

MARITIME SECURITY CHALLENGES FOR SOUTH AFRICA IN THE INDIAN OCEAN REGION (IOR): THE SOUTHERN AND EAST COAST OF AFRICA

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Globally, maritime criminal activities including piracy, terrorism, drugs and arms smuggling, human trafficking, illegal and unregulated fishing (IUU) and environmental threats have impacted the functioning of economies, societies, the environment and the security of maritime regions. These crimes are interconnected and transcend boundaries, generating huge profits. This paper focuses on the maritime security challenges facing the geographical region of the southern and east coast of Africa in the western quadrant of the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) which includes Somalia, Kenya, Tanzania, Mozambique and South Africa. The paper is twofold: firstly, it provides an overview of maritime crime in the area as well as South Africa's regional (SADC, EAC and COMESA) and international (IORA, IBSA and IBSAMAR) involvement within this maritime zone in the past decade and secondly, positions recent studies in the socio-economic dimension of piracy specifically, from the 2006 Somali piracy threats to present. In doing so, new forms of crime and security dilemmas are revealed, making maritime security within the sub-region, an ongoing challenge for all stakeholders concerned.

The Indian Ocean Region (IOR)

The Indian Ocean extends almost 10 000km's between the Cape of Good Hope and Australia and approximately 13 500km's from the Persian Gulf to Antarctica. The vast majority of the world's population, comprising multi-ethnic and multi-religious groups, lives in this region. The Indian Ocean Region (IOR) is home to more than 25% of the world's population and its waterways carry 50% of the world's container ships and 66% of the world's oil shipments (Agnihotri, 2012). From vibrant democracies, fragile states, isolationist regimes, the economically weak nations in coastal Africa to oil rich Arab nations, all co-exist in and around the Indian Ocean.

The African countries bordering the Indian Ocean consider themselves 'gateways' to the African continent and South Africa, Kenya, Tanzania and Mozambique have for centuries had complex and dynamic cultural and economic links with their counterparts along the Indian Ocean Rim (Mothiane, 2013). The Indian Ocean Rim as it is referred to, comprises states in varying degrees of economic and social development, governance and political maturity. This paper focuses mainly on the maritime challenges for South Africa, in relation to the southern and east coast of Africa that faces the western Indian Ocean which includes the littoral states of South Africa, Kenya, Tanzania, Mozambique and Somalia. In this sub-region, with piracy rapidly approaching southern African waters since

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2006 and with 30% of the world's oil being moved through the Mozambique channel, there is an urgency for increased maritime surveillance. At a time when the rise of some of the world's fastest growing economies in sub-Saharan Africa are being heralded, criminal entrepreneurs are undermining growth in the region by financing illicit markets - using commercial jets, fishing vessels and container ships to move drugs, people, small arms, crude oil and other items to meet the global demand for arms, counterfeits, diamonds and precious minerals, wildlife, stolen luxury cars and other illegal goods. Terrorists also engage in criminal activities, principally kidnapping for ransom and other crimes to fund violent campaigns. The UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) estimates that terrorist financing, trafficking in arms, drugs and people and other transnational forms of organized crime generate approximately \$3.34 billion per annum (www.london.usembassy.gov). A brief sketch of the dominant maritime crimes prevalent in the East African sub-region, namely drug trafficking, small arms trafficking and piracy, is presented below.

Drugs and Small Arms (Light Weapons) Trafficking

The notorious drug producing and illicit arms trading areas of the Golden Crescent and the Golden Triangle lie within the propinquity of the IOR. Cocaine, produced in Andean countries (Colombia, Peru and Bolivia) via Africa, accounts for almost 13% of trafficking to Europe or is stockpiled in West African countries for later distribution. Heroin, is produced in Afghanistan for final destinations in Europe, South East Asia, South Asia and Africa, specifically East Africa and southern Africa. Between 2004 and 2011, drug related crimes in South Africa have increased by 100% - drug trafficking benefits from insufficient international cooperation, regulatory inconsistency, political obstacles and lack of governance (SAPS, 2011). In the IOR there are certain countries that are drug producers and those that are primarily weapon repositories, for instance, in South Africa and Mozambique, small arms have worsened crime and armed violence (Biswas, 2013). Together drugs and small arms trafficking in Africa have had a destabilizing impact by undermining democratic institutions as they nurture domestic criminal groups that erode the power of the state. Small arms have fuelled conflict in 22 African countries and in southern Africa local conflicts have surged with the availability of small arms, ineffective policing and civil conflict. The SADC (South African Development Community) has adopted the Protocol on Control of Firearms, Ammunition and other Related Materials in the SADC region. The SADC Protocol focuses mostly on supply-side interventions but also acknowledges the key relationships between limiting the availability of weapons and maintaining stable peace processes and post-conflict situations (Biswas, 2013). The unmanned ports along Africa's coastline (including South Africa) are entry-points for drug and human trafficking, which also pose a serious threat to the countries' economic and social stability.

