

A NEW PATRONAGE NETWORKS OF PEMUDA PANCASILA IN GOVERNOR ELECTION OF NORTH SUMATRA

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This research is motivated by the emergence of the “thugs” as local actors in North Sumatra that play a role in supporting a candidate for Governor of North Sumatra. A case study approach and qualitative analysis and typology chosen as a way to draw up a written interpretation of the data, interview and observation. The findings show that a form of intimidation by members of the Pemuda Pancasila is threatening physical beatings and create inconvenience voters who did not vote candidate supported. The pattern of mobilization on the basis of patron-client pyramid. Model relationship that exists between the Pemuda Pancasila with the bureaucracy, businessmen, and local print media carried out on symbiotic mutualism. The phenomenon appears and the persistence of local bosses and violent groups identify their distinctive differences in North Sumatra.

Keywords: power, local politics, and local bosses.

INTRODUCTION

The constitution amendments a day after the fall of the New Order is one manifestation of the reform movement. The move is considered as part of the demands of institutional reforms that are needed to consolidate democracy in Indonesia after a period of authoritarian New Order. Since then, Indonesia entered a phase of political life that is more open and democratic, and characterized by the recovery of civil rights and politics. Fundamental changes that occurred in the 1945 amendment of which is the recruitment of state officials elected directly by the people through legislative and executive elections at the national level (1945 Article 6A). The decentralization policy became the basic format of central and local relations. While the implementation of regional autonomy a guideline between government, communities and local leaders to manage their own affairs according to the rules applicable legislation including directly elect regional heads. Accommodation of the interests and needs of the community will increase the degree of acceptance of the decisions made by the government (Prasojo & Kurniawan, 2008).

To realize such effective community participation, there are some basic preconditions that should be available, among others, the political equality (political equality) and adequate local accountability (Mouffe, 1999; Lively. 1975). But both became most fundamental problems faced by many developing countries in implementing decentralization. Therefore, decentralization does not always have

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a positive correlation with the consolidation of democracy and the structural efficiency of government at the local level. Richard C. Crook and James Manor in a comparative analysis of the implementation of decentralization in four countries in South Asia and West Africa, namely the state of Karnataka in India, Bangladesh, Ghana, and the Ivory Coast, concluded that except in Karnataka, decentralization in the countries the country just reinforces the patterns of politics at the local level that does not support democracy and better government performance (Manor, 1995).

The implementation of regional autonomy policy in Province of North Sumatra is very possible accumulation of power rests on the actors and certain groups at the local level. Although the regulation on the implementation of regional autonomy has guaranteed every citizen has the freedom to channel their aspirations so that the expected consolidation of democracy can work and government held effectively, but in practice in North Sumatra, appeared mafias and local networks, one of which is under the leadership of youth organizations and providers security services. Most of them work as businessmen, politicians and always take a role in mobilizing the support of the operations of the general election and the local elections.

Ryter and Lindsey are observers who write about criminal activity by the organization Pemuda Pancasila in North Sumatra. The results of his research explains that after the fall of the New Order regime, the behavior of thugs enter the formal political realm. One of the causes of such behavior is a close relationship between the military and youth organizations in the New Order. Acts of violence and money politics very often they do to get important positions in various political parties and parliament. Not just rely on physical strength to always mobilize people and commit acts of violence to other parties deemed contrary. However, the advantage is that they are always in spite of legal sanctions because they provide support to the existing political network (Ryter, 1998; T. Lindsey. 2002).

The coming of the violence in political parties and legislative North Sumatra Province started when Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia (Indonesian Armed Forces), particularly the Ground Forces requires a force of thugs against the communist influence spread *Partai Komunis Indonesia* (Indonesia Communist Party). At that time, physical strength possessed thugs desperately needed the Ground Forces to deal with the masses of stepping into PKI. When PKI expand its power network by establishing the organization of Pemuda Rakyat (Youth Society), not long after the organization of Pemuda Pancasila was established on October 28, 1959. In North Sumatra, most of the board and members of the Pemuda Pancasila recruited from street children who do not have a regular job and have helped the Indonesian Army to block the effect of PKI communist disseminated.

At the beginning of the New Order, Pemuda Pancasila in North Sumatra to be a part of supporting organizations in local government. Managers and cadres of Pemuda Pancasila North Sumatra were given the freedom to form organizations wings of various community groups such as groups of farmers, workers, fishermen,

women up to the campus environment. Similarly, in the bureaucracy, as the recruitment and selection of bureaucratic officials in North Sumatra, Pemuda Pancasila can influence the decision of the head region. Pemuda Pancasila important role when it is becoming one of the organizations that provide support to Golongan Karya Party.

