THE NEW POLITICAL ELITE OF INNER MONGOLIA AND ITS ROLE IN MENGJIANG STATE CREATION

Pavel Dudin*

Abstract: In the article the author tries to trace the formation of the new Mongolian political elites of the mid-1930s that attempted to declare independence and create own Mongolian state. The core or foundation of that community consisted of the so-called junior princes and their associates, who had a good education and took a view at the world order and the organization of the public administration system in new ways. Cultivating the image of the revival of Genghis Khan Mongol Empire era, these people were led by one of the most respected and talented descendants of the Great Khan - De Wang. He withstood opposition from senior princes. It led to a split among the Mongolian aristocracy and later provoked the invasion of the Japanese Empire occupying forces to Inner Mongolia. After the agreement with the central Chinese government to establish the autonomy of Chahar and Suíyuan territory was reached, the Japanese side spurred the princes into declaring independence by provocations, assassinations, and other similar methods and that forced the split in Mongolian society. In turn it had led to military actions, which resulted in establishment of the new state - Mengjiang, and the younger princes got their hands on political power, but could not use it to the full. The Japanese have not been configured to support the aspirations of the Mongolian side to independence. On the contrary, they did their best to fix the current dependence of Mengjiang on the occupying forces in order to ensure uninterrupted supply of essential resources for their military machine. It led to numerous disasters for the entire region, and the young Mongolian leaders went down in history as traitors and collaborators, who put personal ambitions above the interests of people. This attitude to them ever since persists in modern China.

Keywords: Political elite, Inner Mongolia, Mengjiang, aristocracy, Japanese occupation, De Wang.

INTRODUCTION

In reference to state formation, it will be remarked that the North-East Asia was perhaps one of the most active state and statelike entity "producers" in the twentieth century, as in the recent past and in the stormy present. Tibet and the Bogd Khan Mongolia, Kudun theocracy and Tannu-Tuva People's Republic, Alashan and other areas sought for wide international recognition at the same time with the declaration of their independence.

National elite was a key instrument in Inner Mongolia - the aristocracy, represented by the descendants of Genghis Khan, heterogeneous in its composition, which members were in constant distrust with each other, but they managed to rally first in order to achieve autonomy, and then - independence from China. Though princes and senior management of the new Mongol Guo state pursued the higher purpose of independence and revival of Genghis Khan state power, in fact, brought

^{*} Candidate in sciences (in political sciences), Head of the Department "Theory and History of State and Law. Constitutional law" Faculty of Law, East Siberian State University of Technology and Management, Ulan-Ude. Email: dudin2pavel@gmail.com

countless disasters to its people, and therefore, the attitude towards them in today's China is still unequivocal and categorically negative.

Mongolian peoples and Mongolian statehood were repeatedly researched in the domestic and foreign literature, but a full-fledged study of the political elites of Inner Mongolia has not yet been made. Russian Law Faculty of Harbin Professor Riasanovsky V. A (Riasanovsky, 1929; Riasanovsky 1931) was our first compatriot scientist to make an attempt to define the place of the aristocracy in the Mongolian society. One of the most meaningful works on nation-building, which indirectly highlights some issues regarding the political elite, is the work of Bogoslovsky V. A and Moskalev A. A "The National Question in China (1911-1949)" (Bogoslovsky & Moskalev, 1984). In Western literature special mention should go to such scholars as T. Olsen, D. Febenk, R. Rupen and O. Lattimore. And a Japanese historian H. Futaki studied Mongolian national movement.

Foreign literature about that period is published under the heading of the world's leading studying centers as Oxford, CAMBRIDGE, and Universities of Tokyo, where the flow of immigrants from Inner Mongolia rushed to some time ago. In the research papers of William Beasley (Beasley, 1987), Parks Coble (Coble, 1991), Edwin Moise (Moise, 1986), Sarah Crosby Mallory Payne (Paine, 2012), Mark Elliott (Elliott, 2000) and others (Atwood, 2000; Black et. al., 1991; Narangoa & Cribb, 2003) they do not study Mengjiang – in most books it is mentioned in the description of events in the north of China and in Inner Mongolia in the background of the Japanese occupation. Nevertheless, even this meager amount of material allows supplementing existing data.