Terrorism and Piracy

Although maritime terrorism attacks comprise 2% of all international terrorist action, free movement at seas is the next strategic step towards the threat of high profile attacks. Criminality of the maritime sector and vulnerabilities of maritime infrastructure are recognized by terrorists. The United States CTF 151 (Combined Maritime Task Force) has shifted its focus to the Horn of Africa, Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea (member countries which do not include Africa and India –do include Canada, England, Italy, Spain, France, Germany, New Zealand, Denmark, Australia, Singapore and Pakistan). This is presently the only initiative that includes The Horn of Africa in terms of terrorist surveillance. Vines (2012) writes that in Somalia, arguments of no strategic association between pirates and al-Shabaab (a militant affiliate of Islamic extremist group, Al-Qaeda) are becoming difficult to uphold as the two groups converge in the same space, an indication that piracy and terrorist activities are probably mutually reinforcing.

Organized piracy and kidnapping for ransom has become a lucrative trade for which Somali pirates in the region have been largely blamed. The average ransom amount has increased from US \$4 million in 2010 to approximately US\$5 million in 2011 which indicates a profitable business considering 1181 hostages were captured off Somalia by pirates in 2010. The dynamics and economics of piracy will be highlighted later in the paper.

South African Challenges in the Region

While South Africa has taken on a greater leadership role and is making more of a presence by increasing its participation in multilateral organizations within the region, economic disparities and low levels of national investment continue to stifle its patrolling and long term expeditionary capabilities for peacekeeping in Africa. The idea is that South Africa, considered the ‘gateway to Africa’, takes the lead in these peacekeeping operations because it has 4 frigates and 11 warships, until such time as other African navies can build capacity. At a seminar at the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) in April 2014, the Chief of Naval Staff of the South African Navy (SAN) lamented the fact that the commissioning of much needed patrol vessels was halted six years ago and that defense spending has dwindled to 1.1% of the national budget (far lower than other African countries such as Angola with 4.2% of its budget is allocated to defense and Namibia, 3.9%) (*www.issafrica.org*).

On the continent, Wambua (2009) states that efforts towards urgent regional cooperation in the governance of African ocean areas have been compromised by the disharmony in the regimes of African maritime states which focus on maritime boundaries instead of cooperation. While it has been recommended that the African Union (AU) finance regional maritime cooperation such as the expansion of the existing (IMO/MOWCA) initiative (International Maritime Organization / Maritime Organization of West and Central Africa) for an African coastguard service to

cover the entire coast of Africa (to complement national coastguard services) – no visible actions have yet been taken. Lack of cooperation, collaboration and coordination between the African Union states and Regional Economic Communities (RECS) is the greatest challenge. Regional cooperation by African states has also been marred by national policies and legislation which lacks coordination, resulting in conflicting or duplicating of activities. Regional training and research institutions are almost non-existent and requires a coordinating body for the sharing of oceanographic data on marine resources. The state of most African navies is another hindrance due to the following factors: too few vessels, aircraft and communications systems; poorly trained personnel and inadequate legal infrastructure to manage regional maritime governance; lack of financial capacity – for instance, no African states responded to UN Security Council call for navy patrols to combat piracy in the Horn of Africa (Wambua, 2009: 55).