Support cadres of Pemuda Pancasila North Sumatra to New Order's political policies were increasingly institutionalized by the 'paid' with the election of the thugs in a strategic position in the management of Golkar (Golongan Karya) and became a member of Parliament. During the New Order, together with the security forces, cadres and leaders Pemuda Pancasila in North Sumatra role as a political operator among others, threats and intimidation to other groups of different interests. The leaders of the youth organizations, only the duty to secure the New Order government policy, such as maintaining security at election time so that Golkar surpass the United Development Party (PPP) and the Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI) in gaining the most votes.

During the period of New Order, the figures Pemuda Pancasila find new opportunities for the 'class' of implementing the decision-makers or determinant in the area. All the means to do the characters such as multiply wealth and seize power to raise the social status. Even after the reformation in 1999, it can be said the role of Pemuda Pancasila in North Sumatra was expanded at the same time deepening. They were relatively successful adaptation to the various dynamics of democracy at the local level as an active part in the elections to the implementation of direct elections of regional heads.

Most of the cadres and leaders of North Sumatra Pemuda Pancasila as leaders of political parties and become a member of the legislature without having to obtain the consent of the elite in the center. Not a few of them were successfully elected as regents and mayors in the province of North Sumatra. The cadres and leaders Pemuda Pancasila in North Sumatra has also become one of the policy makers in other public institutions as a manager in various local print media, local business associations officials, and other strategic positions (Hadiz, 2005). Opportunities and new opportunities like that, very rarely obtained by local leaders in the New Order.

An initial assumption of the role carried out by cadres and leaders of Pemuda Pancasila as described above, in practice it will be seen and analyzed during the election of the North Sumatra Provincial Governor in 2013. The election of pair GatotPudjonugrohoand T. ErryNuradias Governor and Vice Governor of North Sumatra Province Period 2013-2018, is inseparable from the role of Pemuda Pancasila. The role in question is in addition to relying on the ability to intimidate with the threat of physical violence as well as relying on the money he had, Pemuda Pancasila leaders also use its influence on the political network that they have to work to win-backed candidates in the election of the North Sumatra Provincial Governor in 2013.

To test the assumptions about their role in the Pemuda Pancasila North Sumatra Provincial Governor election in 2013, then this study will answer the following questions. First, as to whether the form of intimidation Pemuda Pancasila in support GatotPudjonugroho in the selection of candidates for Governor of North Sumatra Province in 2013? Second, how patterns of mobilization of cadres and leaders of Pemuda Pancasila were the leaders of political parties and members of DPRD North Sumatra Province in support of candidates for governor and vice governor who want to win? Third, how to model the relationships built between the leadership of the Pemuda Pancasila North Sumatra with bureaucratic officials, businessmen, and local mass media managers in North Sumatra during the election of the Governor of North Sumatra Province in 2013?

The research questions to be answered for the first goal, explained the reasons used as the basis of the Pemuda Pancasila members to intimidate voters to choose GatotPudjonugroho and T. ErryNuradi in the election of Governor and Vice Governor of North Sumatra Province in 2013. Secondly, by knowing the model will be visible mobilization Pemuda Pancasila clearly significant effect on the local political constellation in North Sumatra. Third, the relationship pattern that was found to explain the position and influence of power cadres of Pemuda Pancasila figure in local political bodies in the context of patterns of state-society relations (state-society) in North Sumatra, especially when the election of the Governor of North Sumatra Province in 2013.

LITERATURE REVIEW

The theory used in this research is the Theory of Groups of Violent written by Masaaki and Rozaki, Bossism Theory written by John T. Sidel, as well as the Theory of Patron-Client of James C. Scott. Theories about the growing violence caused by a group of community dynamics change constantly. According to Masaaki and Rozaki, which explains the case of Indonesia, that in the New Order all forms of pressure groups in the community can be embraced by the government by way of institutionalizing them and secure the support of the army and the police or by oppression. However, after the New Order, the various components of society demanding justice who interpret themselves as a matter of ethnicity, religion, culture, politics, economics, class, and so forth. The suit is made to meet the diverse interests through the way groups and the use of the instrument to spread the threat of violence for different interest groups. Masaaki and Rozaki describe a group that plays a role, after the New Order regime, as groups compete for a position to become gods (struggle of Gods) (Masaaki & Rozaki 2006).

