

ANALYSIS OF 2016 KOREAN CANDLE LIGHT PROTEST PARTICIPATION MOTIVES: IDENTITY, ANGER, AND EFFICIENCY

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This research is meaningful as the data were gained directly from the protest participants. Most respondents saw the protests as a public opportunity to highlight the president's corruption and demand her resignation or impeachment. In Korea, citizens are free to express their discontent over political corruption and incompetence and can bring down administrations through active participation.

Keywords: candlelight protest; citizen rallies; participation motives; Korean politics

I. FOREWORD

The first candlelight protest in October 2016 in Korea demanding the president's resignation saw a gathering of 50,000 people. In just three weeks, the protest expanded into a national movement, with over 1,000,000 citizens taking part. As the extent of the president's influence peddling became public through the media, citizens voluntarily participated in peaceful candlelight protests. Twenty-three protests were arranged over five months, with the total participants amounting to a staggering 17,000,000. These protests, which were held every weekend all over the nation, culminated in the National Assembly passing a bill to impeach the president on December 9, 2016. On March 10, 2017, the Constitutional Court came to a unanimous decision to "dismiss President Park Geun-hye from her position," and President Park was ultimately removed from office.

To study the candlelight protests that brought about the president's impeachment and an early presidential election, an analysis of the participants is needed. For this, it is necessary to determine who participated and for what reasons. However, there were disparities in the protesters' motivations and variations in the strength of their will to participate. To be more specific, it is necessary to analyze why there was a difference in the number of protests each participant attended. The data for this study was provided by a panel survey that repeatedly collected answers from the same pool of respondents. Respondents confirmed whether they attended a protest in the first round of surveys; then, after some time, the second round of surveys checked whether they attended again. For this study, we conducted the first survey on citizens who took part in the fifth candlelight protest, which took place on November 26. After receiving their email addresses, we conducted the second survey on December 16 via the internet to verify participation in the two candlelight protests that had taken place in between the two surveys.

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Not everyone who agreed with the purpose of the protests attended, and not all citizens who participated in one protest attended any other following protests. The main objectives of this study was to identify the factors that incentivized the citizens to continue participating and measure the relative influence of those factors on continued participation. We also examined how the events that occurred in between the first and second surveys affected participants' attitudes. It is surmised that the National Assembly's impeachment bill and the President's third address to the nation, as external factors that occurred between the two surveys, affected how the protesters viewed the ongoing situation. In particular, after her second address on November 4, President Park announced on November 29 that she was going to leave it to the National Assembly to determine her course of action, including a shortening of her term; however, public polls on her impeachment remained much the same. According to the protest organizers, the highest number of citizens participated in the protests during this period, with approximately 1,900,000 citizens at the fifth candlelight protest, 2,300,000 at the sixth, and 1,000,000 at the seventh. The public had overwhelmingly responded to the slogan "Remove the President" that first appeared during the fourth protest.

II. PREVIOUS STUDIES

A. Citizen Protests and Organization

The main reason for studying citizen rallies is to identify the conditions that result in citizen protests. Theories on social movements operate under the assumption that there must be social discontent; however, while this is a necessary condition, it is not, by itself, sufficient. The resource mobilization theory states that social movements basically originate from social discontent; however, they only culminate into collective action movements when the right conditions are met in terms of resources, organizations, and changes in opportunity (McCarthy and Zald, 1977). The political opportunity structure theory emphasizes that social movements can only succeed when the three factors of insurgent consciousness, organizational strength, and political opportunity are satisfied (Meyer, 2004). As such, in order for a protest to succeed, a collective belief must be formed and the discontent must manifest through collective action. It is necessary to mobilize potential supporters who see the need for collective action, and to facilitate this, a convincing framework for collective action must be established. Therefore, a protest requires an organization to mobilize the citizens.

Other than studies on how protests occur, another major direction has been analyses of the participants who attend the protests. Specifically, when voluntarily held protests by unorganized citizens became more frequent in the early 21st century, significantly more participant research began to be conducted. Almond

and Verba, whose backgrounds are in cultural theory, are considered the pioneers of systematic analysis on which citizens participate in protest rallies (Almond and Verba, 1960: 136-207). They explained that an individual's participation in collective action was based on the rational choice theory. Olson's classic theory (Olson, 1965) was modified to include soft incentives such as misperceptions and norm observance to explain citizens' participation in collective action (Opp, 2001; Ostrom, 1998). Protest rallies are a definite type of collective action. People participate in protests to acquire public goods, and although the individual's contribution in acquiring this public good is minimal, the reason they participate is not based on rational choice as argued by Olson but because of anger (Green and Shapiro, 1994; Monroe, 1991; Udehn, 1996).