The limited logistical capabilities of the South African Navy in curbing maritime piracy along the east coast further exposes this area to attack as SAN is the only adequately equipped local defense option for regular policing of these waters. In South Africa specifically, the various maritime authorities lack budgets to fight criminal activity and there has been a recommendation sent to the IMO recently by private maritime security companies for naval and government representatives to use private maritime counter-piracy measures, where companies formed by ex - military members, man and protect vessels in high risk areas of vulnerable ports and coastal regions. South Africa's increasing naval presence and intelligence monitoring in this maritime zone was prompted by the incidents of Somali piracy which would have proved detrimental if it moved further southward, jeopardizing the South African coastline. Rear-Admiral Karl Weisener, Director of Maritime Warfare (SAN), proposes that the SADC's maritime strategy would take place in 3 phases:

“The first priority is to control areas where there is an increase in pirate attacks such as the Mozambique channel. . the second priority is to ensure the security of the SADC's west coast. . the third priority is securing southern Africa's vast rivers and lakes. . which are vital to trade and development...if we did not have a presence in the Mozambique channel we would have pirate attacks off Durban, it is that bad. To stop this scourge, we are adopting numerous strategies including 'coastal watchers', where local populations report any suspicious people or incidents. This, along with strong partnerships with our SADC partners...has been remarkably effective”(Pretoria News, March 2013).

Co-operative efforts between national navies, the shipping industry and private security is necessary as few African countries can independently respond effectively to attacks.

Regional and Extra-regional Responses: South Africa, India and the East African Coast

Recent developments in the past decade are overviewed in the section below, indicating an emerging regional response to maritime security with South Africa

at the forefront – these include the multilateral formations of IORA, BRICS and IBSA. IOR–ARC (Indian Ocean Rim - Association for Regional Cooperation), more recently known as IORA (Indian Ocean Rim Association) constitutes 20 members: Australia; Bangladesh; Comores, India, Indonesia, Iran, *Kenya*, Malaysia, *Madagascar*, Mauritius, *Mozambique*, Oman, Seychelles, Singapore, *South Africa*, Sri Lanka, *Tanzania*, Thailand, UAE, Yemen. IORA is the only pan Indian Ocean economic grouping that brings together countries straddling 3 continents, namely, Africa, Asia and Australia (Sakhuja, 2014). The 6 priority areas of IORA are: maritime safety and security; trade and investment facilitation; fisheries management; disaster risk reduction; academic and skills and training cooperation; and tourism promotion and cultural exchanges.

The formation of multilateral forums such as BRICS (Brazil-Russia-India-China and South Africa) and south-south collaborations such as IBSA (India-Brazil-South Africa) and IBSAMAR is particularly significant. BRICS was formed in 2010 as a response to the dominance of global financial governance by western industrial countries. BRICS economies have contributed to a surge in trade among developing countries that is rapidly surpassing the trade growth rate among advanced economies. South Africa's entry into this economic bloc has led to BRICS spread into the African continent. IBSA countries are also members of BRICS but the 2 groups have distinct working agendas. IBSA is considered a strategic alliance for the pursuit of common interests of developing countries in global institutions and a platform for bilateral, trilateral and interregional south-south cooperation (Biswas, 2013). The key collaboration areas are: trade, energy, security (particularly maritime), defense and transport. IBSA is presented in the international media as “one of the most vibrant coalition of developing nations” (Al Jazeera, 22 August 2011). IBSAMAR is the maritime component of IBSA. India-Brazil-South Africa regional maritime exercises exist between the navies of IBSA. Trilateral naval exercises held in 2008, 2010 and 2012 in the IOR are indications of the sharing of best practices in naval operations and has been lauded as one of the most positive indicators of the shift towards more action-oriented south-south relations in maritime governance. The Indian navy is by far the largest of the regional forces in the IOR. The maritime security engagement of South Africa and India specifically, with the East African coastline is elaborated below and highlights the significance and efficacy of multiple regional stakeholders in policing a maritime zone that has increasing geostrategic importance in ‘the new scramble for African resources’ by emerging powers such as India and China.

