"SOUTH AFRICA'S MARITIME SECURITY BAZAAR" – THE BIZARRE ARMS DEAL AND COLLAPSE OF ITS NEWLY ACQUIRED STATE OF ART FRIGATES TO PROTECT THE MARITIME SECTOR

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During the apartheid era, the maritime sector was largely marginalized in support of its land and air force combating capabilities to protect its borders against the perceived threat of communist trained terrorists across its borders to preserve its political and ideological hegemony. The South African Naval defense capability was largely reduced since the 1970s and the defense budget was used to fight against internal political resistance and the threat posed by its neighboring countries who provided asylum for armed freedom fighters within and outside its borders. At the dawn of democracy in 1994, South Africa rapidly became an important continental and global trade partner and the sea routes on its Indian and Atlantic shores circumnavigating the Antarctic rim became the most important driver of economic growth to meet the expectations of its reconstruction and development programme for the majority of its Black populace who have been excluded from participating in the economy of the country. Surrounded by six major commercial ports, South Africa's maritime safety received the least security scrutiny during the apartheid era and much emphasis was placed on retaining its political hegemony in favor of its minority white populace through military force. In the post-apartheid era attempts at looking at the national state of security of the country by the democratic government resulted in an international arms scandal which is continuing to haunt the country since 2000. This paper examines the state of South Africa's maritime security in the post-apartheid era and its attempts to secure it's maritime sector has resulted in strategic marine security systems against potential global threats on its coastline.

Introduction

Historically the economic importance of the Antarctic rim on the Southern part of Africa is well recorded since the occupation by White settlers under the auspices of the Dutch East India Company in 1652, followed by the Portuguese and thereafter the British starting in the Cape Peninsula. Since 1806 the British set up several ports and harbors in various parts of the country to extract raw materials from the rural hinterland to parts of the western world. These trade ports over the years including those under the apartheid regime since 1948 were well established in six major urban settlements (Cape Town, Saldanha, Port Elizabeth, East London, Durban and Richards Bay) spanning the Atlantic, Indian oceans and the Southernmost shores of the country on the Antarctic rim.

It was during this decade, just after the Second World War (1945) that the International Maritime Organization (IMO), formerly known as the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO), was established in

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Geneva in 1948 and came into force ten years later, meeting for the first time in 1959. The IMCO name was changed to IMO in 1982. (*http://www.ukessays.com/ essays/law/international-maritime-organization*). The aim was to regulate all maritime activities in the high seas amongst member states.

After the war years and the ascension to power by the Afrikaaner Nationalist party in 1948 the quest to up-lift the plight of its poor white constituency resulted in rapid agricultural production and concomitantly followed by heightened industrialization within the manufacturing sector. This necessitated the establishment of ports and harbours to support the economic boom after the war years leading to increased exports of South African made products. The AfrikaanerNationalist Party apart from providing economic support to their constituency set up a variety of financial institutions as an anchor to sustain this economic recovery. Infrastructure in the form of transportation, water and sanitation, electrification, education and housing was largely for the preserve of the Afrikaaner minority group at the expense of the majority of the Black populace in the country. Although the United Nations on several occasion raised concern on South Africa's security status in the region due to oppressive racial discriminatory practices it did not take decisive actions to implement serious sanctions against it. This was especially in light of the cold war years where communism was rapidly spreading in the African continent and the western world could not altogether isolate South Africa as a strategic partner. The country was considered strategically located as a sea route to the east which met the capitalist interest of the West through access to important commodity resources, such as gold, sugar and coal. In return it served an important market for Western made products for both South Africa and its landlocked neighbors. It is for this reason that the West did not risk breaking its foreign relations policy with South Africa and maintained a very ambiguous position on the atrocities that apartheid inflicted on the majority of the Black population in the country. In particular, Britain and the USA strongly opposed sanctions against South Africa. Attempts at implementing an arms embargo against South Africa often failed being vetoed by the mighty US and Britain hence the country escaped the wrath of the international community for its inhumane race relations policy (*http://www.sahistory.org.za/20th-century-south-africa/south-africas-foreign- relations-during-apartheid-1948*).