Among the authors who consider the events in Inner Mongolia with modern positions, and in historical retrospect, there stands Xiao-Ting Lin and his works "The ethnic boundaries of modern China: Journey to the West" and "Tibet and the Nationalistic China border: intrigue and ethnic policies, 1928-1949" (Lin, 2007.; Lin, 2011).

Among many such works referred to the mentioned above is one of Justin Tighe "Creating Suiyuan: Northwest Territories policy and their development in the early twentieth century" (Tighe, 2005) should be marked specially. Using the concept of "nation-state" Tighe attempts to explain the formation of the Mongolian political community in the designated historical period and analyzes the administrative-territorial division, he explores issues related to agriculture and the development of territories, gives a description of the social structure of Mongolian society and raises questions of Inner and Outer Mongolia residents relationship.

There are such media sources as the US newspapers: the "New York Times", "New York Post", "Time" magazine that reflect the events described in the article, as well as the Malaysian newspapers owned by the British: "Straits Times" and "Singapore Free Press". The memoirs of De Wang were published after his death

in 1966, the foreign press published the material of the author who was his closest supporter by the Alashan campaign Sechin Jagchid, who published an article in English, Japanese, and later in Chinese language (Hyer & Jagchid, 1983; Jagchid, 1979; Jagchid, 1985).

Regardless of the increased volume of research material, which covers events in Inner Mongolia in the first half of the twentieth century, there are no complex works on Mengjiang itself and its political and social component. Therefore, this article is intended to partially fill this gap.

CONCEPT HEADINGS

Ancestral Mongolian aristocracy in the early middle of 1930-ies was divided into two "camps". Firstly, the old and honored princes, who apparently did not keep pace with the developments in the world and the country changes - the heads of the Mongolian khoshuns deriving an origin from one of the sons of Genghis Khan and wishing to preserve the established way of life of Mongolian society intact as long as possible. Secondly, the group of young princes and their associates, who received a good education in the best universities of Beijing, Japan or Europe and seeing the changes taking place there and all the progress results wished to transfer them to the Mongolian land.

On the one hand, that conservatism and unwillingness to changes, and youth and progress on the other hand eventually led to the first confrontation, and then to the conflict, which resulted in not only the proclamation of the country's independence but also to defection to the Japanese side.

DISCUSSION

The first step in this direction was taken in 1902, when Prince Gunsennorov (Dudin, 2013) established one of the first public schools in Inner Mongolia (Black et. al., 1991). And what happened then did determine the fate of the region for almost 50 years ahead: involving the process of learning Japanese and to the comprehension of Japanese culture, the way of life and thinking and sympathy to the Japanese progress through it. In 1903, the prince visited Japan with the official delegation and after the return, he continued development of educational institutions by the Japanese pattern: a military school for young people, a school for girls, with Japanese teachers, invited (Narangoa & Cribb, 2003). Having established close contacts with the Japanese educational institutions, the prince became the first to practice the system of student exchanges, sending young people to acquire new knowledge in Japan, learn foreign languages, study publishing, newspaper and mining business in other countries. Young people had the opportunity to get to know with different cultures and also adopt a positive experience in various spheres of public life.

Gunsennorov Colleges were famous for their high quality of education. Prominent policymakers of Inner Mongolia and China graduated from them in various years. These people were the protagonists of bright and dramatic processes of 1930-1940s, as they had a high level of knowledge and training, and also because they were familiar with the Japanese culture and ideology. Among the most famous graduates is Tseren Donrov, who in 1925 together with Merse was one of the People's Revolutionary Party of Inner Mongolia founders and in 1934 became a member of the Political Council of the Mongolian Autonomy; Altan-Ochir, a member of the People's Revolutionary Party of Inner Mongolia (Narangoa & Cribb, 2003), a minister Mengjiang government; and a whole galaxy of young personalities, whose excellent education greatly expanded the political outlook and allowed to take a fresh look at the position of Inner Mongolia in the Republic of China and that eventually brought them to power in Mengjiang, replacing the old aristocracy.

