



## International Journal of Applied Business and Economic Research

ISSN : 0972-7302

available at <http://www.serialsjournals.com>

© Serials Publications Pvt. Ltd.

Volume 15 • Number 21 (Part 2) • 2017

### An International Dilemma - National Interests or Collective Peace

Ashutosh Singh<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup>Assistant Professor in History, School of Arts & Languages, Lovely Professional University, Punjab. Email: [ashutosh.22489@lpu.co.in](mailto:ashutosh.22489@lpu.co.in)

#### ABSTRACT

The United Nations was created to remedy the failures of the League of Nations and maintain international peace. While an improvement over its predecessor, it has still failed in keeping the peace in numerous conflict zones around the world. A prominent example of such a failure is the 1994 Rwanda Genocide. The genocide's origins lay in Rwanda's ethnic differences. It is however, still a matter of academic debate whether the international community failed in preventing genocide or there were simply insufficient grounds for an international intervention strong enough to prevent genocide. It thus, raises deeper questions regarding the relationship that a nation state has with the international society. This article therefore endeavours to bring out the fact that the United Nations as it exists today within the international global framework lacks the structure to effectively implement 'Collective Peace'; being held hostage as it is to the whims of the national interests of its member states.

**Keywords:** International, Interests, Collective, Peace.

#### 1. INTRODUCTION

The genocide in 1994 in land locked Rwanda was a culmination of differences between the Hutu and Tutsi ethnic groups. These ethnic differences had a history going back hundreds of years, however, the two groups had for the most part coexisted. German and later Belgian colonialists saw the various social groups in then Ruanda-Urundi through the prism of a questionable pseudo-scientific racist theory with religious overtones. Thus the 'Hamitic Hypothesis' was born. The false identities of an 'elite ruling class' of the Tutsi ethnic group and the 'ruled subjects' from the Hutu ethnic group were European superimpositions on native society. This created an artificial social and a very real economic cleavage in that country's society. After attaining independence in 1962, the nascent institutions of the young state of Rwanda proved incapable of handling the social stresses between the two communities, the Hutu and Tutsi. This resulted

in ethnic conflicts at regular intervals from 1960s to 1990s. The Rwanda genocide of 1994, was historically speaking an accelerated continuation of this ethnic conflict and resulted in close to a million deaths, which constitutes a significant percentage of the population of Rwanda, a small country roughly two-thirds the size of Switzerland.

Such ethnic and social strife marks large parts of Africa even today. However, the reason why the genocide occurred is not in the purview of this paper, which instead deals with why and how the genocide happened with the UN having special rights under Article VII of the UN charter to militarily intervene in the event of a conflict, especially genocide. This becomes all the more significant in light of the fact that information was available that large scale killing was imminent. It is striking to note that the United States and United Kingdom, both permanent members of the UN Security Council voted to draw down the number of UNAMIR, the UN mission to Rwanda to oversee the Arusha Peace Accord.

There were ample indications that an ethnic conflict was imminent in Rwanda, however these indications were ignored or not deemed worthy of a response by the international community including the United Nations. The allegation that the US could have done more to prevent the genocide is often made and its military response to the simultaneously occurring ethnic cleansing in Bosnia is given as a case in point where NATO led by the US forcefully led a military campaign to prevent genocide.

However, this conventional wisdom is challenged in Alan J. Kuperman's 2001 book, 'The Limits of Humanitarian Intervention: Genocide in Rwanda', which brings out a compelling case that once the genocide began, any intervention could not have prevented the genocide from claiming lives, although it may have succeeded in marginally reducing the number of casualties. He states that in order for any intervention to be successful, such an intervention would have had to be pre-emptive so that by the time the genocide began, a robust military capability would already exist on the ground in Rwanda; however, since it was not clear at any stage, well after the killings began on April 7, 1994 that the killings were on a 'genocidal scale', no military intervention was possible as it was seen as one of many civil wars that raged across Africa. On the other hand, many people continue to blame the lack of action by the West in Rwanda as exacerbating the genocide in Rwanda arguing that the West could have done more, even accusing the West of complicity with the various actors of the ethnic strife.

Both views, are correct in their arguments and therein lies the dilemma of the problem – firstly, that can the UN intervene in regional conflicts preemptively, possibly against the wishes of the host country; if not why and secondly, can the member states of the UN be relied upon to apply uniform standards to abuses of human rights across the world; if not what are the reasons.