Mozambique, Tanzania and Kenya

From March 2011 to Feb 2012, 57 pirate attacks in Tanzanian territorial waters were reported (South African Foreign Policy Initiative, 2012) and a 30% drop in the number of ships entering the port of Dar es Salaam was experienced due to

security fears (*Business Day*, February 2012). South Africa's trilateral agreement with Mozambique and Tanzania, signed in 2012 was a timeous response to the incidents. It allows the South African Navy (SAN) to conduct activities in these waters aimed at strengthening the Southern African Development Community (SADC) on the east coast. Antipiracy operation code named Copper (with the SAAF, Special Forces and South African Military Health Services) patrols the Mozambique Channel, however SAN Chief Vice Admiral Mudimu is uncertain of their capacity to include more areas further north (www.safpi.org). The South African frigate SAS Mendi is deployed along the Mozambican channel to combat piracy (Business Report, 2012). The Mozambique channel carries most of South Africa's maritime trade and oil imports, giving it considerable strategic importance. Military helicopters have also been deployed to routinely fly over the region to offer assistance to the anti-piracy efforts. Such efforts have helped to strengthen South Africa-Mozambique relations, as the two countries work together to stem piracy (Mendiolaza & Aitken, 2013). The agreement allows the forces the right to, among other things, patrol, search, arrest, seize and undertake pursuit operations on any maritime crime suspect or pirate. Kornegay (2012) maintains that with the core states of the EAC (East African Community) such as Tanzania emerging as the hub of an expanding eastern and southern African economy, the economic stakes of Indian Ocean maritime security were further heightened. Kenya's establishment of a sub-regional Maritime Rescue Coordination Center in Mombasa, with satellite centers in the Seychelles and Tanzania, provide search and rescue assistance along the coastline of east Africa and has improved security for vessels transiting the waters of the Indian Ocean along the African coast (Wambua, 2009). More recently, a joint international operation of the SADC's regional maritime security strategy has been the launch of Maritime Domain Centers (MDC's). These are linked intelligence-gathering hubs in Kenya, Angola, DRC, Djibouti, Mozambique and Tanzania. They are operated from Silvermine in Cape Town, Bluff in Durban and are linked to a multi-security agency center in Pretoria. The centers will monitor all SADC maritime traffic with the aim of providing actionable information to direct forces to where they are needed to prevent or effect arrests (*Pretoria News*, March 2012).

Herbert-Burns (2012:53) refers to the east African coast as an 'evolving strategic maritime region' (ESMR) comprising the Mozambique Channel, Tanzania, Kenya, Somalia and the Seychelles. He predicts that this ESMR will develop commensurately with the expansion of offshore oil and gas exploration and development along much of the coast line. The development of the major petroleum terminal hub port at Lamu in Kenya and a planned LNG (liquid natural gas) liquefaction and export facility in Mozambique will further raise the geostrategic profile of this region. The expansive development and future plans for the region indicate that this maritime zone will require complex security measures in the

future, which will demand the combined resources and efforts of South Africa and other key players in the IOR, of which the Indian navy is at the forefront.

India, through bilateral and trilateral efforts has strengthened relations among the littoral states of Tanzania, Mozambique and Kenya – all of which are members of the AU (African Union) and other regional groups such as the SADC and COMESA (Common Market of Eastern and Southern Africa). Trade between India and Kenya for instance, touched \$450 million in 2004-5 and Indian exports to Kenya include engineering goods, pharmaceuticals and cotton while imports comprise inorganic chemicals and gemstones. The Indian Oil Corporation (IOC) offered Mozambique support in building a compressed natural gas (CGN) network as well as liquefied natural gas (LNG) business opportunities. India has also cancelled the debts owed by Mozambique and Tanzania (Vines & Oruitemeka, 2008: 8-9). India's trade with Africa amounted to \$68 billion between 2011 to 2012 and the trade target has been set for \$100 billion for 2015. This has been the key impetus behind recent maritime security initiatives to address piracy off Somalia. Going by recent trends, two-thirds of the Indian Ocean is under threat of piracy and all round measures involving national navies, shipping industry and private security measures would increase the surveillance area and increase reaction time in combating piracy and ensuring the safe passage of cargos in these water ways.