While the United States has seen a decrease in voter turnouts and election participation, participation in protests and rallies has generally risen (Dalton, 2002; Putnam, 2000; Verba *et al.*, 1995), with widespread protest rallies now accepted as a regular part of the political process. Europe also recognizes protests related to social movements as part of the system (Meyer and Tarrow, 1998; Tarrow, 1998). The revitalization of protest participation has again raised the question as to which citizens are participating under what conditions. An empirical study discovered three factors that influenced an individual's willingness to participate in protests: biological availability, which refers to the costs and risks an individual must bear to participate; political engagement, which refers to an interest and expertise in politics; and structural availability, which refers to the networks established with other people (Schussman and Sarah, 2005).

All the studies studied above emphasized that the role played by the individual's organization was significant. However, upon analyzing recent protests, it became clear that many citizens did not belong to any rally-related organizations and were attending voluntarily (Norris, 2005); several rallies have occurred without the mobilizing control of any organization. In order for organizations to mobilize gatherers, the foundation of everyday organizations must be active. Leaders must contact citizens through existing organizations to create new organizations for rallies. However, in modern society, it is difficult to find many organizations to which citizens feel a strong sense of belonging. People who are not in organizations related to the rallies must rely on mass media and social media; further, a widespread, deep sense of anger is also necessary to motivate their participation (Walgrave and Manssens, 2000).

B. Citizen Rallies and Motives for Participation

Identity is necessary to attend protests for individuals who do not belong to any rally-related organization. If a person has a politicized collective identity, there is

a higher chance of participation (Kelly and Breinlinger, 1996; Klandermans, 2014); however, the density or intensity of this identity is also important. If protesters were divided into those with a single identity, such as woman, student, immigrant, or farmer, and those with a plural identity, such as peace, environment, and global justice, then, because the latter is not arguing for the benefit of one particular group, the protesters could be seen to be relatively different from one another; therefore, individual people who do not belong to a particular organization become the majority of the participants (Klandermans et. al., 2014: 704-705). Participation is also impacted by motive, and with anger as the foundation, this can be divided into instrumental motives and ideological motives. If a person thinks that their benefits are being violated, instrumental motives are activated; and if their principles are being violated, ideological motives are activated. Anger, in particular, amplifies action at protest rallies; the more intense the anger, the more likely that a person's motives can lead to action (Stekelenburg and Klandermans, 2007).

There have been diverse frameworks of analysis for participation motives. Comparative analyses present a 2x2 table of motives that are the following: instrumental motive and expressive motive according to momentum; and individual motive and collective motive according to purposive (Walgrave et. al., 2010). Stekelenburg's analysis framework for protest participation motives was selected for this case study. Stekelenburg's study identified instrumental and identity motives, collective anger, and ideology as important motivating factors for protest rally participation. Participants with instrumental motives were found to view protests as opportunities to change an unsatisfactory condition by paying a bearable price, and participants with identity motives were found to decide on attending a rally because of identification with other protesters.. Therefore, aside from an instrumental motive, which is when participants attend protests to achieve a certain objective, with all the other three motives, protest participation is itself the goal.

C. Reactionary Protest

The candlelight protests that began in 2016 had a very different cause from most resistance protests studied by most social movement theorists; most resistance protests have usually been triggered by continuous and solidified conditions. Therefore, there is a limit to explaining not only the participants but also the nature and requests of these protests using existing theories. In this sense, there is a need to distinguish protests caused by solidified discontent and protests caused by unexpected events. Jennings referred to unexpected events as events where the citizens suffer "pain and loss" (Jennings, 1999). A common example is vigils for victims of drunk driving accidents and the holding of rallies to protest such behavior. Similar concepts such as the new emotional movement (Walgrave and Verhulst,

2006) and the valence movement (Walgrave *et al.*, 2010) have risen to describe these distinctive characteristics.