## **2. METHODOLOGY**

William Ferroggiaro's August 20, 1994 article, 'The U.S. and the Genocide in Rwanda 1994: Evidence of Inaction' which builds a case exclusively on declassified U.S. Government documents that the latter's inaction in Rwanda was not for want of information about an impending genocide; and Alan J. Kuperman's, 'The Limits of Humanitarian Intervention: Genocide in Rwanda' which argues that information was inadequate to launch a full scale US intervention are used as two important source materials expressing two completely opposite points of view. However, ironically, they both also inadvertently express a common attitude of a nation state when it comes to deploying military forces for tasks which do not cater to the state's national interests.

An analysis of the role of Chapter VII of the UN Charter has been carried out to understand why the UN was unable to carry out its mandate when multiple occasions demand that action be taken under it to prevent loss of human life in Rwanda. A comparison has also been made to understand clearly the difference in magnitude of the simultaneously occurring Rwanda and Balkan crises and the difference in military response of the international community to the two. The analysis is to put across the priorities of nation states as members of the United Nations and whether they are in alignment with the objectives of the latter.

### **3. UN CHAPTER VII IN THE RWANDA GENOCIDE**

Chapter VII of the UN Charter deals with “Action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression” and contains articles 39 to 51. As the name suggests, Chapter VII aims to maintain international peace and security by preventing aggression and if aggression occurs, using all means including military to stop it. Under article 39, the ‘Security Council shall determine such a threat and decide upon the measures to be taken to prevent it.’ Articles 41 deals with the actual implementation of a UN Security Council resolution against the aggressor by using diplomatic and economic means; article 42 further ups the ante and involves the use of military means: ‘blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations.’

The Rwanda genocide began on April 7, 1994 and the killings continued for a period of roughly a hundred days.<sup>1</sup> However, the first UNSC resolution which considered the crisis in Rwanda under Article 39, i.e., to constitute a threat and breach of international peace was on May 17, 1994, a month and a half after the killings began as Security Council Resolution 918 which says:

“Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, 13. Decides that all States shall prevent the sale or supply to Rwanda by their nationals or from their territories or using their flag vessels or aircraft of arms and related matériel of all types, including weapons and ammunition, military vehicles and equipment, paramilitary police equipment and spare parts.”<sup>2</sup>


Resolution 918 only prevented supply of war material to Rwanda, and was clearly taken under article 39 which meant that military force was not considered yet.<sup>3</sup> Over a month later on June 22, 1994, the UNSC passed resolution 929 authorising the use of force:

“Recognizing that the current situation in Rwanda constitutes a unique case which demands an urgent response by the international community,

Determining that the magnitude of the humanitarian crisis in Rwanda constitutes a threat to peace and security in the region,

1. Welcomes the Secretary-General’s letter dated 19 June 1994 (S/1994/728) and agrees that a multinational operation may be set up for humanitarian purposes in Rwanda until UNAMIR is brought up to the necessary strength;”<sup>4</sup>

On June 23, 1994 France troops under Operation ‘Turquoise’ arrived in Rwanda.<sup>5</sup> However, by this time most of the killing was already over.



**Figure 1: A quantitative estimate of the progression of the genocide from April 7, 1994.<sup>6</sup>**

The above graph clearly demonstrates the timeline of the genocide and the surviving population of Tutsi as time progressed. It is noteworthy that even after most Tutsi had been slaughtered, the UN only passed a resolution under article 39 adopting only passive measures. By the time more aggressive measures were adopted, the genocide was gradually dying out. This was partly because most of the Tutsi had been killed and secondly because of the rapid advance of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) which stopped the killings as they advanced.<sup>7</sup> Thus, UNSC Resolution 929 authorising military intervention to prevent further killings was mostly redundant in its primary task of preventing further deaths.

Operation Turquoise as the French led intervention was known did establish ‘safe zones’ which saved the lives of thousands of Tutsi who were hiding from the killings. However, it is also noteworthy, that the French ‘Safe Zones’ also allowed thousands of genocidaires including the senior political and military leadership of the Hutu government of Rwanda who had planned and executed the genocide.<sup>8</sup> The Hutu led government of Rwanda was a close ally of the French government which provided the former with military aid and training.<sup>9</sup> Disturbingly, however, it has also been claimed that the French also provided training to the genocidal Interahamwe and engaged in direct combat with the RPF as they closed in on the Rwandan capital Kigali in the aftermath of the genocide.<sup>10</sup> A particularly incriminating testimony was given by a Interahamwe member about the French role in arming the genocidal militia:

“We had two French military who helped train the Interahamwe. A lot of other Interahamwe were sent for training in Egypt. The French military taught us how to catch people and tie them. It was at the Affichier Central base in the centre of Kigali. It’s where people were tortured. That’s where the French military office was.

