians (54.0%) agree that the typical traits of their cultures are both positive and negative. Yet, the answers of the Ukrainian respondents about their national cultural patterns turned out to be more critical than answers given by Russians: they are less inclined to admit positive

traits of their national culture and talk more frequently about negative features. For example, only 10.6% of Ukrainians found only positive traits of their compatriots, while the corresponding share of Russians reaches 13.4%. At the same time, only negative traits were found by 13.0% Ukrainians and 2.8% of Russians (see Table 1).

TABLE 1: DO YOU BELIEVE THAT THERE EXIST POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE TRAITS TYPICAL FOR THE MAJORITY OF THE BEARERS OF ...:

	<i>Russian culture? (Russians)</i>		<i>Ukrainian culture? (Ukrainians)</i>	
	<i>figures</i>		<i>figures</i>	
	<i>abs.</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>abs.</i>	<i>%</i>
Yes, only positive	67	13.4%	53	10.6%
Yes, only negative	14	2.8%	65	13.0%
Both of them	310	62.0%	270	54.0%
No	18	3.6%	40	8.0%
Difficult to answer	89	17.8%	72	14.4%
No data	2	0.4%		
Total	500	100.0%	500	100.0%

Besides, a more critical perception of the national cultural patterns by the residents of Ukrainian border regions is shown in the fact that almost a third of the respondents (30.8%) do not see *typical positive traits* in their compatriots, while the share of Russian respondents who chose the same answer was only 15.8%

While characterizing the typical traits of the bearers of the Russian culture, Russians most often chose such variants as ‘laboriousness’, ‘friendliness’, ‘generosity’ (36-39% for each trait), and less frequently ‘tolerance’ (20.8%). The same variants turned out to be the most popular among Ukrainians talking about the positive traits of their national character. Still, if the shares of such traits as ‘laboriousness’ and ‘tolerance’ were comparable for two nations (32.2% and 19.0% correspondingly), the other two traits (friendliness and generosity) were chosen by twice as little of the Ukrainian respondents (18.5% for each trait). Russians are of a higher opinion of the intelligence and acumen of their compatriots (23.8% of the Russian respondents vs. 8.4% of Ukrainians) (see Table 2).

Thus, we can talk about significant similarities between Russian and Ukrainian autostereotypes concerning the positive traits of the national character of both nations. They include laboriousness, friendliness, generosity and tolerance. At the same time, there do exist disparities in the degree of agreement among the residents about specific positive national traits. For instance, the greatest consensus among the residents of the Russian border regions was seen for laboriousness, friendliness and generosity (over 30% of choices) and the relative consensus (about 20%) was achieved for tolerance and intelligence/acumen. On the contrary, the residents of the Ukrainian border zone showed consensus only concerning laboriousness and a

TABLE 2: IF YOU ADMIT THE PRESENCE OF POSITIVE TRAITS WHICH OF THEM ARE THE MOST INHERENT TO THE BEARERS OF YOUR CULTURE: (YOU CAN CHOOSE NO MORE THAN THREE VARIANTS)

	<i>Russian respondents (concerning the Russian culture)</i>	<i>Ukrainian respondents (concerning the Ukrainian culture)</i>
Laboriousness	39.4%	32.2%
Friendliness	36.4%	18.4%
Generosity	38.2%	18.8%
Tolerance	20.8%	19.0%
Hospitality	13.2%	14.6%
Intelligence, acumen	23.8%	8.4%
Traditionalism	13.2%	13.0%
Mutual supportiveness	8.2%	6.2%
Love of freedom	11.6%	11.0%
Spirituality	10.2%	7.0%
All	0.2%	0.2%
None	15.8%	30.8%
No data	3.6%	4.0%
<b>Total</b>	100.0%	100.0%

relative consensus in other three traits, namely friendliness, generosity and tolerance. Besides, as we noted before, almost a third of the Ukrainian respondents do not see positive traits in their national character (see Table 3).

In our opinion, this distribution of choices reflects the degree of well-formedness of the national identity, which is lower for the residents of the Ukrainian border zones than for their Russian neighbors.