While existing models of citizen participation are based on the rational choice theory, many reactionary protests caused by unexpected events carry an emotional quality and, therefore, cannot be fully explained using the rational choice theory. Common qualities were found in case studies on reactionary protests in the U.S., the U.K., Belgium, and the Netherlands (Walgrave and Verhulst, 2006). First, emotion and sacrifice were found to be important factors in initiating rallies and attracting participants. Second, rallies were widely supported by elites. Third, the organizations that led the protests were weak. Fourth and last, the media's focused support played an integral role in maintaining and developing the protests. Emotional protests with the above qualities can develop in two different ways. The first type is when the victim or relatives of the victim initially lead the rallies and then gradually hand over leadership to amateur organizers. The emotions in these protests seek to ensure that such individual tragedies do not occur again in the future. Protests that have instrumental objectives are fairly comprehensive but ultimately end up relying on politically motivated elites. The second type is when the victims themselves are the leaders, are able to maintain the movement or the rallies without having any particular political objective, and are able to maintain widespread support without becoming involved in party lines. What these two models have in common is the weakness of the organization; since the protest leaders have had little prior experience, the organization and management rely heavily on the support of popular media.

D. Analysis Model

There is a widespread consensus that citizens attend protest rallies to express anger because of deprivation, despair, or injustice (Gurr, 1970; Lind and Tyler, 1988). However, as not all citizens who feel angry attend, it is necessary to study the factors that motivate citizens to put their anger into action by attending a protest. Previous studies have identified the three factors of efficacy, resources, and opportunity as direct influences on people's participation in protest rallies (Klandermans, 1997; McAdam, 1982; McCarthy and Zald, 1977). Conflicts among groups can be divided into conflicts that stem from differences in principle and those that stem from material interests. Therefore, protests can either be requesting change according to the instrumental route or merely have the objective of expressing anger. While participation motivated by conflicts of interests is an instrumental means of requesting change, participants who attend due to conflicts stemming from different principles largely tend to attend to express their opinion or anger. This is because anger resulting from violated principles becomes moral anger since a significant community value is being ignored.

Efficacy in protest participation refers to the expectation that the current situation may change by attending these protest rallies. Therefore, citizens with a high sense of efficacy who believe their discontent can be resolved by attending the protest will be more likely to attend. Just as important as the instrumental objective of resolving discontent through collective action is identity. People who possess a strong collective identity will be more likely to attend rallies for the benefit of their group; this collective identity also strengthens efficacy (Simon et. al., 1998). As identification with others strengthens emotional solidarity, individuals are motivated and almost feel it their duty to attend the protest to support the group they belong to.




Figure 2.1: Dual Pathway Model

(Source: Stekelemburg and Klandermans, 2010: 8)

With the above theories as the foundation, it is possible to establish a new version of protest participation empirical model. The first is an instrumental objective in which participants attempt to reach their goal by attending the protests; on this route, participants make the decision to attend after calculating the costs and benefits (Klandermans, 1997). In contrast, a second pathway exists in which identity affects participation (Kelly and Breinlinger, 1996). These two models are not mutually exclusive and can be understood as efficacy and emotional pathways (Stürmer and Simon, 2009; Van Zomeren et. al., 2004). This dual pathway model includes both an expressive motive and an instrumental motive (Stekelenburg and Klandermans, 2010). While a participation model with an instrumental motive aims to solve social and political problems, ideological expressive motives aim to maintain moral integrity by expressing anger. As shown in Figure 1, a participation motive model is established in which both emotion and rational factors lead to protest participation along both instrumental and expressive pathways.

III. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

This study analyzed the candlelight protests of 2016 in Korea in which citizens voluntarily participated. A survey was conducted over two sessions. The first participant survey was conducted on November 26, 2016 near Ganghwamun where the protest was taking place; here, 2,064 responses were collected. The respondents were requested to provide their email addresses and phone numbers. The second survey targeted the 914 respondents who agreed to provide these. The second survey was conducted online from December 15 to 19. Excluding duplicate responses, a total of 530 people responded, which was a response rate of 55.8%.

A. Variables and Model Parameters

As mentioned above, this study proposes a modification to existing models presented in Western studies to correspond with the attendance factors at the Korean candlelight protests. The variables used in this study were as follows. To measure the participation intensity dependent variable, participants were asked how many protests they had attended before the fifth rally, which was where the first survey was conducted. The parameter values ranged from 1 to 5. The number of attended protests in the second survey was the number of protests attended between the fifth protest and the seventh protest. Participants who had not attended any protests since the fifth were given 0 points, those who attended just one were given 1, and those who attended both protests were given 2.