At the camp I saw the French show Interahamwe how to throw knives and how to assemble and disassemble guns. It was the French who showed us how to do that - a French major - during a total of four months training for weeks at a time between February 1991 and January 1992. The French also went with us Interahamwe to Mount Kigali, where they gave us training with guns. We didn't know how to use the arms which had been brought from France.”<sup>11</sup>

There are reasonable grounds, therefore, to conclude that the primarily French intervention at the end of the genocide using UN approval to intervene under the pretext of stopping the genocide was actually an attempt to save a friendly regime from being toppled by the RPF which if came to power would naturally be hostile to France. National interests here clearly seemed to trump the UN Charter.

#### **4. ETHNIC CONFLICT OR GENOCIDE**

An ethnic conflict can be broadly described as a conflict between two different groups,<sup>12</sup> whereas ethnic cleansing is a progression of the conflict to a point wherein one group forces a migration upon another group or groups from a region with the intention of making it ethnically homogenous.<sup>13</sup> Intimidation, mass murder or rape may be used to effect such a migration.<sup>14</sup> The United Nations has a very unambiguous stance regarding any ethnic crime and views it most seriously. The UNSC, Final Report of the Commission of Experts established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780 (1992), puts this across very clearly with reference to the ethnic conflict in Bosnia which saw systematic murder and rape of an ethnic group.<sup>15</sup>

Genocide is a more extreme form of ethnic cleansing which involves a planned extermination of a group of people. As per the UN General Assembly adopted the Convention on the Prevention of the Crime of Genocide as General Assembly Resolution 260 on December 9, 1948 stating that:

“In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:

- (a) Killing members of the group;
- (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;”<sup>16</sup>

Resolution 260, therefore does not define the size of the group to be killed for the killing to be classified as genocide. Alan J. Kuperman gives a more practically applicable definition of genocide.<sup>17</sup>

The description of genocide as given by Kuperman is quite contemporary and applicable in international practice. It also gives us an idea as to the threshold of when an ethnic cleansing crosses over to the levels of genocide for international decision makers. Kuperman candidly points out that:

“Moreover, it is unrealistic to argue that an urgent intervention should have been launched on April 10, when most of the international community did not even realize genocide was being attempted until at least ten days later. Indeed, to argue that the United States should have deployed combat forces to Rwanda before senior officials even suspected that genocide was occurring is to argue that such deployments should be a commonplace response to civil war. That standard would have required enforcement operations during the past decade in Albania, Algeria, Angola, Azerbaijan (Nagorno-Karabakh), Bosnia, Cambodia, Congo Republic, Croatia, Ethiopia, Kosovo, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Tajikistan, and Zaire, some on several occasions. Obviously, such a policy is unsustainable.”<sup>18</sup>

It is simply not practical for a country (in this case the United States) to launch peace keeping operations preemptively because it is not known beforehand that the ‘genocide threshold’ has been breached. Kuperman argues that by the time it is finally known that ‘genocide’ has occurred that it is too late, because it has already happened. That is precisely the reason why he states that the United States could not have prevented the genocide as information was too sketchy. The intervention if it had to be successful had to be preemptive.

Kuperman’s latter argument is accurate – you cannot undo a murder, it has to be prevented and for that action must be taken based upon the ground situation. However, such pre-emptive interventions may not be acceptable to the host country, especially if the government in power itself is planning genocide as was the case in Rwanda. Moreover, a forcible intervention is tantamount to a transgression on the nation’s sovereignty – something which the United Nations is duty bound to prevent. The issue of sovereignty is a major factor before considering a military intervention, even for peacekeeping in the minds of UNSC members as the following excerpt from ‘The Limits of Humanitarian Intervention’ illustrates:

“American foreign-policy experts generally do not support such uninvited U.S. military intervention into civil wars before having evidence of genocide because of the potential deleterious consequences: evisceration of the concept of sovereignty, proliferation of interventions, and dilution of U.S. military power.”<sup>19</sup>

Another fear as the above statement reveals is the dilution of military power of the intervening nation or nations if they regularly engage their forces in peacekeeping operations. Since military forces are optimized to fight conventional wars, sustained periods of exposure to low intensity operations such as peacekeeping or counter-insurgency operations reduces their ability to fight conventional wars. Nations also hesitate to deploy their best units in such conditions because it is considered to be too risky to deploy them for such tasks and kept as a hedge against other imminent contingencies:

“However, deploying the entire 101<sup>st</sup> Division to Rwanda would have been excessive and would have deprived the United States of its premier air assault assets for other contingencies.”<sup>20</sup>

Therefore, a nation state would only deploy its premier assets in situations which would be deemed to be of national interest, implying that while an ethnic conflict in a far off land may be important for humanitarian reasons or against international law they are not to be deemed worthy of such help. Additionally, whatever help would be sent at a lower efficiency because they are considered to be of lower priority:

“If anything, it is likely that humanitarian interventions would be conducted with comparatively less efficiency than traditional interventions because they are deemed of lower priority by both military and political officials.”<sup>21</sup>

In case of the military intervention in Rwanda, Kuperman argues that U.S. President Bill Clinton was not aware that ‘genocide’ was imminent. While ample indications were present that indicated that large scale ethnic violence was imminent, the worst case projected scenarios of possible fatalities did not warrant such a military intervention. Thus, under ideal circumstances when the UNSC members agree, that ethnic violence capable of claiming thousands of lives is imminent, preventive intervention is not considered a plausible option for reasons of sovereignty, practicality, cost and own national interests. Mostly, such common agreement is rare with Security Council members differing on whether a conflict is ethnic or

simply an internal affair such as a political civil war, further impeding action in such situations. National views on conflicts are naturally subject to a nation's interests.

When the military considerations mentioned above are added to such uncertainty about the existence of ethnic conflict and subsequently its escalation to the level of a genocide (definitions of which vary), it is understandable why a nation state would be reluctant to intervene and put its national assets for a crusade which has questionable benefits to it. As was aptly put by a western military aide during the Rwanda crisis to Allan Thomas which he mentions in his book, 'The Media and the Rwanda Genocide':

“A representative of one major power came to me within the first weeks of the genocide and said quite clearly that, after doing an assessment, they had decided that they were not going to come and stop the carnage. There were bodies all over. We were already burning bodies with diesel fuel, because of the fear of disease, the smell and the wild dogs. This representative said, ‘You know, this country is of no strategic value. Geographically, it provides us nothing. Its not even worth putting a radar station here. Economically it's nothing, because there's no strategic resources, only tea and coffee, and the bottom is falling out of those markets.’

This person said, ‘In fact what there's too much of here is people. Well, we're not going to come because of people.’ In quantifying that, he went on to say that his government could only reconsider its decision not to intervene if for every one of its soldiers either killed or injured, there would be an equivalent of 85,000 dead Rwandans.”<sup>22</sup>

A nation state at its heart is therefore hesitant to intervene in any conflict or peacekeeping operation where it does not have direct or tangible interests. Kuperman's contention therefore, that intervention in Rwanda did not occur because of lack of sufficient warning is incomplete at best. While genocide as defined by Kuperman and indeed by many in international policy making circles may not have been certain, it was certainly clear that some form of major ethnic conflict was imminent to the local UN Peacekeeping forces under Romeo Dallaire. An example of such was the infamous 'Genocide Fax' from Dallaire to Department of Peacekeeping Operations in New York on 11 January, 1994 based on intelligence by a member of the Interahamwe, warning of a plan to carry out the extermination of Tutsi by provoking a civil war; details of weapons caches being collected for the planned violence were also given.<sup>23</sup>

Such ethnic violence not amounting to genocide would still constitute a grave breach of international humanitarian law as mentioned above, and should have technically been solid grounds for the UN Security Council to launch a preventive intervention into Rwanda. However, since more practical matters related to self interests of a state often govern the deployment of such interventions, some of which are given above, nation states as they exist today within the framework of the UN cannot be expected to reliably uphold UN's own charter. Therefore, Kuperman's argument that an 'imminent genocide' was not known is a flimsy argument at best for the United States or any other member of the UN Security Council to shirk from its responsibility towards keeping the collective peace.

## **5. CROSSING THE 'THRESHOLD'**

In the light of the above, it is no surprise that even after the genocide began on April 7, and it was clear that the ethnic violence that had broken out in Rwanda was pre-planned and was being carried out with

the intention of exterminating another ethnic group, thus tantamount to genocide, attempts were made to prevent labeling it as such.<sup>24</sup> This was done to avoid the moral and legal pressure of having to intervene to stop genocide.

It is however, a matter of debate as to what exactly constitutes a genocide. As per the definition given above, even the death of a single man could constitute genocide. However, that is not sufficient to launch an intervention into a foreign land. It is clear that as per UN humanitarian law, the ethnic conflict alone should have been enough to launch a peacekeeping mission with a mandate to ‘aggressively intervene’.