TABLE 3: IF YOU ADMIT THE PRESENCE OF NEGATIVE TRAITS WHICH OF THEM ARE THE MOST INHERENT TO THE BEARERS OF YOUR CULTURE: (YOU CAN CHOOSE NO MORE THAN THREE VARIANTS)

	<i>Russian respondents (concerning the Ukrainian culture)</i>	<i>Ukrainian respondents (concerning the Russian culture)</i>
Laziness	39.4%	25.0%
Aggressiveness	24.4%	37.8%
Avarice	14.8%	16.8%
Intolerance	13.2%	18.8%
Unsociability	7.6%	6.6%
Dumbness	6.6%	13.6%
Denial of traditions	8.4%	13.6%
Lack of mutual supportiveness	12.6%	12.2%
Servility	5.0%	10.4%
Earthliness	7.4%	3.6%
All	0.2%	-
None	30.2%	29.2%
No data	3.8%	4.0%
<b>TOTAL</b>	100.0%	100.0%

The negative autostereotypes concerning Russian and Ukrainian cultures also largely coincide. The most negative traits of Ukrainians and Russians, according to the respondents, are laziness and aggressiveness. Yet, the share of Russians who believe that laziness is their national trait was significantly bigger than that of Ukrainians (39.4% vs. 25.0%), while Ukrainians more frequently selected aggressiveness of their compatriots (37.8% vs. 24.4%). Besides, unlike Russians, a significant number of Ukrainians admitted the presence of intolerance in their culture (18.8% of the respondents vs. 13.2% of the Russians).

Generally, a more critical opinion of Ukrainians about their compatriots' typical negative traits can be seen even in less frequently chosen variants. For instance, 13.6% of the respondents believe that their compatriots can be characterized with dumbness, while the corresponding share of Russians is twice as little, and reaches 6.6%. Other examples include denial of traditions (13.6% vs. 8.4%) and servility (10.4% vs. 5.0%) (see Table 3).

It also proves self-depreciation of Ukrainians, which is a part of their cultural code and which ultimately hampers the formation of an authentic national identity.

Therefore, the comparison of autostereotypes inherent to the residents of Russian and Ukrainian border regions reveals, first, their similarity and, correspondingly, preservation of the socio-cultural cross-border community and, second, low self-esteem of the residents of the Ukrainian border regions. These two features along with a low consensus among Ukrainians concerning typical national traits give more weight to the local identity of Ukrainian border dwellers and ensure its integration with the identities of the Russian border zones to the detriment of an authentic national identity. It can be explained by the hypothesis by Krylov and Gritsenko about the substitution of the ethnic identification among the residents of Ukrainian border zones with a regional one which was more temporally stable amidst the spatial reorganization which took place after the collapse of the USSR (Krylov & Gritsenko 2012).

The ethno-national heterostereotypes of the residents of Russian and Ukrainian border regions showed greater disparities.

Answers of the both groups of respondents to the question "Are there typical positive personal traits inherent to the majority of the bearers of the Ukrainian culture?" showed that the residents of Russian border regions have difficulties differentiating such traits concerning Ukrainians than concerning their compatriots. For instance, the only variant having a relevant share among Russians (36.2%) was "there are no positive traits inherent to the majority of the bearers of the Ukrainian culture" (see Table 4). On the contrary, the share of Russians who admitted the absence of positive traits among their compatriots was 15.8% (see Table 2).

Russians display a greater consensus concerning the negative traits of Ukrainians. For instance, 21% to 34% of the respondents named laziness,

TABLE 4: ARE THERE TYPICAL POSITIVE PERSONAL TRAITS INHERENT TO THE MAJORITY OF ...: (YOU CAN CHOOSE NO MORE THAN THREE VARIANTS)

	<i>bearers of the Ukrainian culture? Russians about UKRAINIANS</i>	<i>bearers of the Russian culture? Ukrainians about RUSSIANS</i>
Laboriousness	17.2%	37.6%
Friendliness	18.2%	35.8%
Generosity	14.8%	23.8%
Tolerance	12.6%	19.6%
Hospitality	16.4%	17.6%
Intelligence, acumen	10.2%	20.8%
Traditionalism	17.8%	16.0%
Mutual supportiveness	6.8%	11.2%
Love of freedom	9.4%	12.6%
Spirituality	7.4%	7.8%
None	36.2%	17.6%
No data	4.0%	4,2
<b>Total</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>100.0%</b>

aggressiveness and avarice as typical traits of the Ukrainian national character (see Table 5).