The independent variable, the degree of anger over the situation, was measured using the question "If you could rate the anger you felt towards this Park Geun Hye- Choi Sun Sil Gate and the government, what score would you give?" in the first survey; in the second survey, the degree of anger was measured using the question "After the National Assembly passed the impeachment bill, how much did your anger change?." The following three responses were provided: 1) my anger diminished, 2) my anger was similar to what I felt before the impeachment bill, and 3) my anger grew. The ideology variable that demonstrated collective identity was only examined in the first survey. Because there were only 20 days between the first and second surveys, there was no reason to assume that there had been a change in ideological beliefs in such a short period of time. Therefore, the ideology scores from the first survey were used when analyzing the responses from the second survey. The values were 1 for very liberal, 3 for moderate, and 5 for very conservative; so, the parameter ranged from 1 to 5.

Efficacy, which was a significant variable in this study model, was measured through the expected influence of the candlelight protests. Questions concerning this variable were included in both surveys; "How much do you believe the people's request expressed through the candlelight protest will influence the president's

position?” was asked with responses measured on a scale of four from “very significant” to “no influence.” Legitimacy was measured by asking participants whether they would continue to attend if the candlelight protests became violent; “If the candlelight protests clashed with the police, what attitude would you adopt?” was asked with the following responses measured on a scale of three: “I will support the candlelight protests,” “I will decide depending on the situation,” and “I will not attend.” This survey measured the legitimacy participants were granting to the protests to express their opinions.

In between the first and second surveys, a significant event occurred concerning the President’s impeachment: the President’s third address to the nation on November 29. In the address, she basically told the country that she would leave it to the National Assembly to determine the course of action, such as shortening her term. The people’s response to this address was very negative. Another political incident was when the National Assembly passed the impeachment bill on December 9. After this decision, only a legal procedure was required where the Constitutional Court either accepted or dismissed the bill to confirm impeachment. The sixth protest took place on December 3 and the seventh on December 10. Therefore, respondents who had had an instrumental motive to remove the president had a motive to attend not only the fifth but also the sixth protest. Because the seventh protest was a celebration of the passing of the impeachment bill, which had occurred the previous day, participants with an instrumental motive had sufficient reason to attend.

Figure 3.1 is the empirical model used to measure the intensity of the participants’ motives. Data used for this study were obtained from the protest participants as mentioned above.




Figure 3.1: Intensity Model for Participants’ Motives

This model uses variables similar to the model in Figure 2.1; however, while the collective political ideological identity is still considered an exogenous variable, there is a difference in the relationship between the variables. Both models also assume that collective identity influences how people express their opinions on certain matters; however, unlike Figure 2.1, Figure 3.1 does not assume that collective identity influences efficacy. Further, while Figure 2.1 assumes that collective identity does not directly influence collective anger, Figure 3.1 assumes that there is a direct influence. As such, the relationships between the variables differ in the two models as Figure 2.1 has an objective motive that includes conflicts between groups, while Figure 3.1 includes both the participation motives of achieving goals and expressing anger.

The four independent variables in Figure 3.1 are assumed to directly influence participation intensity. The more liberal the political belief, the more influential the candlelight protest was believed to be on the president’s position, and the more intense the anger was toward the influence peddling. Also, the more the value put on the protests, the higher the motive to attend the candlelight protests. As the relationships between the independent variables indicated that a respondent’s political beliefs affected their degree of anger, it was assumed that the more liberal a respondent’s political belief, the more intense their anger.¹ Although political beliefs were not assumed to directly affect the efficacy of candlelight protests, they were understood to have an indirect influence over the general motive degree through the anger and opinion expression variables. For the anger variable, it was assumed that the angrier a participant was toward the corruption scandal leading to impeachment, the more the value put on the protests, and the more the expectations generated that the candlelight protests would make significant contributions to the president’s resignation or impeachment. Lastly, the legitimacy variable was assumed to be related to the value put on the protests; in other words, the more valuable the protests were considered to be (continued support for the protest even when it turned violent), the higher the level of efficacy to be expected from the candlelight protests.