Despite the UN's lack of decisiveness in imposing sanctions against South Africa, in 1985 the Commonwealth head of States imposed a ban on the sale and export of computer equipment capable of being used by the South African military forces, police or security apparatuses; a strict and rigorously controlled embargo on imports of arms, ammunition, military vehicles and paramilitary equipment from South Africa; and an embargo on all military co-operation with South Africa (*http://www.southafrica.to/history/history1948.htm*). Notwithstanding the pressures from the UN Security Council and the Commonwealth Head of States to impose

financial and arms embargo on South Africa, it nonetheless bypassed these sanctions through bilateral agreements with nation states on the production and sale of military hardware with the private sector and hiring international experts. It developed the most advanced military-industrial base on the continent and by the late 1960s, South Africa had acquired at least 127 foreign production licenses for arms, ammunition, and military vehicles.

South Africa had purchased fighter aircraft, tanks, naval vessels, naval armaments, and maritime patrol aircraft, primarily from Britain. After that, military equipment was carefully maintained, upgraded, and often reverse-engineered or copied, when the arms embargo made it difficult to obtain replacements or replacement parts (South Africa Country Specific Report nd: 335)

South Africa's Military Dominance in the Apartheid Era and Decline of its Maritime Security Sector

The Union Defence Force (UDF) established in 1912 was transformed by the Defence Act (No. 44) of 1957 and renamed it the South African Defence Force (SADF). The SADF numbering 20 000 in 1958 grew to 80 000 by the 1970s which made conscription for whites above the age of sixteen a must. It comprised the South African Army, the South African Navy, South African Medical Service and the South African Air Force (Doring, 1987: 16-17). During the 1970s, the SADF began enrolling non-whites including females into the military as career soldiers. Women were not assigned combat roles. As consequence since the 1970s, the army become the primary defender of the apartheid regime in the context of heightened political tide for African nationalism both within South Africa and towards its neighbouring states.

In so far as the South African Navy (SAN) is concerned, it traces its origins more than a century kat the time when the UDF's seagoing vessels were introduced for the first time, and at a time when the volunteer naval unit was established in Durban in 1885with the aim of participating in the maritime defence sector. Just before World War 1, the British Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve established a division in South Africa in1912. The navy's modern antecedent was the Seaward Defence Force (SDF), established in 1940 with fifteen small ships and several shore bases. During and immediately after the Second World War the traditional naval links between South Africa and Britain deepened to such an extent that it became a matter of co-dependence. As a result of the Simon's Town Agreement (1957) the SA Navy received ships and equipment from Britain and support from the Royal Navy through training, naval exercises, equipment and ideological doctrine on marine supremacy (Potgieter, 2000: 181). Until 1966 the SAN was still an exclusively British-equipped navy. With the exception of the South African-built training vessel (Navigator) the Navy's ships and craft were built in the United Kingdom, and in some instances were former Royal Navy (RN) ships (Wessels, 2009: 112).

The SDF soon grew into a force of several escort groups and minesweeping flotillas, some of which served in the Mediterranean during World War II. Many SDF personnel sought active service in the British Royal Navy vessels and were involved in mine clearance, submarine detection; vessel salvage operations, ship repair activities and production of war materials.The SDF was renamed the South African Naval Force in1947 and the South African Navy was established in 1951 (Potgieter, 2000: 174-175).With mounting international pressure the Nationalist Party Government was increasingly marginalised due to its apartheid policies resulting in growing political and foreign relation isolation. Given the dependence of the SA Navy on Britain such isolation impacted on its maritime defence resulting in the cancellation of the Simons Town Agreement with Britain in 1977. Hence it became imperative for the apartheid regime to take responsibility for its own maritime defence which failed due to an emphasis that the SAN must acquire strike aircraft and not corvettes or frigates resulting in the SAN entering a new era in its maritime history (Potgieter, 2000:182).