The question, still stands however, that did the events in Rwanda demand a pre-emptive intervention ‘as per accepted standards of international jurisprudence’? After the UN General Assembly Resolution of 1948, the International Criminal Court (ICC) has also refrained from putting a number of deaths as a criteria for defining genocide. Article 6 of the Rome Statute of the ICC states that “Genocide” means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such a targeted killing of any group of individuals<sup>25</sup>

It is important that a number should not be assigned to the term genocide because often war or other man made calamities may cause the deaths of a large number of people. Genocide my on the other hand often involve the killing of a small group, yet genocide is considered more heinous because of it very nature.<sup>26</sup> It is feared that if the the literal interpretation of the law or a standard lowering the threshold of deaths is commonly used to judge a situation genocidal, then the term would be freely thrown around and the international community may be forced to act too soon in too many situations not demanding an intervention.<sup>27</sup>

The dangers of a high threshold however, are far greater than non-intervention as Rwanda too vividly demonstrates. A high threshold will delay a response for preventive action; and only preventive action can avoid the consequences of a genocide. However, the definition of a high threshold is commonly used to define genocide and such a threshold is often extended to suit national interests.

The ‘threshold’ definition of genocide is commonly used to avoid intervention by reluctant states. During the Rwanda genocide, Clinton administration officials were categorically instructed to use the term ‘acts of genocide’ instead of ‘genocide’. This use of ambiguous terminology was intentional and stemmed from a desire to prevent involvement in a difficult political situation of intervening in the internal affairs of a foreign country.<sup>28</sup> The Rwandese example, therefore, clearly illustrates that nations states by their very nature will use a multitude of excuses to avoid getting involved in a situation deemed be of zero positive yield to their national interests even though such situations may be gravely violating international legal and human rights norms. Such excuses may range from not classifying or hesitation in classifying a genocide as such; instead calling it as an ‘ethnic conflict’ or as ‘acts of genocide’ and citing lack of prior intelligence to avoid launching an intervention.

## **6. LIMITS OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION OR IMAGINATION**

A host of political and strategic handicaps may constrain the deployment and positioning of a peacekeeping force. Such handicaps have been carefully studied and brought across by Alan Kuperman. In his book ‘The Limits of Humanitarian Intervention: Genocide in Rwanda’, he closely examines the possible access routes and bases from which a hypothetised US peacekeeping mission could have been launched into Rwanda.



Since Rwanda is a landlocked country, a rapid deployment of forces would require a military airlift. The study therefore takes into account the weight of the possible US military units which would likely have been airlifted into the region, the number of troops which would have been required to quell violence on a country-wide scale, the supporting equipment which would have been required such as vehicles and helicopters, and most importantly the logistical support which such a force would have required; this is compared to the available military airlift consisting of different combinations of strategic military transports such as the C-5 Galaxy and the then in service, C-141 Starlifter.<sup>29</sup> The problems facing such an operation such as the ability to transport the thousands of tons of equipment in face of the logistical limitations of local airfields as well as the land locked and remote location of the theater are exhaustively discussed.<sup>30</sup>

The entire analysis, however, takes the U.S. in isolation as a sole peacekeeping force in the world. The very title of the book suggests that U.S. strategic and military limitations when operating at extended distances from the U.S. homeland form the basis of global and indeed UN's limitations when conducting humanitarian peacekeeping missions; the entire research also suggests that the U.S. should act unilaterally while conducting humanitarian missions. The force deployments and hypothetical scenarios are depicted accordingly.

While, it cannot be denied that the U.S. is a major world power and arguably the most powerful member of the UN, the US should not be involved unilaterally in any such peacekeeping endeavour. Such an action like Operation Turquoise under French Command is the very anti-thesis of the spirit of the UN; it thus stands to lose credibility both internationally as well as locally.

It would have been much wiser to involve and discuss involvement of militaries from Rwanda's neighboring countries as UN peacekeepers. Such a force would not be as capable as those of major world powers, but they could certainly avoid the extended logistics, as well as be able to deploy larger forces in a much shorter time than forces deployed by distant major powers. It would also ease barriers of language and culture between the peacekeeping forces and locals; the former are important factors in any peacekeeping operation.