Somalia

Civil war, a series of devastating droughts and over a million internally displaced people have created a dire humanitarian crisis in Somalia (Nincic, 2009). Somalia is characterized by ongoing conflict, no legitimate monopoly on the use of force, weak state-society and intra-society relations, a high dependency on external humanitarian assistance and diaspora remittances, and substantial war economies such as piracy and arms trafficking (World Bank Study 2013). Several theories abound on the causes of piracy in Somalia. The dominant one claims that Somali fishermen turned to piracy for survival, with the dwindling of fish stocks due to the dumping of toxic waste and overfishing by foreign industrial trawlers. This occurrence was fortified by the collapse of the state, severe famine and long periods of political unrest. Another school of thought maintains that Somalis were never fishermen but as nomadic pastoralists, turned to piracy as an extension of warlord predation on land. This argument is supported by research indicating that piracy emanates from well-organized areas under warlord or Islamic fundamentalist control (Coelho, 2014). While kidnapping for ransom has been historically associated with the funding of terrorist operations, it has been found that recent kidnapping for ransom is also motivated for the pirate's financial gain. Nincic (2009) elaborates that the lucrative business of maritime piracy offers strong economic incentives for impoverished and destitute people to turn to maritime crime. While much publicity exists on the costs to the shipping industry, it also extracts a deep toll

from the local population itself as food aid is stolen by pirates or left to rot because of delays on hijacked vessels, not reaching the mouths that need it most. More than 2, 6 million people in Somalia were dependent on food aid in 2008 alone (Nincic, 2009:10). Another dimension of the social impact of piracy on local communities is the presence of juvenile pirates or 'child pirates'. Frtiz's (2012: 893) study of effective juvenile justice systems in Somalia and Puntland exposes this conspicuously absent phenomenon in the discourse on piracy. She cites how in March 2011 for instance, an Indian vessel captured 61 pirates, 25 of whom were under the age of 15 and at least 4 of whom were under the age of 11 at the time of apprehension. Children accused of piracy may face prosecution in the courts of any state in the world, as piracy is a crime of universal jurisdiction. Children suspected of piracy are currently facing trial across the globe in places such as Germany, Kenya and the Seychelles. She highlights that the dire conditions of poverty, hierarchical clan identity, scarce opportunities for meaningful employment and a general disinterest from the international and domestic community further compounds the problem and will continue to ensure that young men are ready to replace pirates who are imprisoned.

Recent studies (see Hansen, 2012; Bowden & Basnet, 2011; Schoeman & Haefele, 2013) provide qualitative data on the socio-economic dynamics and implications of piracy and related criminal activity. The act of piracy and the taking of hostages has implications for a host of other criminal activities within its ambit, involving terrorist networks, illicit financial flows, kidnapping and trafficked persons. Fieldwork conducted by researchers in a World Bank study (2013: 45) tracking the illicit financial flows from pirate activities off the Horn of Africa, relate how:

“. . . the alcohol used by pirates came from Ethiopia; the khat (a mild stimulant drug from a shrub native to East Africa and southern Arabia) from Kenya; and sex workers and trafficked girls from Djibouti, Ethiopia and Somaliland”.

Kochan (2013) reports how local people assisting the pirates also benefit from the operations, where cooks, lawyers, banknote checkers and pimps are all in high demand. Some pirates used their substantial pay-offs to diversify their business interests into human trafficking, drugs and the arms trade. Some have taken over transportation networks as well as Somali hotels and restaurants. The piracy groups are also believed to fund the terrorist group al-Shabaab which claimed responsibility for the Nairobi shopping centre siege in October 2013.

The Economics of Piracy

The absence of designated organizational frameworks to interpret and promulgate data related to crimes in international waters (Hulbert, 2011) has highlighted the economics driven approach to piracy. The maritime area impacted by Somali piracy is vast, almost 2. 5 million square miles, including the Arabian Sea, Gulf of Aden,

Gulf of Oman and the southern Red Sea. Herbert-Burns (2012: 24) explains the volatile and costly situation for merchant vessels:

“The operational inability of even a vastly increased naval presence to secure this oceanic-sized space has meant that merchant vessels transiting or operating in the affected areas must implement their own anti-piracy measures, which are characterized by risk-avoidance, anti-boarding and hardening measures as set forth in . . . shipping industry guidelines for merchant vessel crews that give detailed information on the optimum practical and operational measures that should be implemented to deter and prevent attack and boarding by Somali pirates in the high risk areas. Furthermore, the hiring of armed private security teams is now becoming the norm rather than the exception. The serious risk-mitigating measure is being increasingly driven by the realization that naval forces cannot provide sufficient protection and because hull insurance underwriters and Protection and Indemnity clubs are refusing to offer acceptable war risk premiums unless security teams are embarked.”