Those who were born in the late XIX - early XX century were the new generation of Mongol elite. Having shaped like full-fledged personalities with established views, by the end of the 1920s the beginning of the 1930s they were ready to take political responsibility for the fate of Mongolian land for themselves. Demchig Donrov (De Wang) the prince of Dzun-Sunni khoshun (Chahar province) eventually started to play a key role in the galaxy of the so-called younger princes. His characteristics in China had always been negative - a traitor who had put personal interests above the interests of his own people (Jagchid, 1985; Lu, 1977; Lu, 1980). The Western press was originally a loyal and supportive in the prince's aspirations for independence, after 1943 he was called a toy in the hands of the Japanese, and a clown at the head of the puppet regime (Inner Mongolia: Prince Humpty-Dumpty, 1945).

The prince can rightly be attributed to the representatives of the so-called new political elite of the prewar Inner Mongolia period. After receiving a good education, De Wang used it to achieve political power while seeking to liberate the country from under the Chinese authorities. The position of the Qing empire Mongolian population under the Manchu domination for centuries was described as subordinate and dependent. In practice, it was not secured by any formal legal or actual governmental policy. The Mongols have experienced oppression, their land was colonized, and this process was much more intense than in Outer Mongolia. After the overthrow of the Manchu dynasty, the situation had not changed. The position of lords also remained entirely dependent on the Chinese authorities, although the most advanced of them had already begun to lean toward serious and radical reform idea.

De Wang, as well as Gunsennorov, saw the need for reforms in many directions: from the population census to church life and its impact on the social order; from education to rearmament etc. And although these aspirations still caused sharp

rejection of the old aristocracy, they found wide support and approval among the lower classes, which had long been waiting for opportunities to break out of underdevelopment and poverty. Since then, the popularity of De Wang has begun to increase, and he became the symbol of reforms.

The prince led political activity since the mid-1920s, delving diligently into all spheres of khoshun's life that had been entrusted to him, drawing near not natives of the aristocracy, but talented people from the commons.

The movement for Inner Mongolia independence was the objective response to the processes that were going through the Chinese and Mongolian society in the early twentieth century. The growth of contacts with the outside world, the development of education, the perception of Western ideas - all of this led to an increase in the number of supporters of independence. The victory of the Kuomintang of China in the summer of 1928 speeded up and contributed to the expansion of this process when practically all of China moved under the Party control. Then the teaching of Sun Yat-sen quickly became national self-determination slogans, which were widely deemed as a call for independence. At the same time, the actual policy of the KMT ran counter to the stated priorities and that did not meet the interests of the Mongols. The old control system laid by the Manchus did not meet modern requirements, and the transformations carried out by power circles did not lead to the desired results. There were calls for the revision of the Organic Law and the adoption of the new Constitution, liberalizing the rights of national territories.

De Wang tried to forge relationships with the Japanese side, at the same time, there was a cooling of relations with the Nanjing government after the Manchurian Incident on September 18th of 1931, when Japan switched to the active military actions, which led to the seizure of Manchuria and North-Eastern China territories. The Manchurian incident made it clear that Japan was preparing a major force for the invasion of China, and therefore De Wang decided to take advantage of that situation to obtain independence. He proceeded to the formation of supporter groups not only in Inner Mongolia but also in major Chinese cities - Peiping, Nanjing, and others. With the increasing popularity of De Wang, two separate meetings with him were organized in Nanjing in autumn and winter of 1932 on the initiative of the Chiang Kai-shek. The most important problems of Mongolia were discussed, but they did not lead to the desired result. Gradually expanding its influence, by 1933, the prince was able to create a formidable force on which he could draw at already open political activities, which naturally aroused opposition among the old aristocracy.