Moreover, Belgium and France who were most forthcoming in sending troops to Rwanda have a long colonial past in the region. While Belgium was the colonial master of Rwanda and Congo and was widely despised by the Hutu for favouring the Tutsi during colonial rule, French was the official language of the Hutu regime and the latter enjoyed close military and political ties with France. French role in the genocide has already been described earlier, and therefore it is not surprising that there was a lack of trust between French and the Tutsi led RPF. It is also no coincidence that after the shooting down of President Habyarimana's plane on April 6, a contingent of ten Belgian para commandos escorting Prime Minister Agathe Uwilingiyimana were made to surrender their weapons by the Presidential Guard and murdered in cold blood.<sup>31</sup> While apparently the reason for the assassination of Belgian soldiers was to force them to withdraw their troops based on the lesson derived from the American experience in Somalia - "If you kill them, they will leave";<sup>32</sup> it is certain that the decision of killing Belgians over Ghanians who were also a part of the Prime Minister's security detail was at least partly motivated because of the entrenched hatred for the former in the minds of the Hutu extremists. Belgium and France thus made poor candidates for peacekeeping operations in Rwanda-Congo because of their historical legacy, yet they were the most forthcoming in providing troops because of their national need to protect their economic and strategic interests in the region.

It can be argued that most of the countries adjoining Rwanda have relatively small and/or ineffective military forces; additionally the regional militaries' effectiveness is further undermined by the prevalence of rampant factionalism and corruption. This state of affairs is typical of most countries in sub-Saharan Africa; South Africa is a notable exception. This drawback can be remedied to a great extent by mixing up such regional forces with a few elite troops from powerful militaries which could also provide the leadership of such composite forces. Thus peacekeeping forces consisting primarily from local countries would provide the bulk of the manpower and deploy at short notice with limited need for extensive logistic support.

This is all the more important as peacekeeping operations are not traditional military operations but rather policing operations. They may be an overlap where certain military capabilities are useful or even essential in carrying out policing tasks, but peacekeeping is primarily policing and maintaining the peace rather than acting as a military occupation force. Unfortunately, this is exactly how, Alan Kuperman deals with the subject of a hypothetical U.S. intervention to prevent a genocide in Rwanda and supports his argument by quoting the study of James T. Quinlivan:

“Given Rwanda’s 1994 population of about 8 million, the force requirement would have been 80,000–160,000 troops. That is far more than would have been feasible politically or logistically, considering that it represents 10 to 20 percent of all active duty U.S. soldiers and marines and a much higher percentage of the combat troops among them. However, it is important to emphasize that Quinlivan’s study focuses on full-blown policing operations. By contrast, operations merely to secure an area and prevent large-scale violence require a smaller presence. On the low extreme, France’s Operation Turquoise was able to employ a density of less than 1.5 troops per thousand of population in the Safe Humanitarian Zone because it deployed after most Tutsi had been killed.”<sup>33</sup>

It is clear that the nature of the intervention that Kuperman contemplates and spends much time discussing and evaluating is more along the lines of a military occupation and pacification of a full blown civil war. While, the argument Kuperman gives is to debate what ‘the US could have done after genocide broke out’. The idea on the contrary has to be deterrence of such a civil war by the mere presence of UN troops. While Kuperman agrees, that prevention was the only way out, yet he discusses only what the U.S. could have done and not what the UN acting together could have done.

A deterrent presence by UN troops as mentioned above would require a far fewer number of troops than those anticipated in the scenario above. It is also important to point out that Kuperman acknowledges that a small force of 3,400 French led troops with a low density of 1.5 troops per thousand population was effective when deployed.<sup>34</sup> Ideally, non-regional players should have a supporting role of filling in ‘capability niches’ which cannot be filled in by the regional peacekeeping troops under a UN mandate. A full fledged military operation led by a single nation would dilute the legitimacy of the mission, and would be more costly than it needs to be by making it a military instead of a policing operation.

An argument against the method of intervention described above is the example of the Srebrenica Massacre of July 11-13, 1995 when Bosnian Serb Army units under General Mladić surrounded 370 U.N Dutch peacekeepers in a UN “safe zone” protecting Bosnian muslims. The U.N. troops were forced to surrender their weapons by the Serbs who then proceeded to kill 8,000 muslim men and boys.<sup>35</sup> This example goes against the logic given above, atleast superficially.

However, the situation in Rwanda was very different from that in Bosnia. The Serbs were far better equipped and trained than any Rwandese military unit. Moreover, the Dutch peacekeepers' three requests to the UN command for air support were denied.<sup>36</sup> This lack of aggressive action by NATO forces under UN command encouraged Serb General Ratko Mladic to hold the heavily outnumbered Dutch peacekeepers hostage and force the evacuation of the town of Srebrenica. Therefore, the Srebrenica Massacre is more an example of the failure of UN command structure to aggressively respond to the ground situation, reluctance or unwillingness of Peacekeeping forces to risk their lives for those they do not consider 'their own', an unclear mandate of peacekeeping forces who are restrained from engaging aggressors because of their 'neutrality' and a fear of taking sides or intruding upon a nation's sovereignty. These problems have always plagued UN peacekeeping missions since their inception.