The World Bank Report (2013) on the economic aspects of piracy offers a ‘business model’ of pirate operations (Do *et al.*, 2013) based on the unique historical development and ever-adapting organizational nature of the networks. The financing and sharing of proceeds relate to 3 dominant configurations, namely: the ‘artisanal’ scheme; the ‘cooperative’ scheme; and the ‘individualistic’ scheme. The artisanal scheme relates to a small, low-level operation generally funded by the pooled resources of family relatives. The cooperative scheme (also referred to as the ‘shareholder’ model) is more widespread and involves 3 to 5 financiers who will invest shares in the operation and who will be rewarded in proportion to their investment. On payment of the ransom, all costs are met before the pirates receive their share (between US\$30 000 and US\$75 000) and financiers receive between 25 and 30% of the total ransom payment to share among themselves. The individualistic scheme refers to financiers who can fund an operation on their own financial capacity. Hence the sole financier controls the operation and claims between 50-70% of the final ransom payment. Pirates interviewed in the study elaborated that businessman working on the coast profited by selling goods to pirates at a far higher cost than was the norm. The consequences however, of the development of ‘pirate-centric societies’ supported by local communities in port cities, includes the formation of militias and rival criminal gangs. Pirate leaders and financiers accrue power and economic resources from ransom money which ultimately undermines the stability of the community and efforts at a legitimate government. Bowden and Basnet’s (2011) study of the economic cost of Somali piracy, indicates the enormity of ransom costs despite the decline in pirate attacks since 2011, due to a rising number of attempted attacks where pirates have secured equal or greater value (for fewer hijacked vessels). They also highlight that hijackings and ransom payments are becoming increasingly longer to negotiate, taking up to at least 6 months for negotiations (and sometimes much longer) including the release of ships. Recently a shifting modus operandi from kidnapping seafaring crew to land based hostages, particularly those

considered wealthy – ‘white people mean money’ (Schoeman & Haefele, 2013) is on the rise.

Other costs include piracy insurance (the high cost of piracy off the Horn of Africa has resulted in insurance firms designating the area a ‘war-risk’ zone and raising rates accordingly, Lorenz *et al.* 2012), security equipment and guards, the cost of re-routing and increased speed, the cost to labour, the cost of prosecution and imprisonment, the cost of military operations, and the cost of counter-piracy organizations. The involvement of insurance companies and professional negotiators with ship owners and pirates obscures the human rights of hostages and their experiences as human shields, of physical injury and psychological trauma. Bowden & Basnet (2011) illustrate how the capture of 2 vessels in 2010, the *Asphalt Venture* and the *Choizil*, confirm the distressing trend in the treatment of hostages. In the former, 2 Indian crewmen died while in captivity and 5 others were not released in retaliation for India’s arrest and detention of some 120 suspected Somali pirates. In the latter, 2 sailors off this South African yacht were taken ashore to Somalia and have not yet been released as they continue being held ransom by pirates.

What is not deemed a high profile case in the eyes of the maritime sector, media and governments is given little attention and governments have only shown involvement in instances where large vessel hijackings may impact the country’s economy. The authors substantiate that in addition to the ‘direct costs’ of Somali piracy on industry, government and civil society stakeholders, piracy also severely impacts regional countries as it disrupts trade patterns, regional security and stability, and demand for leisure activities like tourism. For instance, the effects on Kenya’s maritime trade and tourism industry in the study, are estimated between \$129 and \$795 million lost in Kenya’s tourism revenue with 3-20% of tourism jobs being lost. Schumacher (2013) affirms that piracy also indirectly affects consumers by increasing the costs of regional trade, forcing an inflation of food prices and reducing the revenue of both foreign and domestic economy.

India has played a pro-active and meaningful role in the evolving counter-piracy framework at international level and proposed a ‘five-step anti-piracy action plan’ to the UN Security council (UNSC) in 2011. This involved several recommendations including: tracking the trail of ransom money to different parts of the world; prosecution of the beneficiaries of ransom money for abetting piracy; sanitization of the Somali coastline through identified corridors and the enactment of national laws to criminalize piracy. In lieu of these suggestions, the UNSC passed Resolution 1976 (2011) on Somali piracy for the urgent setting up of specialized courts to prosecute Somali pirates. India supports the expanding jurisdiction of the ICC (International Criminal Court) with UN participation to prosecute captured pirates (Agnihotri, 2012:25). The Indian Navy has a track record in robust policing actions in the IOR, notably the sinking of a hijacked Thai trawler