The contradictions and confrontation of the "old" and "new" Mongolian aristocracy should be divided into two stages. The first stage can be called political; it is characterized by the struggle for political influence in the period of the Autonomy creation during 1933-1936.

Suspicion and isolation traditionally dominated among princes, but in spite of that fact, they were able to reach agreement on the autonomy issue (China: Inner Mongolia to Inner Mongolia, 1933). The press highlighted the young age of the informal leader of Mongolia. His personality, full of ambition and credibility, was opposed to Prince Yun, head of the Autonomy, "an old and sick man" (Mongolia sets up its new capital, 1934). De Wang started forming his own military structures immediately: the inverse image of the army, the military academy, and the arsenal, which allowed him to quickly become militarily the most powerful prince.

In October of 1933, the supporters of independence created their own representative government that united the province of Chahar and Suiyuan - Political Council (the Committee), which immediately became known as the Mongolian Government, and adopted an action program focusing central governments in the ancient Baylinmyao monastery. De Wang received the authority to conduct the distribution of weapons and ammunition, forming the law enforcement.

In November 1933, Panchen Lama IX and his inner circle had been implicated in this process, speaking on the side of the forces that demanding a broad autonomy. It was indicated with reference to the representative of the Panchen Lama, that broad support of the autonomists was provided by the participation of students (Negotiations aid Mongol Autonomy, 1933).

A surprising aspect of the Council was the crucial role of a large group of the so-called "junior princes", which up until then was absent in the region control system, or at a formal presence in those or other structures, did not have the casting vote right. Those young people were mostly graduates of Chinese, Japanese and European universities. They were enthusiastic and more radical than their older counterparts: they talked about radical transformations that could make their nation, barely affected by modern civilization, a true progressive.

For the first time the "junior princes" had access to the autonomy controls in March 1934, when some of them became part of the Political Council. A third of the 41 members of the Council were actually presented by De Wang supporters, including Altanochir, Wu Heling, Tuvshin Bayar, etc. However, only 2 "junior princes" got the key positions in the management structure: Demchugdongrub (De Wang) received the status of the Secretary General, and Altanochir became the head of Administration of industry and commerce.

It is significant that the Council's first important project was the creation and gradual build-up of the Central Mongolian army, which Mongols did not have from the time of the conquest of China by the Manchus in the mid-end of the XVII century. Groups of young graduates of Chinese and Japanese military academies arrived from various regions on horseback in the neighborhood of Bailingmiao to teach the art of modern warfare, and actively participated in all the demonstration activities

Many of them more versed in matters of geopolitics were convinced that Japan intends to gain control of the entire region, like Manchukuo. At the same time, they were hostile in relation to Soviet Russia: Sovietization alienated the possibility of reunification with Outer Mongolia from them.

Prior to the beginning of the movement for autonomy the need for educated youth was not great, in this regard, many Mongolians who have received a good education, sought to leave to find a better life, not being able to implement their knowledge and ambitions at home. The declaration of independence created a new field of activity for those people. That is why they were involved in the new Autonomy's control, which was in desperate need of skilled staff and managers. The youth, knowledge, lack of administrative conventions fear, fear of decision-making and responsibility provided "junior princes" with strong positions in the administrative affairs and a significant advantage.

However, such innovations came into conflict with the traditional way of life and social fabric, reigning for centuries in Mongolian society. Young people did not always catch such moments sensitively; they had spent much of their life outside of Mongolia, having absorbed the exotic and sedentary way of life. They no longer wore the traditional Mongolian clothing, had a loose command of the native language, but were fluent in Chinese and one or more European languages. Brought up in the spirit of liberal values, young people did neither show much interest in the coronation of Puyi as emperor of Manchukuo (Mongols building a self-ruled state, 1934) nor worshiped the representatives of the nobility. All they talked about was the "awakening" of Mongolia, they planned to build schools, construct roads, form a modern army and develop untapped natural resources of the country. Young Mongols were less religious and actively sought to reduce the power of the church. At the beginning of the Autonomist movement, they just told the representatives of the Panchen Lama IX to stop attempts of uniting politics and religion in the movement for independence.