Masaaki and Rozaki have explained that the existence of non-state violence occurred not because of the country allow it, but because the country can not deny its existence, or rather, the country that need them. The presence of such a community group, hamper the pace of democratization and decentralization even

threatened to be frozen democracy for the role of the reformists lose strength with interest groups that rely on its network of violence with rooted in the body of a political party. This condition is also affecting their blurred portrait of the local legislative bodies that have not been able to embody the aspirations of the community as a corridor container. Weak law enforcement process, of course, into political capital for those who have access and capacity in using violence and threats of violence so it's handy to seize power at the local level (Masaaki & Rozaki 2006).

The concept of governance therein presupposes the role of the state is no longer dominant, but only made the government as a facilitator. Therefore, providing the opportunity and the same space for community groups as stake holders. The opportunity was then utilized to loosen up the role of state protection of its citizens and vice versa community groups that have political capital mastery of violence has become part of the main players (Masaaki & Rozaki 2006).

The existence of violent groups in society can not be separated from the actors alternating and make them as strong or boss in their own communities. The term local bosses or bossism back into the discussion when Sidel explained the phenomenon of the rise of local bosses in the Philippines, Thailand, and Indonesia in terms of state and community relations at the local level (Migdal, 1988; Sidel, 1997). From that research, Sidel calls bossism term that reflects the strong state than strong society. He saw bossism demonstrate the role of the local elite as political brokers who have a predatory monopolistic control of the power of coercion and economic resources within their own territories. Bossism regime operates in the shadow areas are characterized by communion bureaucrats, party bosses, businessmen, military, and civilian (Sidel, 1997). In the case of the Philippines, Sidel concluded that the size and importance of the extensive private land ownership is not the main source of power and wealth. State resources and more prominent trading capital. Many local strongmen who become rich just after taking office. The wealth obtained through access to the economy, in the form of an assortment of privileges given elected officials, the 'indebted' for their services in mobilizing support through the use of violence and intimidation, vote buying voters, and electoral fraud.

In the form of an assortment of perks given elected officials, who 'owed' for their services in mobilizing support through the use of violence and intimidation, the purchase of the vote, and cheating in the election. The local strong man who is rooted in the Philippines is more representative of the oddities of the country's institutional structure, the peculiarity is not a patron-client relationship or power and an oligarchy based on land ownership. Developed since the introduction of political changes in the early 20th century, the form of election of the head of the region as well as members of Parliament in the national and local levels, provides an opportunity for the elected officials can still use discretion up local law

enforcement, public works, taxation, etcetera. In contrast to the conclusion of Migdal, the local strongman in the Philippines according to Sidel, thus proving to support the development of capitalism, among others, marked by the growth of economic activities at the local level (Sidel, 1997).

Research findings concerning the development of the local boss of Sidel in Southeast Asia, explains some of the important note below. First, the local strongman gained power and wealth instead of land ownership or personal wealth, but rather from the sources state that accumulated after holding power. Patron-client relationships are no longer the main strut their power. The expansion of the violence and control the political officials selected is the source of their power. These controls are key for the accumulation of human resources, nature, and the local financial, through the enforcement of discrimination laws and rules, discretion permit monopoly, contract, and land use. In contrast to Migdal, the political power of brokerage is obtained and may provide an opportunity for the accumulation of wealth, and not vice versa (Sidel, 1997).

Second, the relationship between people strong with the wider community in the area of its authority is not determined by “side of demand”, that is the client needs over patrons. The relationship is more determined by “side of supplies” in the form of State structures at the national level and the local level of the economy. Third, various practices purchase votes, cheating in the election, or the collection of personal wealth through illegal means is carried out by means of coercion, rather than paternalistic relations of reciprocity or clientelistic. Strong local interests into the backrest in the relationship between them and the public at large (Harriss, Stokke, & Törnquist, 2004).

The local boss is the businessman, was included in a group that often practice violence, then the cast and has an influence on the local political institutions such as political parties, legislative, and executive. Their appearance is not detached from the structure of society and the structure of the state itself. In the structure of society that is paternalistic, people who have influence tend to be respected in society. While the structure of the country allows the creation of one condition for appearing, persisting, and successful local boss. Of the framework, this study will explain how individuals and figures in North Sumatra may appear as local bosses in the strength of the group’s violence. This research will prove the assumption that the phenomenon of the emergence of a local boss in North Sumatra is not associated with a weak State, but related to, in the language of Sidel, operates in the shadow of the regime of the area is characterized by an alliance of party bosses, businessmen, military, and thugs. They have monopolistic control of the strength and resources of economic coercion in certain territories.