TABLE 1: CHANGE IN ANGER LEVELS AFTER THE PASSING OF THE IMPEACHMENT BILL AND DEMANDS ON THE PRESIDENT (%)

	<i>Change in Anger Levels</i>			<i>Demand on President</i>		
	<i>Decreased Anger</i>	<i>Similar to before Impeachment Bill</i>	<i>Increased Anger</i>	<i>Immediate Resignation</i>	<i>Wait for the Constitutional Court’s Ruling</i>	<i>Respondents</i>
Immediateresignation	22.6	67.4	10	90.8	9.2	380
Impeachment	23.7	70.5	5.8	84.5	16.5	139
Backseat	80	20	-	60	40	10

B. Participants' Change in Perception

Although the period between the two surveys was less than three weeks, new information was released that could have changed the public's perception, such as new press coverage regarding the influence peddling, the President's third address to the nation, and the National Assembly's impeachment bill. As Table 1 illustrates, most participants experienced no shifts in anger levels after the National Assembly passed the impeachment bill. Respondents who had demanded the President's immediate resignation and those who had demanded impeachment experienced a 22.6% and a 23.7% decrease in anger levels, respectively. There was only a 3% difference in the percentages of the two groups that responded that their anger levels were similar before and after the impeachment bill. The reason why the public's anger did not subside after the National Assembly's impeachment bill seems to be the President's refusal to the people's requests. The public's increasing demands on the President after the impeachment bill were clearly demonstrated with cross-sectional analysis regarding to the President's course of action. As the right-hand section of Table 1 illustrates, more than 90% of the respondents who had demanded the President's immediate resignation in the first survey gave the same response in the second survey. What is interesting is the change in attitude of those respondents who had demanded impeachment. We surmised that the respondents who had demanded impeachment would claim that they should wait for the Constitutional Court's ruling on the impeachment bill. However, nearly 85% of respondents who had demanded impeachment in the first survey wanted the president's immediate resignation in the second survey. Although the overall number was less, more than half the moderate respondents who had said that the President should take a back seat and give her authorities to the prime minister in the first survey demanded her immediate resignation in the second survey. Such changes in attitude demonstrated that the President did not properly acknowledge and respond to the situation during the period between the two surveys. As such, the demands toward the President gradually converged and the protests became more generalized, resulting in protests with consistently more than 1,000,000 participants. It was assumed that if there was a significant change in the demands to the President, the efficacy people expected from the protests in influencing the President's course of action must also change. Although more than 1,000,000 citizens participated in the protests every week to express their demands, the fact that the President barely responded must have led to people's disappointment in the influence these candlelight protests were having. Because there is a limit to how much citizens can directly participate in politics in a representative democracy, the people continuously organized peaceful protests to pressure the President; however, the President did not respond, which angered the people even more.

Table 2 below shows the results that support this claim. The table above shows that there were 203 respondents who said that the candlelight protests would have a “very significant” influence on the President in the first survey; however, in the second survey, there were only 163 who believed this. The response “somewhat significant” changed slightly from 262 to 268; however, 11.9% of the respondents who had expected a very significant influence changed to the negative answers of “not really significant” or “not significant at all,” and 17.1% of respondents who had replied “somewhat significant” in the first survey lost most of their expectations, which was confirmed in the second survey. Overall, as most of the expectations diminished, most respondents replied that they expected the protests to have little influence.

TABLE 2: CANDLELIGHT PROTESTS’ INFLUENCE ON THE PRESIDENT’S COURSE OF ACTION (%)

<i>Ist</i>	<i>2nd</i>	<i>Very Significant</i>	<i>Somewhat Significant</i>	<i>Not Really Significant</i>	<i>Not Significant At All</i>	<i>Participants</i>
Very Significant		44.3	43.8	8.9	3	203 (38.4)
Somewhat Significant		22.9	59.9	15.6	1.5	262 (49.6)
Not Really Significant		19	36.2	39.7	5.2	58 (11.0)
Not Significant At All		40	20	20	20	59 (0.9)
Total		163(30.9)	268(50.8)	83(15.7)	14(2.7)	528

Therefore, as the citizens’ anger increased but their expectations regarding the protests’ influence diminished, it is necessary to examine how this changed the motivation to participate. Table 3 below shows that 37.4% of respondents who had had a strong will to participate in the first survey were less motivated by the time of the second survey. Conversely, 32.4% changed from having little motivation to having greater motivation. The number of respondents who had strong motivations decreased from 302 to 261, and the number of respondents with weak participation increased.