Despite the fact that the so-called "Old guard" of the Mongolian aristocrats still had the real power in Mongolia, the "junior princes" had high hopes for Demchugdongrub and his support. Whereas he said that the creation of the Autonomous Government of Inner Mongolia would open the way to the transformation of Mongolia into a new enlightened state (Mongolia sets up its new capital, 1934).

Further events were associated with the actual rift in the Autonomy and among autonomists. At that time Japan pulled the main forces on the borders of Jehol and eastern Chahar, taking measures to support loyal Mongolian forces (Mongolian princes..., 1933) and in order to protect the occupied territory against a possible attack of the Soviet armed forces stationed in the Soviet-Mongolian border (Inner Mongolia declared independent, 1935).

The group of Mongolia with China relation supporters was still headed by Prince Shagdurjab (Plots in the North, 1933), although the reason for that was the desire of the old aristocracy to maintain their privileges, which the official Nanjing had guaranteed them (With China holding supreme control, 1933). Speaking to reporters, Prince Sha declared his support for the central Chinese government (Stern Warning By China To Japan, 1936), as well as the fact that Mongolia was a part of China, and a multi-million Mongolian people was ready to stand up as one with Chiang Kai-shek, to destroy the Japanese threat (Chinese attacking over a wide area, 1939).

The general Huang Shaohong, Nanjing envoy to Baylinmyao, suggested avoiding open conflict between the old and the young princes to overcome the crisis, resulting in the situation failed for a short time to stabilize.

Later, Prince Yun offered Nanjing his assistance, who, on the one hand, sought to maintain stable regulations with the central government, on the other - to push the Chinese side to send a punitive force to Mongolia (Inner Mongolia declared independent, 1935). Those actions disrupted the plans of De Wang for the proclamation of the independence of Inner Mongolia, scheduled for December of 1935 (Soviet Advises China..., 1935), and gave rise to a new round of tension between the princes. On January 20, 1936, Prince Yun appealed to Nanjing for military support against De Wang's rebel forces for the second time (Conflict between Mongolian princes likely, 1936), thus, the possibility of open conflict among the heads of khoshuns had been turning into reality.

After that, Nanjing announced the Abolition of the Mongol Local Autonomy Political Affairs Committee and formed the Suiyuan Union Political Committee banners with the board of 17 Mongolian princes representing the opposition of De Wang (Appointments To New Political Council, 1936), and the move of its headquarters from Baylinmyao to Guisui. The new structure was headed by Prince Sha. A similar structure of the South Chahar was headed by De Wang's uncle, Prince Buyandalay (Situation at Kalgan Much Worse, 1936), and Zhangjiakou was determined as its center.

Japan also did not lie up from the described events. In January 23, 1936, the Japanese had Nima-odor assassinated, a prominent politician, a member of the Political Council of the Autonomy and the Central Committee of the Kuomintang (Zhang & Zhang, 2006). The sparking fear among the other Committee members, in particular, his close associate Jodubjab, which led him to collaborate with the Japanese. (Hyer & Jagchid, 1983). Jodubjab served as head of the local police and he sent De Wang a telegram with an invitation to go into action to establish the independent government of Mengjiang (Prince Teh goes over to Manchukuo, 1936). The young princes and their supporters had also decided to go for radical actions. February 12, 1936, it was decided to form own armed forces under De Wang's authority and officers of the Kwantung Army took participation in it.

At the initiative of the Chinese Communist Party in response to those events, the decision was made to hold the armed uprising in Baylinmyao on the 21 of February with the participation of more than a thousand people. Although the rebellion was suppressed, it had made significant changes in the Japanese command's plans to progress to the central regions of Inner Mongolia, and in the policy of the Kuomintang that previously held a passive stance on events in Mongolia.