Another theory used in this research is patrimonialism that refers to understand about a relationship forms someone considers patron became the leader of a group that is based on the personal relationship. Nathan Quimpo clarifies the term

patrimonialism “as a type of rule in which the ruler does not distinguish between personal and public patrimony and treats matters and resources of state as his personal affair” (Quimpo, 2007). Patron relationship forms the client described by James c. Scott as follows,

“The patron-client relationship – an exchange relationship between roles – may be defined as a special case of dyadic (two person) ties involving a largely instrumental friendship in which an individual of higher socioeconomic status (patron) uses his own influence and resources to provide protection or benefit, or both, for a person of lower status (client) who, for his part, reciprocates by offering general support and assistance, including personal, to the patron”(Scott, 1972).

Scott then explained that the patron-client can be patron-client clusters that a patron with some clients. Patron-client groups can be combined from different-shaped cluster of patron-client led by a patron as patron-client pyramid. Under the patron’s high, there are a number of clients who is patron to a number of small clients. A client of Supreme patron also became a patron for some clients. In the form of a truncated pyramid, there are some small client becomes a patron patrons the highest and has some of its own clients (Hadiz & Robison, 2013).

For the purposes of this study, a new theory about patrimonialism Scott is to be used for viewing the form of patronage networks conducted by the Pemuda Pancasila. The network of patronage in question is a pattern of relations among the Pemuda Pancasila with the hirelings and relations among the Pemuda Pancasila with other groups such as government officials, political parties, members of the legislature, entrepreneurs, and the media to gain access to local resources in North Sumatra.



Source: prepared from a variety of sources, 2012.

Figure 1: The Flow of Thought-Provoking Research

RESEARCH METHOD

This research used the qualitative approach with case studies as a research strategy (Yin, 2009). This approach is directed at setting and the individual holistically or intact. The data obtained which are in the form of written document and the results of in-depth interviews to 47 respondents, observations, and the FGDs will be analyzed using qualitative analysis of typology technique (Lofland & Lofland, 1995). The qualitative approach so that it is more in reference to the approach of semiotics that is making the description or overview of the objects examined, based on the data that appear as is, and describe systematically will facts the situation factually and closely.

This research uses three data collection techniques (Lubis, *et al.*, 2016; Muda and Dharsuky, 2016; Muda *et al.*, 2016 and Dalimunthe, *et al.*, 2016). First, the use of documentation to examine the existing data, either in the form of policy documents, papers, journals, or books of previous research results that are relevant to local political dynamics in North Sumatra and are linked to the activities of the Pemuda Pancasila with governor candidate. Second, in-depth interviews. The data are also described and analyzed through the technique of in-depth interviews with informants from the 47 leaders and cadres of Pemuda Pancasila in both the local and national level as well as individual involved in or related to political activities in North Sumatra.

The interviews are mainly directed to the key informants and the obtained further information from other informant selection through a snowball technique. The key informants in this study are the leaders, cadres and the officials of the Pemuda Pancasila (PP) of North Sumatra Governor candidates of North Sumatra and successful teams. Other key informants are the leaders of political parties in North Sumatra as well as establish a relationship with the figures of the local election.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Pemuda Pancasila's role in contributing to win Gatot Pudjonugroho and T. Erry Nuradiat the time of the election of the Governor of North Sumatra carried out by way of spreading of intimidation of the patron-client using a model pyramid. The relationship between patron and client became the only model that can move the potential mobilization of member organizations to invite voters in each of his realm in order to select Gatot as a candidate for Governor of North Sumatra Province in 2013. To strengthen the network of community groups in North Sumatra gubernatorial candidates won in the Pemuda Pancasila supported, establish relations with bureaucratic officials, entrepreneurs, and local print media in the pattern of mutually beneficial relationships.

The presence of street children and thugs in North Sumatra was recruited by IPKI to become youth wing organization called Pemuda Pancasila. The presence

of the Pemuda Pancasila in 1960 was more readily accepted among the thugs and hopefully will direct them in activities of organizations that planned and programmed. Relying on muscle strength, hardness and ease government-provided facilities to members of the Pemuda Pancasila, some of the thugs found out his true identity as a local influential figures in North Sumatra since the New Order to Post-Reformation.