in 2008 and the recent capture of a Somali pirate ship off south-western India early in 2013 (Large, 2013: 35). Increasingly, the Indian Navy plays an important role in ensuring the safety of sea-lanes especially because the naval resources of the US and EU are being stretched across other operations and media reports indicate a reluctance to deploy task forces in the IOR. Piracy and vessel hijacking continue to present the most serious security challenge for upstream and offshore operations in the Somali Basin, the Mozambique Channel and in eastern Africa. The chronic insecurity situation in Somalia and continued vessel hijackings throughout the Somali Basin are preventing seismic surveying and exploratory drilling (Herbert-Burns, 2012: 33) where abundant natural gas deposits and promising signs of oil have been sited. Kornegay (2012) emphasizes that taking charge of the Somali piracy challenge as it increasingly migrated southward has become an economic as well as a maritime security imperative, for the core community states of the EAC (East African Community) appear to be fast emerging as the hub of an expanding eastern and southern African economy.

The changing geographical spread of piracy attacks also alters the countries, industries and trade routes impacted by piracy. In 2011, the Gulf countries, Pakistan and India were significantly impacted, indicating an escalation of piracy incidents on the oil-supplying nations of the IOR. While pirate attacks along the east African coast have waned in 2012-2013, the dynamics of the 'pirate industry' and the repercussions of this phenomenon as it shifts to other geographical areas of the world remains a security challenge, as it presents itself in ever-evolving guises. An attack as recent as 17 January 2014, by Somali pirates south of Salalah (a port in Oman, West Central Asia situated at the major East-West shipping lanes at the heart of the Indian Ocean rim) is a clear indication that Somali pirates continue to have the knowledge, determination and logistic capability to wage attacks against vulnerable ships (www.insurancejournal.com/news).

Conclusion

Maritime piracy is recognized as a security threat prevalent in the waters off the Horn of Africa, in West Africa (near Nigeria), the waters off India, the South China Sea and the Straits of Malacca and the Caribbean. It features significantly in maritime security objectives because of the inter-linkages and inter-relatedness of piracy hotspots with drug trafficking routes, terrorist havens and drug production areas in the IOR. International challenges include combining and synergizing the capacities of all stake holders concerned and national, regional, continental and international organizations need to establish or improve existing mechanisms for maritime governance. Maritime task forces and initiatives can only achieve temporary results. Coelho (2014: 130) succinctly states that maritime insecurity is always created ashore and that a holistic approach to maritime security must include the economy and society of coastal communities. The threats to southern Africa,

Somalia and the Gulf of Guinea are revealing of the conditions that foster 'local piracies' from which we can understand and develop the necessary mechanisms to inhibit these conditions and counter the threat.

It seems inevitable that deeper engagement between India and African countries is necessary to assist African countries strengthen their governance frameworks as maritime partnerships require the support of strong legislation (both domestic and internal). It is also incumbent upon India to revitalize the disparate nature of membership and lacking vision of the relatively inactive IORA (countries are diverse in size, areas and economic strength), particularly the existent 6 dialogue partners and the 2 observers IORG (Indian Ocean Research Group) and IOTO (Indian Ocean Tourism Organization), if it is to benefit the member states which include the east and southern African littoral region. The support of initiatives such as IBSAMAR are noteworthy and would benefit the fragmented policing of the African coastline of the IOR, if continued into the future. The need for IBSA to move beyond its high profile south-south diplomacy and include more action oriented efforts in the IOR is necessary at this crucial stage of India-Africa relations. India's maritime industry provides an excellent role model for the African continent and the IOR. While South Africa's efforts at providing an African model to solve African maritime challenges is still in its infancy stage, India is the most obvious net provider of security and stability in the Indian Ocean region and beyond. Michel and Sticklor (2012: 19) aptly state that in combatting piracy demands, policymakers should turn their attention to naval power capacities, private shipping practises and interests, international legal regimes, coastal state development strategies and governance capacities in the IOR. The region's strategic energy and natural resources, the growing importance of its ports and shipping lanes, the rise of China and India as significant regional and global players, the deep and broad engagement of the US and other western powers in the region and the mounting risks to coastal economies and communities across the Indian Ocean will continue to play a key role in global politics in the future.

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