TABLE 3: INTENTIONS REGARDING ATTENDING FUTURE CANDLELIGHT PROTESTS (%)

<i>Ist</i>	<i>2nd</i>	<i>Definitely Attend</i>	<i>Attend if Conditions Allow</i>	<i>Participants</i>
Definitely Attend		62.3	37.4	302(57.3)
Attend If Conditions Allow		32.4	67.1	225(42.7)
Total		261(49.5)	264(50.1)	527

^aNote: The number of those who responded “cannot attend future protests” was too small and was excluded.

The responses to the survey question that identified people’s anger about the influence peddling and the President’s course of action are shown in Table 4,

which shows the responses to whether the respondents agreed or disagreed with pardoning the President. In both surveys, the majority felt that the President should face judicial action even if she voluntarily resigned. However, a small minority of 6.8% who had disagreed with judicial action in the first survey mostly replied that they disagreed with pardoning her in the second. As a result, while 36 respondents disagreed with judicial action in the first survey, only 7 disagreed in the second; in other words, 33 respondents changed their answers, with only 4 people changing from agreeing with judicial action to disagreeing. The results of the second survey illustrated that people's attitudes toward the President's course of action had grown more resolute since the first survey.

TABLE 4: ATTITUDE ON PARDONING JUDICIAL ACTION FOR PRESIDENT (%)

<i>1st</i>	<i>2nd</i>	<i>Agree</i>	<i>Disagree</i>	<i>Participants</i>
Agree		8.3	91.7	36 (6.8)
Disagree		0.8	99.2	494 (93.2)
Total		7 (1.3)	523 (98.7)	530

^aQuestion: There are opinions that claim "there is no need to have the President face judicial action if she voluntarily resigns." What do you think about this opinion?

To those who attended the candlelight protests, the protests were an arena where they could express their anger and communicate with others who were attending. Therefore, it can be seen that the protests did not simply stop at the political objective of removing the president or pressuring the National Assembly and the Constitutional Court. Even though the President did not respond to the protests' requests, people did not give up attending the rallies. Table 5 illustrates what values people attributed to the candlelight protests as they continued to attend. The number in each cell of the table is the ratio of frequencies of each cell to the total number of respondents. For example, 48.5% of total respondents said in both surveys that they would continue to attend and support the candlelight protests even if they became violent. An interesting finding was that 13.1% (12.3% + 0.8%) of respondents changed their responses from saying they would continue to attend even if it became violent in the first survey to becoming more passive in the second survey. In contrast, 21.8% (21% + 0.8%) of respondents changed their answers from a passive attitude in the first survey to a more aggressive attitude in the second. Compared with the first survey, people had become more loyal to the candlelight protests by the second survey.

C. Path Analysis

From the bivariate analysis above, we examined the internal changes demonstrated in the survey results. As surveys allow for the conduct of two (or more) surveys on

TABLE 5: IF CANDLELIGHT PROTESTS BECOME VIOLENT

<i>1st</i>	<i>2nd</i>	<i>Continue Support</i>	<i>Decide Depending on Situation</i>	<i>Oppose</i>	<i>Total</i>
Continue to Attend		48.5	12.3	0.8	325 (61.6)
Attend Depending on Situation		21	13.3	1.5	189 (35.8)
Will Not Attend		0.8	1.5	0.4	14 (2.7)
Total		371(70.3)	143(27.1)	14(2.7)	100

^a Question: "If the candlelight protests clashed with the police, what attitude would you adopt?"

the same pool of respondents, it is possible to empirically analyze the content and direction of any changes. However, because bivariate analyses cannot control how the variables affect the relationship between variables, there is the risk of being unable to identify any false relationships. Therefore, multivariate analyses are recommended to more exactly measure the independent variables' influences on the dependent variables. The most widespread multivariate analysis method for measuring causality is linear regression analysis (OLS). However, to be able to fully trust the results, the independence of each independent variable must be proven.

However, as illustrated in the theoretical discussion and in Western case studies, the intensity of a person's motive to participate shows that there is a significant level of causality between the independent variables. As such, this could not only directly influence participation intensity but also have a significant indirect influence on this dependent variable. Therefore, to measure the total level of influence the independent variables have on the dependent variables, both indirect and direct influences must be measured and combined. Based on this rationale, this study used path analysis to measure the total influence of each factor on participation intensity. Further, by analyzing only the 530 respondents who replied to both the first and second surveys, it was possible to compare the results of the two surveys. Such a research strategy follows the logic that any changes of attitude in the same individual occurred because of exogenous conditions that had occurred during the research period.