The roots of these problems stem from the very idea of absolute sovereignty of a state and the traditional approach of the states to view conflicts in another land as not being their wars. This partly explains why the Dutch troops did not fight as they would have had they been defending their own country, it also contributes to the UN peacekeepers' reputation that they 'cut and run' when the going gets tough.<sup>37</sup> This has the obvious consequence of further reducing their deterrence value. These answers to these deep rooted problems lie in the nature of the relationship between the United Nations and its member states.

Another argument which Kuperman in the article 'The Moral Hazard of Humanitarian Intervention: Lessons from the Balkans' makes is that emerging trend of humanitarian interventions is that they actually increase the number of casualties in a civil war. The argument therefore supports non-intervention in any potentially genocidal conflict. On a philosophical level such an argument heads towards national sovereignty and away from ideas of strengthening international organisations established for international peace.

## **7. BOSNIA AND RWANDA – A COMPARISON**

A very interesting comparative case in point are the almost simultaneous series of events in Bosnia where an ethnic conflict was looming and the displacement of hundreds of thousands of refugees was underway. The western response in the Balkans was however, markedly different from that in Rwanda. A robust military response ensured that the Serbs were unable to carry out ethnic cleansing on as large a scale as they would have wanted to. While there were events like the Srebrenica massacre which ironically also involved Dutch peacekeepers like the ones killed in Rwanda, it was never used as an argument to withdraw the military deployment like it was made in Rwanda. Moreover, it was never said that the military deployment in the Balkans aggravated the ethnic crisis or in any way gave a 'casus belli' to the Serbs involved in ethnic cleansing.

While it is clear that a large enough military force like the one described by Kuperman would probably never be politically feasible, yet any military force certainly has a deterrent effect on any state planning on engaging in genocide or ethnic cleansing. This became evident because of NATO military intervention in the Balkans. It is more important, however, to understand why so many western nations agreed to send significant military forces to the Balkans, in a conflict which clearly had a significantly lower human cost than which happened in Rwanda.

The Balkans region was of a far greater geo-strategic value than land-locked Rwanda located in Sub-Saharan Africa. The Balkans formed the soft under belly of the former eastern bloc which at this time

was passing through turmoil. The opportunity presented the west with a splendid opportunity to project military power in the region and expand its geo-political foot print while sending a strong military signal to Russia. Rwanda on the other hand provided no such benefits, being a land locked country with very limited economic or geo-political potential. It is clear, therefore, by this example that the member states of the United Nations have motivations other than implementing the ideals on which the United Nations were formed.

## **8. CONCLUSION - PARAMOUNTCY OF NATIONAL INTERESTS**

This research paper unearths a far deeper philosophical problem which confronts the international community and the very idea of the United Nations and that National interests continue to occupy paramountcy in the view of the nation state. The ideas of sovereignty are used to maintain the paramountcy of national interests over the needs of global security. The question that raises itself is that how can an international organisation be responsible for and maintain peace when its members being sovereign states think first for their own selfish interests as and then, if they find it convenient, for international peace. The members cannot really be faulted for doing so as they are independent sovereign states first and foremost before being members of any international organisation. International peace, therefore, is a luxury of citizens of a nation state, not a necessity until it directly affects them or their national interest. This approach is incompatible with the interests of an increasingly globalised world. The veto power of the UN Security Council permanent members is arguably the greatest systemic manifestation of a superiority of state interests over international ones; a country may therefore prevent the UNSC from acting and overrule the majority to protect its own national interests. The UN Security Council is a relic of the Second World War and a forum for furthering narrow national interests rather than defending international peace which its founding fathers intended it to be.

The national interests of the constituent nations therefore continue to undermine the values and objectives of the United Nations which stand up for the Kantian ideas of 'Collective Peace'. History has taught us that failure of the ideal of collective peace will result in human suffering.