The expansion of the influence of the Pemuda Pancasila figure it can be seen from their roles when the election of Governor and Vice Governor of North Sumatra Province in 2013. A very open way they present its own authority on the process of the election of the Governor. Gatot Pudjonugroho – T. Erry Nuradi (*Ganteng*) is won by couples who want to Pemuda Pancasila North Sumatra Province among other candidates. Pemuda Pancasila, elders ordered the Chairman of the Pemuda Pancasila North Sumatra Province, Gatot Pudjonugroho support as candidate for North Sumatera Governor. The support was not regardless from economic benefit in North Sumatera.

Intimidation by members of Pemuda Pancasila North Sumatra seen in all stages of the election of Governor of North Sumatra Province. When they provided support to the governor candidate, they committed the intimidation by threatening the head of the Gatot's winning team in order to give some money to the winning activities undertaken by Pemuda Pancasila, so that the support was acquired. During the campaign, another intimidation committed by the members is provide instruction about sanctions, such as dismissal and physical beatings threats for Pemuda Pancasila's cadres who does not support the governor candidate who wants to win.

Externally, Pemuda Pancasila's members oversee the voters to elect Gatot and give physical threats to the ones who did not vote Gatot in their respective communities. During pre-election period, they always distribute packages of food such as rice, oil, and money to the voters who need it, yet the voters are required to choose Gatot Pudjonugroho in the local election. Those who have received the food will receive physical beatings threatened unless they choose Gatot Pudjonugroho. In balloting and counting period, Pemuda Pancasila's members are ordered to guard polling stations (TPS) in their respective areas so that voters choose Gatot. This custody is order and forces the voters to choose Gatot. Apart from serving as supervisor, Pemuda Pancasila's members were also in charge of witnessing at the polling station to maintain and even gain Gatot a vote.

The theory by Budiardjo and Andrain about the use of physical power is relevant to explain the use of power committed by Pemuda Pancasila North Sumatra to support Gatot Pudjonugroho as governor candidates of North Sumatra. The theory put forward by Rauf about coercion in maintaining power is still relevant to explain study findings (Rauf, 2005). Referring to the theory proposed by Antonio Gramsci, what Pemuda Pancasila's leaders have done is the domination or oppression

(Gramsci, 1999). The members of Pemuda Pancasila and other communities in North Sumatra are obedient to the Pemuda Pancasila leaders not because of respect but fear.

The model of mobilization undertaken by Pemuda Pancasila to mobilize the organization's potency to support the governor candidates is divided into two phases. First is the upward mobilization for members of Pemuda Pancasila. Each member of Pemuda Pancasila are obliged to follow the head of organization's order without any reason. Closely similar to military organization, Pemuda Pancasila also use the command system – like the commander's or the chairman's orders. However, the command system will not come off without the costs that must be given to its members. The upward orders to move the mass on the basis of financial count characterize the patron-client relationship between the leaders respected by its members.

Second does Pemuda Pancasila elite perform the mobilization by using patron-client relationship pyramid by Scott and Rauf. In order to move the Pemuda Pancasila members, it is necessary to require elite leaders or the people respected by members in the activities. Each Pemuda Pancasila person has various interests, yet it is not certain that the board and members of the organization can follow their desire. But this figure's interest, which is not considered by the board and members of the organization, will disrupt the management or organizational activities. At least, the figure of Pemuda Pancasila has its own power to move Pemuda Pancasila members.

The relevant model of mobilization to explain these conditions is the theory of James C. Scott and MaswadiRauf, which is a pattern of relations between Pemuda Pancasila leaders with their members in more personal, high royal and unbalanced way. Pemuda Pancasila figures provide a variety of economic resources and protection for their members. They apply new patrimonialism with a pattern of patron-client pyramid.

Other efforts by Pemuda Pancasila are utilize bureaucratic institutions, employers, and local printed media to win the governor candidates. The relations between Pemuda Pancasila leaders and bureaucracy, businessmen, and local printed media had carried out in diverse, interlocking and intrigue ways to maintain access to power and utilize the resources. At one side, Pemuda Pancasila leaders are still willing to access to the resources controlled by local government resources. The decentralization policy that strengthens democracy and stresses the importance of participation, as described by Smith, did not occur in the process of Governor of North Sumatra nomination in 2013. Smith explained that the political equality in the implementation of decentralization is expected to open up opportunities for people to participate in various political activities at the local level. However, this study explains that the implementation of direct local elections only provide opportunities for more autonomous participation at the local actors who become

politicians, bureaucrats, businessmen and managers of printed media in North Sumatra.