After February 1936, De Wang openly took sides with the Japanese. On April 21, 1936, the congress of the political elite for a decision on the establishment of the Mongol Military Government was convened in Uzemzhin. In April 24 the decision was taken, and the government was formed by May 12th. Since then, the personality of De Wang had become key in the politics of Mengjiang, which he headed in August of 1938.

"The second phase" of contradictions and oppositions of the "old" and "new" Mongolian aristocracy was of geopolitical nature and was down to the choice of military partners, China, Japan, and the USSR could be among them.

In March 1936, Japan's supporters under the command of Li Shouxin seized Baylinmyao monastery and moved inland. This fact served as a formal reason for the resumption of confrontation within the political elite of Mongolia, one part of which was accusing the other of treason and desertion to the Japanese (Manchoukuans push..., 1936).

After the dissolution of the unified Mongol Local Autonomy Political Affairs Committee, the break in relations with Nanjing and illegalization of those princes who sought to preserve the autonomy. The issue of De Wang asking for help from the Soviet Russia with possible accession to the Outer Mongolia was seriously discussed in May 1936. At the same time the Japanese military executed Khingan princes - the leaders of the north-eastern outskirts of the Mongolian land, which caused the aristocrats of Inner Mongolia doubt about their own security, and forced them to consider the Soviet Union as the sole partner (Inner Mongolia wavers, 1936) on the whole of Inner Asia. Another part of the Mongolian leaders continued considering both China and Japan as potential allies (Hard choice for Mongols, 1936), which further intensified the split.

In July 1936, the young princes staged provocation during a secret visit of Prince Yun to Baylinmyao. Though the monastery lost its capital functions, it continued to be an important strategic object. Yun was detained by De Wang supporters and placed under arrest (Series developments in Mongolia, 1936), which caused a wave of indignation in the old aristocracy and raised the question of an armed confrontation among the Mongolian khoshuns, which occurred in December 1936 when Chinese troops tried to seize Baylinmyao. Nanjing government had issued an ultimatum to the joint Mongolian and Japanese forces that captured and held the former capital. An armed clash took place between pro-Japanese forces under

the command of De Wang and several thousand of Mongolian troops led by Prince Pang (Given Time Limit To Evacuate Pailingmiau, 1936), however, it had not led to a civil war. To release tension the pro-Japanese Mongolian military government made the aged prince its Chairman (Yondonwangchug, 2003). Thus, the first head of the self-proclaimed Mongol Guo state became one of the "old" Mongolian aristocracy leaders. Despite a high formal status, his real powers were very modest. Executive authorities had been engaged with "young princes" and their supporters. De Wang became Secretary-General, his deputies were: Togt, who also became the Minister of Foreign Affairs; Li Shouxin, headed Staff; and Wu Heling, who became Minister for aimag affairs.

October 27, 1937, at the peak of his political career, Yondonwangchug was announced as the Chairman of Mengjiang (Inner Mongolians set up new regime..., 1937), but the reached compromise and a truce were short-lived - March 24, 1938, the old prince died of poisoning (Japanese halt advance on the Yangtze, 1938), and Prince Shagdurjab left the territory of Inner Mongolia and continued resistance at the Kuomintang-controlled areas.

RESULT

At the same time, the period of state formation in Inner Mongolia came to an end and was followed by the era of Japanese military authorities domination. The influence of the ancestral aristocracy to the control process disappears. The presidency is concentrated in the hands of one person, as well as a number of other important government posts. The president played a leading role and crowned the pyramid of legislative, executive, judicial and military power. There was not only the strengthening of his role in the system of public authorities but also formalization of the institution - it was consolidated in the Basic Law of the country. The president was elected at the congress of the highest Mongolian nobility. That would serve as a symbol of the continuity of Genghis Khan statehood. When the great Khans of Mongolian state did not inherit the post on the basis of blood and primogeniture but were elected by Quriltai.