With international pressure mounting on South Africa and armaments sales to South Africa being increasingly scrutinised, the local armaments industry underwent tremendous growth and more emphasis was placed on developing its local or indigenous armament manufacturing capacity. However, despite the arms embargo on South Africa, the cold war period recognised the Southern tip of Africa as a strategic maritime route that needed to be safeguarded against communist influence and penetration. Considering that in the 1960s most commonwealth nations in the African continent were gaining independence western commercial interest was of paramount importance to seize markets for capitalist gains through the exodus of colonialist influence. In the Southern African region Angola, South West Africa, Mozambique and Rhodesia had come under communist influence resulting in the western world sharing an ambivalent political attitude towards South Africa. On the one end demobilising SA military capacity on the basis of internal racial discrimination through arms sanctions and at the same time facing the risk of communist influence in the region resulted in a bifurcated attitude towards the county (Wessels, 2009:117-118) which was to the advantage of the apartheid regime. It was this ambivalent attitude against arms embargo and the spread of communism in the country that served as a catalyst for South Africa to resuscitate its defence and military capacity through a para-statal (Manganyi, 2012:422, Mc Williams, 1988:62).

In 1968 the arms procurement agency of the South African Department of Defence Force sought the resources of the private sector in building its armaments capacity through the para-statal Armaments Corporation of South Africa (Armscor). Through the Armaments Development and Production Act (No. 57) of 1968 Armscor was provided legal jurisdiction to respond to South Africa's increased security and defence requirement due to international criticism on its political ideology of apartheid, domestic turbulence within the black communities,the

insurgency in Namibia, sanctionsand the arms embargo hastened the necessityfor a monolithic and centralised coordinating body for the domestic control of production and distribution of weapon systems. Thus, the resultwas the rising prominence of Armscor with the attendant industrial, political and economic power (Mc Williams, 1988:63). South Africa received military technology through licensing agreements, primarily with West Germany, Italy, Israel, France, Belgium, and Canada. Licensing and co-production agreements in the 1970s and 1980s made it difficult to distinguish between fully indigenous military manufacture and those of international origin. This was one of the legal mechanisms used by the apartheid regime to defy the sanctions imposed by the international community (Simpson 1989 212-213). Armscor as a public-private venture had substantial backing from international and domestic funding through companies operating in South Africa. For example the Barlows group of companies, Gencor, Reunert Technology and Fuchs Electronics to mention a few with support from international financiers and technical expertise were the back bone of Armscor (Simpson 1989).The Centre for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) was the intellectual backbone that provided Armscor with research support and experiments.

Armscor's financial autonomy was evident through its easy access to the capital market for loans, but at the same time, many of its functions were closely regulated by the government. The executives of Armscor had to report directly to the minister of defense. It comprised a ten-member corporate board with overlapping membership with the ministry's Defence Planning Committee which included leading businessmen, financiers, and scientists, as well as the government's director general of finance and the chief of the SADF. Armscor was represented on the government's high-level military planning and policy bodies. Nimrod, Armscor's marketing and sales department undertook an aggressive arms export promotion campaign in the 1980s through participation in international arms exhibitions, in Greece in 1982, Chile each year from 1984 through the end of the decade, and in Turkey in 1989. Armscor also displayed its artillery at numerous demonstrations and trade fairs in South Africa. Despite the UN ban on arms sales to Pretoria and a 1984 UN ban on the purchase of arms from South Africa, Armscor's business flourished. The corporation evolved as a secret body which did not disclose export figures or their customers during the 1980s, but the United States government estimated South Africa's arms sales at US$273 million (in constant 1989 dollars) over the five-year period from 1984 to 1988. The best year was 1985, when it earned roughly US$102 million (CIA World Factbook 1996). With 23,000 employees, 1,000 subcontractors, 1.3 billion rand ($585 million) in assets and an income of 1.6 billion rand, Armscor stocked the most sophisticated military arsenal in the Third World. The company produced more than 8,000 military items, from boots to fighter planes to air-to-ground missiles, including 144 types of ammunition (Nairn, 1986).