TABLE 5: ARE THERE TYPICAL NEGATIVE PERSONAL TRAITS INHERENT TO THE MAJORITY OF ...: (YOU CAN CHOOSE NO MORE THAN THREE VARIANTS)

	<i>bearers of the Ukrainian culture (as viewed by the residents of Russian border regions)?</i>	<i>bearers of the Russian culture as viewed by the residents of Ukrainian border regions)?</i>
Laziness	22.8%	20.2%
Aggressiveness	34.2%	9.6%
Avarice	21.0%	8.6%
Intolerance	12.4%	9.2%
Unsociability	6.8%	8.0%
Dumbness	13.0%	5.6%
Denial of traditions	8.6%	4.8%
Lack of mutual supportiveness	8.8%	9.8%
Servility	6.8%	8.4%
Earthliness	10.2%	3.6%
No data	3.8%	4.0%
None	31.0%	52.4%
<b>Total</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>100.0%</b>

Answers given by Ukrainians concerning the Russian character are quite opposite. They display consensus regarding two traits of the bearers of the Russian culture: laboriousness and friendliness; the share of the respondents reaches 36-38%. There exists a relative consensus regarding a number of other positive traits

of the Russian culture (generosity, tolerance, hospitality, intelligence and acumen, and traditionalism) among the residents of the Ukrainian border regions (16-24% of the respondents). Speaking about negative heterostereotypes, the Ukrainian respondents displayed a certain consensus only regarding one Russian national trait, laziness, which was named by 20.2% of them (see Tables 4 & 5).

This phenomenon, in our opinion, can be explained by *lower significance of Ukrainians for Russians than Russians for Ukrainians*. We can see it by comparing the answers to the question about the presence of positive traits which was posed to Russians about the bearers of the Ukrainian culture and vice versa. The shares of the answers prove that almost Ukrainians assess almost all positive Russian traits higher than Russians assess Ukrainians (in many cases, by times). For instance, 17.2% of Russians admitted Ukrainians' laboriousness, while Russians' laboriousness was admitted by twice as many Ukrainians (37.6%). Similar figures go for friendliness (18.2% vs. 35.8%), generosity (14.8% vs. 23.8%), intelligence and acumen (10.2% vs. 20.8%), tolerance (12.6% vs. 19.6%), and mutual supportiveness (6.8% vs. 11.2%) (see Table 4).

A lower significance of Ukraine for Russians and higher – of Russia for Ukrainians in the Russia-Ukraine border zones is also evident from the revealed socio-psychological asymmetry of Russia-Ukraine familial networks. Thus, 67.8% of Russians having relatives in Ukraine keep in touch with them, while the corresponding share of Ukrainians is 15% higher and reaches 82.4%. Another evidence of such asymmetry is the share of categorically positive answers about the mutual understanding with the foreign relatives which is significantly lower for Russians (19.6% vs. 47.2% for Ukrainians).

Such disproportions are likely to be attributed not only to a larger ratio of Russians in the population of the Ukrainian border regions comparing to the ratio of Ukrainians in Russian regions, but also to a misbalance in the distribution of the human capital. In familial networks, Russians have larger resources and therefore are considered to be more desirable parties for family building. Most importantly, the border zones see a certain political and cultural asymmetry due to the historical views of Russia's leading role in the political and cultural space which in the 2000's were shaped into the concept of the "Russian world". Thus, the Ukrainian respondents more often consider the common history as uniting both states (27.7% vs. 20.8%); 27.0% of Ukrainians vs. 11.6% of Russians believe that, for the most part, relations between Russia and Ukraine were based on voluntary cooperation. A greater orientation of the residents of Ukrainian border regions towards Russia can be seen from the answers to the question about the future of the interstate relations. Among the Russian respondents, the most popular variant was 'neutral independent states'. It was chosen by 37.0% of Russians and 31.6% of Ukrainians. The Ukrainian respondents chose another variant "the common state" – this answer was given by 35.6% of Ukrainians and 16.8 of Russians.

An unstable socio-economic and political situation in Ukraine and deepening of socio-cultural gaps cannot provide conditions for positive self-identification of Ukrainians (especially of those living in border regions) to the same degree than of Russians. Typically, the share of the Ukrainian respondents proud of their country is 13% lower than that of Russians (63.8% vs. 76.6%), while the share of Ukrainians who do not believe that they can be proud of their state reaches 25.0% (for Russians the share is 8.4%).

The Russian respondents show a greater consensus concerning the basis for their national pride: 50.4% name the victory in World War II and 46.8% – historical heritage. These bases belong to the Soviet past which is a consolidating value for about a half of the respondents. The variant “I see no grounds for pride” was selected only by 5.4% of the respondents and 17.0% of them could not answer this question.

Among the Ukrainian respondents, the same answers are prevailing, but they are shared by significantly less people: the share of those proud of the victory in World War II makes up 33.8% and of the historical heritage – 28.4%. Besides, 24.8% of the Ukrainian respondents see no grounds for pride for their country which is five times higher than the corresponding share of Russians and shows weak positive identification of a significant part of the respondents with their nation.