The highest representatives of the Mongolian aristocracy consistently held the post of the head of the state - descendants of Genghis Khan and the heads of khoshuns. At that, the first president Prince Yun was more of a figurehead, who had the highest authority, which allowed him to rally the majority of Mongolian aristocracy and thus avoid the political struggle. After his death, the power prerogatives concentrated in the hands of the most active and powerful of all the princes - De Wang.

In September 1, 1939, De Wang kept the presidency after uniting of other semi-independent regimes and the formation of Mengjiang United Autonomous Government, (Liu, 1995) and remained on until August 1945, when the troops of

the USSR and the MPR eliminated Mengjiang and Japan surrendered. De Wang came up with a suggestion to merge with government troops of Chiang Kai-shek to eliminate the communist threat, seeking help from the autonomous government of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. But those plans failed to come to pass. De Wang's militia groups were defeated by the Communists less than in two months, and he, when in Beijing, was arrested by the Kuomintang.

However, the supporters of De Wang remained free, and in April 1949 attempted to create a political entity in the Northwest of China, which went down in history as Alashan Republic (Western Mongolian Autonomy). However, in September of the same year, the Republic collapsed under the onslaught of the Communists. De Wang, together with his supporters crossed the border with Mongolia in December 29. September 18, 1950, he was arrested and handed over to Chinese authorities. He had been accused of collusion with the Japanese military circles and imprisoned. In April 1963, the Supreme People's Court of Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region pardoned De Wang. He returned to civil life and died in 1966.

CONCLUSION

As to the aristocracy, the special role is given to the so-called "Young princes" whose desire to achieve independence eventually led to the formation of Mengjiang. If they were born in a quieter time, their life and political views could serve as an example of courage and national pride. The people, many of whom had given their lives for the cause of independence of the native land and the revival of the former might of the country - these could be the epithets with which their descendants would award them. However, the realities of life appeared to be more severe. They cooperated with the Japanese military regime, which committed violent crimes during the invasion.

After the war, some of them ended their lives facing the firing squad of Chinese justice, some served long sentences in the prisons of the new communist regime. Though they escaped punishment as war criminals under international tribunal, all of them paid for their loyalty to the occupiers.

However, one cannot deny the fact that under the circumstances, Japan was seen as the only power and the only possibility of obtaining independence, since neither the central government Nanjing nor the Soviet Union was going to meet the national interests of the Mongols. Only the lack of political foresight did not let "young princes" realize in the initial phase of contacts with the Japanese that they had come to China not to release the Mongolian people. It resulted in the events that still make the Chinese and Japanese peoples feel hatred for each other, and the impossibility to forget the past.

Acknowledgement

The study was sponsored by the Russian President Council on Grants in the framework of a research project (Quasi-States of Inner Asia: statehood issues the context of the struggle of nations for self-determination), project number MK-6398.2016.6.

References

Appointments To New Political Council. (1936). The Singapore Free Press and Mercantile Advertiser, p. 9.

Atwood, C. (2000). Inner Mongolian Nationalism in the 1920s: A Survey of Documentary Information. *Twentieth-Century China*, 25 (2), 75-113.

Beasley, W. G. (1987). Japanese imperialism 1894-1945. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Black, C. E., Dupree, L., West, E.E., Naby, E. (1991). The Modernization of Inner Asia.

Bogoslovsky, V. A., Moskalev, A. A. (1984). The ethnic problem of China (1911-1949). M.: Nauka, 1984.

China: Inner Mongolia to Inner Mongolia. (1933). Time.

Chinese attacking over a wide area. (1939). The New York Times.

Coble, M. P. (1991). Facing Japan: Chinese Politics and Japanese Imperialism, 1931-1937. Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press.

Conflict between mongolian princes likely. (1936). The Singapore Free Press and Mercantile Advertiser.

Dudin, P. N. (2013). Patron of Sinhay era. Concept. Modern scientific research. Issue 1.

Elliott, M. (2000). The Limits of Tartary: Manchuria in Imperial and National Geographies. *The Journal of Asian Studies*. Vol. 59, No. 3.