Figure 3.2 shows a model for the factors that influenced participation intensity; these were efficacy, collective identity, anger, and legitimacy. The model based on responses from the first survey confirmed that all variables aside from political beliefs, which include efficacy, anger, and legitimacy, had a direct influence at a statistically significant level. The coefficient values provided in Figure 3.2 are all standardized coefficient values. In terms of influence levels, the legitimacy variable was found to have the most significant influence; in other words, the more loyal a participant was to the protests and the more influence a participant thought the protests might have, the higher the participation intensity. Participants with higher levels of anger had more motives to attend the protests. The results confirmed that




Figure 3.2: First Survey Path Analysis

^a Fitness of Model: rho1, 0.909; rho2, 1.134; RMSEA, 0.00/chi-square, .458; df = 1; p = .499

political beliefs did not have any significant influence over participation intensity, which was contrary to the general belief that most participants are liberal as liberals have a higher participation intensity. This was also contrary to the claims that the candlelight protests were an attack by liberals against a conservative administration. The fact that participation intensity is not different significantly according to political beliefs illustrates that the protests were not political competition among political groups.

For the causality between independent variables, it was assumed that although collective identity does not directly influence participation intensity, it has an indirect influence mediated by the legitimacy. Anger was also assumed to have an indirect influence through protest legitimacy. Table 6 illustrates the total effect each independent variable had, including both the direct and indirect influences. The values in the very bottom row show that protest legitimacy had the largest influence on participation intensity, followed by efficacy, anger, and political beliefs. The direction of influence each variable had was in agreement with the expected theoretical directions.

There are two significant aspects in this analysis. The first is that political belief was not found to have any direct statistically significant influence on participation intensity. As mentioned above, this demonstrated that the candlelight protests were not a political attack by liberal groups against the conservative

administration. The second is that while people attended the protests to relay the message that the president should voluntarily resign, what was more important was that it became a space and an opportunity for angry citizens to collectively express their anger.

TABLE 6: TOTAL INFLUENCE OVER INTENSITY OF PARTICIPATION (1ST)

	<i>Collective Identity</i>	<i>Anger</i>	<i>Legitimacy</i>	<i>Efficacy</i>
Anger	-0.06	0.00	0.00	0.00
Legitimacy	-0.19	0.07	0.00	0.00
Efficacy	-0.02	0.12	0.06	0.00
Intensity of participation	-0.10	0.11	0.21	0.12

Figure 3.3 is an application of the same model as Figure 3.2 for the second survey. Anger was found to be the only variable that directly influenced participation intensity. While efficacy and legitimacy were significant variables in the first model, by the second survey, they were no longer significant. This indicated that while the increasing anger people felt over the situation increased participation intensity, the expectations that the protests would pressure the President into resigning had reduced significantly. Therefore, it could be speculated that the meaning of the candlelight protests after the fifth protest lay in people expressing their grievances.




Figure 3.3: Path Analysis for the Second Survey

Fitness of Model: rho1, 0.994; rho2, 1.316; RMSEA, 0.00/chi-square, .023; df = 1; p = .881

Table 7 summarizes the total influence of each independent variable. As illustrated in Figure 3.3, anger appeared to have a significantly greater influence than the other variables. Compared with the first survey results, all variables aside from anger significantly decreased in influence, indicating that only anger was influencing people's participation intensity and that the other variables had no meaningful influence.

TABLE 7: TOTAL INFLUENCE ON INTENSITY OF PARTICIPATION (2ND)

	<i>Collective Identity</i>	<i>Anger</i>	<i>Legitimacy</i>	<i>Efficacy</i>
Anger	-0.17	0	0	0
Legitimacy	-0.134	0.143	0	0
Efficacy	-0.02	0.029	0.141	0
Participation Degree	-0.08	0.14	0.07	0.02

Table 8 examined whether the coefficient values were the same for Figure 3.2 and Figure 3.3 when analyzed using the same model. The first row was reached under the null hypothesis that the first and second surveys produced the same coefficient values; however, because the significance probability ($p = .007$) dismissed the null hypothesis, this indicated that the two models were not the same. The surveys collected responses from the same pool of people with a short gap of only 20 days, and the survey questions remained the same; however, because the responses were so different, they could not be analyzed using the same model, which proved that the political incidents that took place within the 20 days had changed respondents' attitudes.