### *Footnotes*

- <sup>1</sup> Genser, Jared, *The United Nations Security Council in the Age of Human Rights*, Cambridge University Press, 2014, pp 47.
- <sup>2</sup> UN Security Council Resolution 918.
- <sup>3</sup> Schweigman, David, *The Authority of the Security Council Under Chapter VII of the UN Charter: Legal Limits and the Role of the International Court of Justice*, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2001, pp 135.
- <sup>4</sup> UN Security Council Resolution 929.
- <sup>5</sup> Fleitz, Frederick H., *Peacekeeping Fiascoes of the 1990s: Causes, Solutions, and U.S. Interests*, Greenwood Publishing Group, 2002, pp 156.
- <sup>6</sup> Kuperman, Alan J., *The Limits of Humanitarian Intervention: Genocide in Rwanda*, Brookings Institution Press, Washington D.C., 2001, pp 21.
- <sup>7</sup> *Ibid.* pp 20.

- 8 Prunier, Gérard. Operation Turquoise: A Humanitarian Escape, in Adelman, Howard and Suhrke, Astri (eds). *The Path of a Genocide. The Rwanda Crisis from Uganda to Zaire*, New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction, 1999. pp 303.
- 9 Murphy, Sean D., *Humanitarian Intervention: The United Nations in an Evolving World Order*, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1996, pp 248.
- 10 Midlarsky, Manus I., *The Killing Trap: Genocide in the Twentieth Century*, Cambridge University Press, 2005, pp 230.
- 11 Testimony of Janvier Afrika, a member of the Interahamwe quoted in Wallis, Andrew, *Silent Accomplice: The Untold Story of France’s Role in the Rwandan Genocide*, I.B.Tauris, 2014, pp 58-59.
- 12 Kaufman, Stuart J., *Modern Hatreds: The Symbolic politics of ethnic war*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 2001, pp 17.
- 13 Stone, Dan, *The Oxford Handbook of Postwar European History*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012, pp 142.
- 14 Stiglmayer, Alexandra, *Mass Rape: The War Against Women in Bosnia-Herzegovina*, University of Nebraska Press, 1994, pp 206.
- 15 UN Security Council Report S/1994/674, 27 May, 1994.
- 16 UN general Assembly Resolution 260 (III), Article II, Prevention and Punishment of the crime of Genocide, 9 December, 1948, pp 174.
- 17 Kuperman, Alan J., *The Limits of Humanitarian Intervention: Genocide in Rwanda*, Brookings Institution Press, Washington D.C., 2001, pp 27.
- 18 Ibid, pp 85.
- 19 Ibid, pp 3.
- 20 Ibid, pp 65-66.
- 21 Ibid, pp 62.
- 22 Anonymous Western military aide quoted in Thompson, Allan, *The Media and the Rwanda Genocide*, IDRC, 2007, pp 13.
- 23 Fax (the genocide fax) from Gen Roméo Dallaire to Gen Baril, UNDPKO, 11 January, 1994.
- 24 Jehl, Douglas, Officials Told to Avoid Calling Rwanda Killings ‘Genocide’, *The New York Times*, June 10, 1994. See also Ronayne, Peter, *Never Again?: The United States and the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide Since the Holocaust*, Rowman & Littlefield, 2001, pp 172.
- 25 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Article 6, pp 3.
- 26 Simon, Thomas W., *The Laws of Genocide: Prescriptions for a Just World*, Greenwood Publishing Group, 2007, pp 60.
- 27 Ibid.
- 28 Negash, Girma, *Apologia Politica: States & Their Apologies by Proxy*, Lexington Books, 2006, pp 88.
- 29 Kuperman, Alan J., *The Limits of Humanitarian Intervention: Genocide in Rwanda*, Brookings Institution Press, Washington D.C., 2001, pp 56.

- <sup>30</sup> Ibid, pp 57.
- <sup>31</sup> Newton, Michael, Famous Assassinations in World History: An Encyclopedia [2 volumes], ABC-CLIO, 2014, pp 591.
- <sup>32</sup> Stanton, Gregory H., The Rwandan Genocide: Why Early Warning Failed, Journal of African Conflicts and Peace Studies, University of South Florida, Vol. 1, Issue 2, 2009, pp 6-25.
- <sup>33</sup> Kuperman, Alan J., The Limits of Humanitarian Intervention: Genocide in Rwanda, Brookings Institution Press, Washington D.C., 2001, pp 63-64.
- <sup>34</sup> Ibid, pp 50.
- <sup>35</sup> Binet, Laurence, MSF and Srebrenica, 1993-2003, Médecins Sans Frontières, 2015, pp 132.
- <sup>36</sup> Bartrop, Paul R. and Jacobs, Steven Leonard, Modern Genocide: The Definitive Resource and Document Collection [4 volumes]: The Definitive Resource and Document Collection, ABC-CLIO, 2014, pp 186.
- <sup>37</sup> Genser, Jared, The United Nations Security Council in the Age of Human Rights, Cambridge University Press, 2014.