Given Time Limit to Evacuate Pailingmiau. (1936). *The Singapore Free Press and Mercantile Advertiser*.

Hard choice for mongols. (1936). The New York Times.

Hyer P., Jagchid, S. (1983). A Mongolian living Buddha: biography of the Kanjurwa Khutughtu. SUNY Press.

Inner Mongolia declared independent. (1935). The Singapore Free Press and Mercantile Advertiser.

Inner Mongolians set up new regime; break from Nanking. (1937). Chicago Tribune.

Inner Mongolia: Prince Humpty-Dumpty. (1945). Time.

Inner Mongolia wavers. (1936). The New York Times.

Jagchid, S. (1979). Prince Gungsangnorbu: Forerunner of Inner Mongolian Modernization, Zentralasiatische Studien.

Jagchid, S. (1985) My memories of De Wang and Inner Mongolia. *Research Institute for Language and Culture of Africa and Asia*. Tokyo: Foreign Languages University of Tokyo.

Japanese halt advance on the Yangtze. (1938). The Singapore Free Press and Mercantile Advertiser.

Lin, H. (2007). *Tibet and Nationalist China's Frontier: Intrigues and Ethnopolitics*, 1928-49. University of British Columbia Press.

- Lin, H. (2011). *Modern China's ethnic frontiers: a journey to the west*. London: New York: Routledge.
- Liu, S. L. (1995). Chronology and Biography of officials. Chinese publishing house.
- Lu, M. H. (1977). *The full story of De Wang and Mongolian autonomy*. Hohhot: People's Publishing House of Inner Mongolia.
- Lu, M. H. (1980). *The Beginning and the End of the Mongolian Autonomy Movement*. Beijing: Publishing House of Zhong Hua Shu Ju.
- Manchoukuans push far into Mongolia. Japanese Allies Drive 200 Milles Nearer Russia. (1936). New York Post.
- Moise, E. E. Modern China: A History. London and New York: Longman, 1986.
- Mongols building self-ruled state. (1934). The New York Times.
- Mongolian princes. Nanking To Offer Limited Independence. (1933). *The Singapore Free Press and Mercantile Advertiser*.
- Mongolia sets up its new capital. (1934). The New York Times.
- Narangoa, L. & Cribb, R. B. (2003). *Imperial Japan and national identities in Asia, 1895-1945*. Nordic Institute of Asian Studies monograph series. Routledge, p. 91.
- Negotiations aid Mongol Autonomy. (1933). The New York Times.
- Paine, S. C. M. (2012). The Wars for Asia, 1911-1949. Cambridge University Press.
- Plots in the North. (1933). The Singapore Free Press and Mercantile Advertiser.
- Prince Teh goes over to Manchukuo. (1936). The Singapore Free Press and Mercantile Advertiser.
- Riasanovsky, V. A. (1929). Mongolian law (mainly conventional). *Proceedings of the Faculty of Law in Harbin*. Vol. 8.
- Riasanovsky, V. A. (1931). *Mongolian law (mainly conventional): Historical Review of tribes*. Harbin: Type.
- Series developments in Mongolia. (1936). *The Singapore Free Press and Mercantile Advertiser*, p. 9.
- Situation At Kalgan Much Worse. (1936). *The Singapore Free Press and Mercantile Advertiser*, p. 9.
- Soviet Advises China Not To Conclude Agreements With Japan Or Manchukuo (1935). *The Singapore Free Press and Mercantile Advertiser*, p. 10.
- Stern Warning By China To Japan (1936). The Singapore Free Press and Mercantile Advertiser.
- Tighe, J. (2005). Constructing Suiyuan: The Politics of Northwestern Territory And Development in Early Twentieth-Century China. Brill Academic Pub.
- With China holding supreme control. (1933). *The Singapore Free Press and Mercantile Advertiser*, p. 9.
- Yondonwangchug. (2003). Inner Mongolia News, p.12.
- Zhang, Y., Zhang, X. (2006). *Biographies of royals at the end of an era*. Writers' Publishing House.