Therefore, pride for the nation as an axiological attractor consolidating the national identity is a factor of identification for the residents of Russian border regions comparing to the Ukrainian residents.

Ukraine’s inability, comparing to Russia, to provide conditions for adequate national identification is shown in a lack of agreement in the Ukrainian respondents’ answers about the cultural identification. 24.2% of Ukrainians identify themselves with the global culture, 18.6 – with European, only 15.8% - with Ukrainian, a little less (11.8%) with Russian and Eurasian (11.2). By contrast, the absolute majority of the residents of Russian border regions (70.8%) identify themselves with the Russian culture.

The inability of the residents of the Ukrainian border regions to fully identify themselves with the Ukrainian culture is to a certain extent compensated by the local identity. 27.8% of Ukrainians reported that they saw themselves as representatives of their region, city or district, while the corresponding share of Russians was 11.6%. This fact clearly shows the problems of the civil self-identification of the population of the Ukrainian border zone.

## 5. CONCLUSIONS

Our research has proved that the ethno-national heterostereotypes of Russians concerning Ukrainians are more negative than the heterostereotypes of the opposite party. Yet, it is not a result of a discrimination policy, but shows, first of all, the incompleteness of the ethno-national identity of the residents of Ukrainian border

zones and their subordinate position in Russia-Ukraine communication. Together with the socio-cultural, structural and psychological preponderance of the Russian component on micro-level Russia-Ukraine communication and the inability of the Ukrainian state to provide conditions to form positive ethnic stereotypes among the residents of border regions, this leads to a high orientation of Ukrainian residents towards Russia and to a certain extent hampers the formation of negative ethno-national heterostereotypes regarding Russians even in the times of the crisis of the Russia-Ukraine relations.

In their turn, Russians have increasingly more grounds for positive ethno-national autostereotypes on the wave of patriotic sentiments which were raised by the proactive foreign policy and propagandistic opposition to the West and Ukraine as their liege and led to a decrease in the orientation towards Ukraine and to fewer obstacles for a confrontational paradigm in the collective conscience. If the situation in the Russian border regions is rather determined, the result of the identification choice in the Ukrainian border zone is less evident.

#### *Acknowledgements*

This paper was written as part of Commission No. 2016/2459 for the state work in the field of scientific research within the project part of the state commission of the Ministry of Education and Science of the Russian Federation (headed by V.P. Babintsev).

#### *References*

- Ajtony, Z. (2011). Ethnic stereotypes-Impediments or enhancers of social cognition. *Acta Universitatis Sapientiae, Philologica*, 3(2). đ. 134-155.
- Zhernovaja, O.R., Smirnova, O.A. (2014). Pozitivnaja i negativnaja rol' jetnicheskikh stereotipov nacii v sozdanii imidzha strany (na primere imidzha Rossijskoj Federacii i Velikobitanii). *Vestnik Nizhegorodskogo universiteta im. N.I. Lobachevskogo*, 2: p. 324.
- Katz, D., Braly, K. (1933). Racial Stereotypes in One Hundred College Students. *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 28: p. 96.
- Mastro, D. & Tukachinsky, R. (2013). The influence of media exposure on the formation, activation, and application of racial/ethnic stereotypes. In E. Scharrer (Eds.), *Media effects/ Media psychology*. (pp. 295-315). Boston, MA: Wiley-Blackwell.
- Otnoshenie k drugim stranam. (April 2, 2015). In Levada-center. Retrieved on May 10, 2016, <http://www.levada.ru/old/02-04-2015/otnoshenie-k-drugim-stranam> (in Russian)
- Jekspress-vypusk . (October 13, 2015). In Levada-center. Retrieved on May 10, 2016, <http://www.levada.ru/old/13-10-2015/vneshnepoliticheskie-orientatsii> (in Russian)
- Krylov, M.P., Gritsenko, A.A. (2012). Regional'naja i etnokul'turnaja identichnost' v rossijsko-ukrainskom i rossijsko-beloruskom porubezh'e: istoricheskaja pamjat' i kul'turnye transformacii. *Labirint. Zhurnal social'no-gumanitarnyh issledovanij*, 2. p. 31.



This document was created with Win2PDF available at <http://www.win2pdf.com>.  
The unregistered version of Win2PDF is for evaluation or non-commercial use only.  
This page will not be added after purchasing Win2PDF.