In a quest to make South Africa's military sector self-sufficient driven by capitalist motives through the manufacture and sales of armaments, the SAN was grossly neglected. The SAN during this period had two combat support ships, but no longer any destroyers or frigates to replenish, since the Navy had been drastically downsized both in terms of ships and personnel in the mid-1980s, being reduced to a 24-hull navy, and having its last frigate withdrawn from service in 1985 (Wessels 2013:119). In an undated country report it is estimated that in the 1970s and 1980s Navy personnel were reduced from almost 9,000 to half that number by 1990. More specifically Manganyi (2012:432) asserts that sustaining the apartheid regime and thwarting the expansion of Soviet power in Africa cost the South African maritime sector dearly. The former South African National Defence Force (SANDF) fought a war in Angola and Namibia against the so called communist terrorist insurgence resulting in funds being deployed to the Army and Air Force at the expense of the Navy's budget. The net impact was reduction in budget from more than twenty per cent in the 1970s to less than ten per cent in the 1990s to support the South African Navy.

Implications of the International Maritime Policy Framework on South Africa's Maritime Capacity

Given the fact that South Africa's maritime security sector has been downsized considerably it begs the question as to whether it has the capacity to conform to international norms and standards in protecting its oceans and the country as a whole. Historically the world's oceans have long been subject to the 'freedom of the seas' doctrine, i.e. a principle developed in the seventeenth century, essentially limiting national rights and jurisdiction over the oceans to a narrow belt of sea surrounding a nation's coastline. The remainder of the seas was proclaimed to be free to all and belonging to none. While this situation prevailed until the twentieth century, by mid-century, there was a growing impetus to extend national claims over offshore resources. As maritime technology became more sophisticated, the oceans became increasingly more exploited in terms of resources such as oil, diamonds, and gravel, metals and fish stocks. As early as 1958, a specialised United Nations (UN) agency, the International Maritime Organisation (IMO), was established, with responsibility for improving maritime safety; preventing pollution from ships; and overseeing the process of liability and compensation, especially in relation to damage caused by pollution. In addition, the IMO was given the task of ensuring that a number of international conventions which had already been developed were kept up to date. These conventions included the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (1948) and the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil (1954). The IMO conventions provided the means for international uniformity after they have been adopted by international conferences. Governments undertook to give effect to the provisions

of conventions they accede to, or ratify by promulgating their own domestic laws, decrees, orders or regulations (Maritime Security, 2014: 3).

In addition to these efforts by the IMO, attempts were also made to regulate the use of the oceans in a single convention that was acceptable to all nations. These efforts finally culminated in the adoption of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). UNCLOS has gained nearly universal acceptance since its entry into force on 16 November 1994. It provided, for the first time, a universal legal framework for the rational management of marine resources and their conservation for future generations. It enshrines the notion that all problems of ocean space are closely interrelated and need to be addressed as a whole. Today, UNCLOS is the globally recognised framework dealing with all matters related to the law of the sea.

The South African maritime nation is endowed with a double geo-political identity, namely the land and the sea. This to a large degree shapes the country's maritime and naval interests. Strategically situated along vital sea routes of the world, the South Atlantic, the Indian and the Southern oceans, South Africa has a coastline of about 3 000 kilometres along which its marine resources are spread; from the Orange River in the west to Ponta do Ouro in the east. The geo-strategic position occupied by South Africa is the most important factor and is followed in importance by the country's maritime zones, marine resources, marine ecology and conservation, as well as maritime trade through six major harbours linking it to urban centres which serve as export processing zones. All of these factors carry with them immediate national, regional and international obligations (Siko 1996:1).

South Africa's maritime zones, signed into law by the country's President on 11th November 1994 (Maritime Zones Act No 15 of 1994), cover the territorial waters, contiguous, exclusive economic zone (EEZ), the continental shelf and the Prince Edward Islands, which belong to South Africa. The latter is situated 1000 kilometres south-east of Port Elizabeth. All of these zones fall within South Africa's jurisdiction for monitoring, control and enforcement of state authority. In total, it comprises an area of marine assets of more than 1 million square kilometres (CIA World Factbook 2013: 1).

With this vast estate, comes certain rights and obligations upon which specific international institutions and legal norms have a direct bearing and implication. South Africa is a member of the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) and the International Hydrographic Organisation (IHO). As a subscriber to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas (UNCLOS), and including being a signatory to the Convention on Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), South Africa is morally bound to observe these normative international guidelines.