It is clear that from the end of November when the first survey took place to mid-December when the second survey was conducted, the candlelight protests had become more of an opportunity to express anger than to pursue an objective. Although the participants were unable to determine the president's course of action from the protests, they continued to attend to express their increasingly forceful opinions and rising anger.

TABLE 8: EXAMINATION OF MODEL SAMENESS

	<i>DF</i>	<i>CMIN</i>	<i>P</i>	<i>NFI</i> <i>Delta-1</i>	<i>IFI</i> <i>Delta-2</i>	<i>RFI</i> <i>rho-1</i>	<i>TLI</i> <i>rho2</i>
STRUCTURAL WEIGHTS	7	19.50	0.007	0.14	0.14	0.09	0.11
STRUCTURAL INTERCEPTS	11	2133.05	0	14.81	15.46	25.87	32.68
STRUCTURAL MEANS	12	2133.05	0	14.81	15.46	24.41	30.84
STRUCTURAL COVARIANCES	13	2133.05	0	14.81	15.46	23.11	29.19
STRUCTURAL RESIDUALS	17	3618.45	0	25.13	26.22	32.47	41.02

IV. IMPLICATIONS

The candlelight protests that were held every week for nearly five months from October onward remained peaceful to the end. These protests will remain significant in the history of Korean politics as they resulted in the National Assembly passing an impeachment bill and the Constitutional Court's acceptance of the impeachment. Public polls on the president's resignation or impeachment had always had a 70% or higher approval rating. When examined against the anti-imported beef candlelight rallies in 2008, the recent candlelight protests were significantly larger. In 2008, as social organizations such as the Korean Confederation of Trade Unions started leading candlelight rallies, political slogans became prevalent and normal citizens stopped attending. However, as the impeachment candlelight protests remained a voluntary, non-political gathering of ordinary citizens until the end and the technical organization named the "Emergency Citizen Coalition to Remove Park's Administration" remained a small organization that simply served the purpose of organizing and managing the rallies, there was continuing and increasing attendance throughout the five months period.

This research is meaningful as the data were gained directly from the protest participants at Gwanghwamun. Without empirical information from actual locations, the researcher's ability to define and give meaning to the protests would not be free from arbitrary interpretation. Without knowing exactly why people attended the protests, the underlying meanings cannot be extracted. The question about the number of times participants attended the protests did not just provide numerical information as attendance was found to depend on whether the participant's motive was to express anger or to achieve the president's removal. If an expression of anger was the objective, there would be a higher chance that the participant would not attend multiple protests. In the survey held at the end of December 2016, it was determined that most respondents attended an average of 1.8 protests, indicating that angered citizens attended the protests with a desire to publicly express their anger; however, if the objective was to remove the president, more repeated participation would have been expected.

The following are the conclusions reached from the empirical data extracted from this survey-based research. First, the candlelight protests were not valuable to the citizens simply because they were peaceful. While it is significant that the rallies were organized as cultural events and peaceful protests to allow citizens to feel freer to voluntarily participate, most respondents saw the protests as a public opportunity to highlight the president's corruption and demand her resignation or impeachment. Therefore, as illustrated above, most respondents claimed that they would continue to support the protests even if violent clashes occurred with the police. Second, as the participants were enraged by the president's violation of

moral principles, there was no ideological influence attached to their decisions to attend. The factor that had the largest influence on participation intensity was anger over the situation, with both surveys revealing that political beliefs had no influence on their attendance decisions. Third, the citizens were responding to the environment. The empirical results that the data from the first and second surveys could not be analyzed using the same model demonstrated that when politics did not respond to citizens' requests, citizens did not despair; rather, they reacted more strongly.

In Korea, citizens are free to express their discontent over political corruption and incompetence and can bring down administrations through active participation. There are still arguments, however, as to whether these candlelight protests actually influenced the legal procedures; however, there is no way to measure such influence levels. What is important is that although it is possible to punish a government that does not meet people's expectations, the political sphere must seek to provide an alternative. The early 19th presidential election of 2017 was the result of people's efforts. It is yet to be seen whether Korean politics can actually renew itself or whether it will end up as another disappointment to the Korean people.

Note

1. This relationship can be explained from the two causes. The first was from the perspective of political competition. It was assumed that liberal respondents would be more critical of Park Geun-hye's conservative government. The second was caused by the characteristics of the political belief in which liberal respondents tended to respond more sensitively to moral issues.

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