The Theory of John T. Sidel's about bossism also mentioned that country is powerful in bossism position. The phenomenon of Bossism emergence is not related to the state's weakness but to the operation of the local regime shadow characterized by communion bureaucrats, party bosses, businessmen, military and civilian. This study describes the country's position is powerful. Pemuda Pancasila's chairman and figures are in need of bureaucratic officials and majors to maintain power relationships with the state officials, and vice versa. Thus, the emergence of the local bosses in North Sumatra is limited by state power at the local level.

On the basis of these findings and theoretical implications, this study propose a new theoretical perspective in local context about violent groups that can take advantage of local political institutions in North Sumatra. A theoretical perspective found is called the theory of "New Patronage Network of Local Bosses". Despite the similar emergence of the phenomenon of violence in several regions in Indonesia, some differences are found from the results of this study. Contributions to Political Science Theory found in this study identify the specific phenomenon about violent groups and local bosses in North Sumatra.

First, the local power is not monopolized by one group or individual violence (so-called as local bosses) in North Sumatra. The emergence of violent groups and local bosses in North Sumatra is scattered into other communities through certain patterns, which may be similar or different. They are relatively powerful in the community by implementing new patrimonialism and the pattern of patron-client pyramid. The title "chairman" is always used by the client to call the boss or patron, known as a figure of violent groups in North Sumatra.

Second, sources of power gained by the chairman of group violence at the local level come from physical strength and wealth. The source physical strength and wealth was used to build a new patronage networks characterized by their mutually coalition between the elites who occupy positions of political party, members of parliament, government officials and local entrepreneurs. The new patronage network has been growing when elites' power constellation and interests have controlled the implementation of regional autonomy.

Third, theory perspective of New Patronage Network of Local Bos's explains that in order to maintain its influence to society, Pemuda Pancasila North Sumatra figures should be closed to the local mass media. The mass media is regarded as one of the civil society to create a positive image of Pemuda Pancasila leaders in the organization's programs. Intimidation such as threats to physical hit by Pemuda Pancasila should be accompanied with acts of charity such as helping the poor in health and education aspects. The charity makes the heads of the violence group "respectable citizens" and known as public figures. The action also should be publicized through the local media.

Fourth, Pemuda Pancasila leaders have the political asset, economic, and increasingly powerful network in the future implementation of local autonomy in North Sumatra. The involvement of Pemuda Pancasila leaders to support one of the candidates for Governor of North Sumatra in direct local elections is a form of autonomous participation owned by the elite people at local level. The situation was ongoing at the time the community is still difficult to understand the importance of political equality in the implementation of decentralization.

DISCUSSION OR RECOMMENDATIONS

The practice of intimidation Pemuda Pancasila members in North Sumatra is seen in all stages of the election of Governor of North Sumatra Province. While providing support to a candidate who is willing to win, intimidation is internally threat the organization's members in such as dismissal and threats of physical beatings for the cadres of Pemuda Pancasila who do not support a candidate who wants to win. Acts of intimidation committed by Pemuda Pancasila in the local election is an order cadre who is legislative members to support GatotPudjonugroho as a candidate of governor. Although numerous members have different legislative candidates, it is not permitted to discuss, engage and influence members of Pemuda Pancasila to choose a candidate beside GatotPudjonugroho. Should the board of know it Pemuda Pancasila North Sumatra will be liable to dismissal as a member and other social sanctions.

Externally, Pemuda Pancasila members oversee the voters to choose Gatot and give physical threats to voters who did not vote Gatot in their respective communities. The model of mobilization undertaken by Pemuda Pancasila to mobilize the organization's potency to support governor candidates has done on the basis of patron-client pyramid, which is Pemuda Pancasila figures who have their own power to move the members.

The relationship model that exists between Pemuda Pancasila and the bureaucracy, businessmen, and local printed media has carried out on the basis of a mutual relationship or symbiotic mutualism. The relationship with the bureaucracy, businessmen, as well as the local media carried out in diverse, interlocking and intrigue ways to maintain power access and utilize the resources. The relation that existed between Pemuda Pancasila and the bureaucracy, businessmen, and local printed media was done on the basis of a mutual relationship. At one side, Pemuda Pancasila wants to retain access to get local government resources. On the other hand, the bureaucratic officials, the businessmen, and the local print media managers need the power of Pemuda Pancasila's to maintain their businesses such as avoiding threats and maintaining security in their businesses locations.

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