Two areas of importance are the hydrographic duties and the "search and rescue' responsibilities. The South African Navy's Directorate for Hydrography is entrusted with the responsibility (through membership of IMO and IHO) for navigation charts,

and navigational and NAVAREA warnings in the assigned area. The search and rescue area of responsibility is vested in the country by conventions of the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) and the MO respectively from a position on the coast at the international border between Angola and Namibia, and then to the position on the coast at the international border between South Africa and Mozambique. A maritime region of 17.2 million square kilometres exists. South Africa is expected to have the means to successfully carry out search and rescue operations in this vast area.

From the above explanation on the vastness of the South African maritime domain, the question arise which contributes to a juridical dilemma: If state laws apply in sovereignty, does South Africa have the necessary, human and financial resources to deal with maritime safety and security in an efficient and effective manner as expected by international standards and norms?

South African Response to Maritime Safety and Security Post-Apartheid

After liberation in 1994 and the collapse of the Soviet Union in the late 1980s, the dismantling of the SANDF's budget became a popular political discourse given the enormous development backlogs inherited from apartheid. As a trade off to the 'no threat' argument, the new democratic government elected to sustain a minimum level of human defence capacity and artillery that would enable the Defence Force to expand its capacity and skills when required. Honiball (1996:2) critiques that there was some validity in such reasoning since a threat is seen purely from a military perspective, but nationally it was a narrow view simply because such threats has shifted from an external to an internal context. This was especially in light of the fact that levels of internal civil disobedience characterised by anarchy, lawlessness and violence on matters related to development and service delivery issues was anticipated to increase affecting internal safety, security and the economy of the country. Hence transformation of the SANDF required shifting resources to contain internal threats by redeploying military personnel into the police service.

The disbandment of the marines left South Africa with limited force geared for marine-type military operations. Integration into the international community following the 1994 democratic elections coincided with several internecine intra-state conflicts ravaging several parts of the continent. In response, all major policy documents of the country reflected the need to contribute to eradicating African conflicts to safe guard the countries interest. Hence South Africa entered into a peace keeping missions as contained in major South African policy documents such as the White Paper on Defence and the White Paper on South African Participation in International Peace Missions. The country has been instrumental and preoccupied since 1997 in brokering African peace in Angola, Burundi, Lesotho, Kenya, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, Sudan and Zimbabwe. Additionally, South African peacekeepers deployed to countries such as Burundi, the Democratic

Republic of Congo (DRC), Comoros, Eritrea-Ethiopia, the Central African Republic and Sudan took centre stage in conflict resolution and management in the region beginning with mediation efforts in several countries (Maganyi 2012: 433).

Whilst South Africa was brokering peace in trouble torn regions in the continent at the expense of its safety and security on its eastern coast line, Somali pirates found new criminal opportunities closer to the Tanzanian and Mozambican coastline. This was largely due to the Mozambique Channel forming a natural corridor separating it from Madagascar and reducing the maneuverability of vessels, making them vulnerable to attacks. Maritime traffic in the area is also known to be dominated by unarmed vessels and serves as an alternative route for cargo and other commercial vessels in a bid to avoiding the route near the Horn of Africa. In the absence of anti-piracy patrol forces around this maritime corridor has made the region more attractive to pirates since countries in the region, with the exception of South Africa, lacked naval resources to patrol the coastline (Maganyi 2012:453).

In response to such threats the SAN established the Maritime Reaction Squadron (MRS) on 1 September 2006, which resurrected the marine capability in the SANDF (Maganyi 2010: 435). South Africa's commitment to maritime safety and security was affirmed in January 2010, during the fourteenth African Union (AU) Summit at which heads of state endorsed the "African Union Maritime Transport Charter" and the "Maritime Transport Plan of Action". The summit reaffirmed the previous October's "Durban Resolution on Maritime Safety, Maritime Security, and Protection of the Marine Environment" for ratification by fifty-three member states. Their titles sound both impressive and comprehensive. Despite such commitment the charter and plan of action reduced in papers has become in dire need for legitimacy due to a lack of inclusivity and weak enforcement mechanisms by member states resulting in little success due to a lack of clear support from AU leaders (Baker 2011: 43).

In so far as South Africa is concerned, its attempts in 1999 to procure four German frigates and submarines to protect its maritime coast line not only resulted in a political outcry on the unnecessary R12bn expenditure but contributed to a total paralysis of the SAN. When the deal was first put together for the perceived state-of-the-art vessels - together with three German-built submarines - were expected to entrench South Africa's position as a regional power. Military leaders have cautioned parliamentary committees that the costs of these frigates would cause inadequate funding for other developmental priorities such as adequate medical treatment for AIDS within the South African military, inability to maintain existing maritime equipment, let alone to undertake peacekeeping operations elsewhere in Africa (Crawford-Browne 2010:339). According to Dunne and Lamb (2003: 7) the official original cost of the arms deal including the German frigates was R30 billion. This amount jumped to R53 billion and currently it is estimated at R140 billion, largely due to currency fluctuation. Crawford-Browne (2010: 331)

estimates on projections of rand/dollar exchange rates made by the government's own consultants, the rand liability including the frigates and other military artillery will amount to R370 billion by 2019, when the final payments are due.

Ironically ARMSCOR, the apartheid military apparatus which helped build the South African military sector continues to retain its core function in the post-apartheid era for arms procurement on behalf of the Department of Defence at an international level. DENEL took control of the domestic defence industry, falling under the Ministry of Public Enterprises. The chairperson of ARMSCOR is a member of the Defence Planning Committee, chaired by the Minister of Defence no different to the structure prevalent during the apartheid era. ARMSCOR ensures that the technical, legal, and financial integrity of companies supplying acquisitions are in accordance with DoD requirements. Additional tasks include offering marketing support for the industry, facilitating participation in international armaments shows, and the co-management of Industrial Participation Programmes with the Department of Trade and Industry (Sylvester and Seegers 2008: 55-56).

Karyn Maughan (29th August 2008) of the Mercury a popular newspaper reported that the state's controversial purchases which absorbed most of the South African Navy's financial resources have left the navy incapable of tracking the vessels that travel around the South African coast; conducting patrols aimed at protecting and defending the maritime sovereignty of the republic; unable to fulfill its collateral responsibilities of maritime safety, pollution response, search-and-rescue, protection of maritime resources and interdiction of maritime offenders; and conducting patrols of South Africa's resource and fossil fuel-rich economic exclusion zone. A Sunday Time report by Jordan (2012-11-18) brought to public attention that the German built frigates encountered serious mechanical problems and budget shortfalls affecting the maintenance of all four frigates.

It was envisaged that the shady arms deal and procurement of the frigates would create 26 000 new jobs. To the contrary, Dunne and Lamb (2003:7) in their study assert that South Africa's maritime and naval shipbuilding industry, concentrated largely in Durban and Cape Town downsized quite dramatically in recent years with the attendant loss of valuable capabilities and skills. The country's only naval shipyard, Dorbyl Marine, closed down in the early 1990s because of poor trading conditions. The industry lacked the capacity to design and manufacture major naval ships including submarines, although a few companies have the capacity to design and manufacture small harbour patrol boats. The local maritime industry does, however, have a limited capacity in naval electronics (including ship borne radar systems), systems integration (combat suites), ammunition (including naval bombs and mines), research and development and ship repair and maintenance. Hence with the acquisition of the frigates the maritime sector was not particularly well placed to benefit from the Navy's acquisition programmes without significant investments to upgrade and expand its existing capabilities. Some of these

predictions have become reality, as in January 2003, due to the installation of faulty copper communication cabling by a South African company, the delivery schedule of the corvettes was set back by a year.

It would appear that South Africa's attempt at being a regional maritime power house has dealt a major blow due to poor decision making, underscored by political corruption to safeguard both its national and continental water interests. It has failed to protect the maritime transport sector, compromised the development expectations of the masses of its poor citizens and deferred its economic development for its previously disadvantaged citizens for the sake of exercising its political superiority in the continent. This failure has made it dependent on the west to safeguard the maritime routes in order to maximize the economic opportunities that the sea provides in the interest of national development. At a global level, South Africa's maritime capability falls short of even the IMO conventions expectations.

To illustrate this point, the European Union has taken proactive steps to safeguard strategic maritime routes to protect its economic interest by investing in a variety of partnership arrangements with African states through a diverse number of capacity building and infrastructure development programmes in its fight against human and drug trafficking, arms smuggling, piracy and illicit harvesting and damage to the marine life.

The European Commission has taken the lead in supporting the implementation of the Djibouti Code of Conduct, which provides a framework for cooperation among coastal and user states for the repression of piracy and armed robbery against ships in the Western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden (Fotiadis, 2011:14). Their action focused initially on the Straits of Malacca and Singapore which is the core marine route for Europe and the Americas where the safety of navigation is challenged by the archipelago structure of the Straits coupled with high-intensity naval traffic and shipments of hazardous material by supporting the implementation of the Djibouti Code of Conduct for the repression of piracy and armed robbery, illicit drugs and human trafficking and damage to the marine environment in the Western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden. The implementation of the agreement entails the establishment of a regional training centre in Djibouti, working under the aegis of the International Maritime Organization (IMO), and a regional information-sharing centre based in Yemen. Ultimately, the scope of the programme encompasses the whole spectrum of maritime security and safety, beyond the short-term response to the piracy threat.

Some of the highlights of the European Commission to bring the "sea to order" was its intervention programme between 2010-14 in Western and Central Africa, selected hubs in Latin America, Caribbean and South Africa resulting in 25 significant seizures of chemical precursors (Côte d'Ivoire), 1,870 kg of cannabis (Gabon), cocaine (Nigeria, Senegal, Ghana, Cape Verde and Mali) and several

seizures of cash, arms and African works of art (Fotiadis, 2011:11) at a cost of •4.8 million. During 2010 -12 the EU expended •3.3 million in its attempt at counteracting the illicit accumulation and trafficking of firearms in Africa with special focus on Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan, Seychelles, Tanzania and Uganda (Fotiadis, 2011: 13).

Although the armaments scandal is receiving legal scrutiny at present and the political think tanks having made poor decisions on resuscitating South Africa's maritime security sector this year (2014) the government has found an alternative way of securing its maritime security. The Minister of the Department of Finance on the 4th May 2014 announced that the inter-departmental Port of Entry Control Centre in Cape Town harbour, commonly referred to as Cowrie Place, is the first prototype maritime facility in South Africa, where all relevant government services related to the movement of people and goods are rendered from the same building, in a coordinated fashion. As a vigilant State, it aims to thwart threats and opportunities facing the country in a maritime context – the global phenomena of counterfeit and illicit goods, undocumented foreign nationals entering the country, smugglers and contraband. It is hoped to extend this Port of Entry Control Centre to its remaining five ports in the near future. However, the limitation of such a proactive step does not secure the sea routes around the Antarctic rim were the major ports are located (Department of Finance, May 2014).

Conclusion

The paper highlights that although during apartheid South Africa emerged as one of the mighty military powers in the Third World, producer of artillery and benefitted financially by escaping the wrath of the UN sanctions, it has compromised the efficacy of its maritime defence sector. It took the penetration of communism in the region as an opportunity to evade the full might of the arms sanctions against it. It strategically did not see the need to have invested heavily on its maritime security system since its priority was to defend the "sovereignty" of white political hegemony both on its borders against neighbouring states and internally amongst the majority of the indigenous disenfranchised black populace. The creation of the para-statal ARMSCOR was one of the ways of evading the arms sanctions by masking western acquired skills and expertise in the production of military apparel as though it was indigenized. Post-apartheid in an ironical turn of events in its attempts to acquire frigates to protect its maritime coast line used ARMSCOR to engage in the acquisition of fraudulent maritime artillery through illegitimate tender processes, a matter which is being contested legally until this day. The acquisition of these frigates has not improved South Africa's maritime security sector but rather has become a liability due to the lack of capacity to man and maintain these expensive security vessels that has cost the nation billions of rands. Considering

that the acquisition of these frigates have been a poor decision and in view of the pending threat to its shorelines against piracy, drugs, terrorists, undocumented migrants and counterfeit goods, the state has now embarked on an experimental programme of establishing Port of Entry Control Centres to curb maritime trade violations. The contradiction lies in the fact that these Port of Entry Control Centres will have the capacity to police freight on its harbours and ports but will not impact on the safety and security of its coastline.

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